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EDITOR :
Dr. H. C. BHAYANI



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
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Dr. H. C. Bhayani 1-

1 Detachment and Liberation in Indian Philosophy and its impact on Modern Times—its relevance. *

—Dr. H. M. Joshi, Baroda.

The roots of Indian philosophy—Darshanas—are lying in Rigveda, Tantra and Āgamas. It is difficult to decide and fix which is earlier and which is later in historical sequence. It is generally accepted that Rigveda is the first poetry of the whole world. It is said that the language of Rigveda is not entirely literal and therefore it does not depict factual Reality. Jain philosophers attempt to trace their roots and origin in Rigveda then on the other hand learned scholars of Tantra literature hold that the tradition of Tantra emerged as parallel with Vedic tradition. Vedas as well as Tantras discuss and lay down the principles of subtle Individual and Reality. Their articulation is symbolic. This is learnt from the 'Nirukta' of Yaska also.

In the contemplative tradition of India there are clearly two paths suggested for the realization of the supreme aim of life. Sages and philosophers have tested them in practise. The first path is that of penance and austerity and the second path is that of love and devotion. It is possible to obtain practical guidance as well as literature regarding these two paths in ancient cultures of Greece, Iran, Rome and China. Thinkers, philosophers and sages such as Pythagoras, Diogenes, Confucious, Lao Tze, Plotinus, Asho Zarathustra have laid down the paths of austerity and friendship.

In Upanishads, later literature of Buddhism and Jainism the rigid principles and practices of realization of goals have been enunciated. As a result certain key-concepts which are propounded may be formulated as follows, (1) Thought or principle without practise are meaningless, (2) In different faculties and parts of personality such as body, mind, feeling will, contemplation and activity it is essential to establish determination, Dharma, Permanent principle and equanimity, (3) Whatever is thought and done by person makes an impact upon his Individuality and his surroundings, (4) Human life is not separate and divided component but it has continuous relation with social, natural and worldly life, (5) The goals of Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Moksha mould human life and society in its distinct phases.

These four aims have significantly contributed to social, religious and philosophical development of India. Therefore it is necessary to understand

* Kasturbhai Memorial Lecture. 1989-90.

its analysis. An attempt is made to lay down these ideals from linguistic, special, and moral points of views. 'Dharma' and 'Moksha' are shown their meanings and their concepts keeping in view their time and circumstance. Uniformity of nature, truth, Karma, ritual, swadharma, sect, creed and supreme aim of life are the diverse meanings of the term 'Dharma'. There have been several meanings and definitions of the term 'Dharma' shown in Sruti, Smriti, Purana and Darshana. Prescriptive, performative, as matters of duty, rule, categorical imperative, desireless action have been its several meanings. In similar manner it would be desirable to bring out the diverse aim of 'Liberation' and its methods.

In Vedic literature and culture the meaning of liberation was harmony, purity of mind, goodness, light, realization of principle of welfare and over coming of death. These meanings are expressed in the following, 'संनद्धश्च सवदश्च सवामनासि जानताम् ।' 'सम्यग्यो अभि' स्वयं त आराः नाभिभिवाऽमितः ।'

Moreover, Worship fire while coming together, our mind, heart and work together. Like spokes in the wheel you will also move and join the centre. In Yajurveda Mantra ending as 'May our mind be led towards good decisions and will'. This is its prayer. Moreover in Purusha Shukta 'त्वमेवदित्वाति मृत्युमेति नान्यदन्वाः विद्यते अयनाय It is expressed as 'by knowing which one crosses over sansar forming life and death. There is no other way of attaining liberation.' Later during Upanishadic period it is said in Isha, 'Enjoy by renouncing it तेन त्यक्तेन भुजिथाः the idea of detachment is suggested. Along with this idea of detachment it is also suggested to live for hundred years by performing action. Of course in certain dialogues of Upanishads and certain stories of Puranas the ideals of other-worldliness, ephemerality of the world and life and to go bodily to heaven have been expressed. However, by and large, the ideals of sanyasa and liberation are not elaborated in the Upanishads. They form part of the philosophical idea but they are not discussed in detail in the Upanishads as they are dealt with as an independent topic in later Darshanas.

Certain sages and teacher had accepted the life-long ideal of detachment and Sanyāsa as Dharma. But it was not widespread and common. Later in Epic, Purānas, and in Darshanas these ideas were given dominance. The vow of Bhishma, going to forest, austerities, renunciation and absolute liberation are instances to give absolute value to state of detachment. Of course in Rāmāyana the idea of equity is suggested in the Dharma of the ruler. However during that time owing to invasion of external race and peoples the Adhikār Bheda, that only certain caste-people can read Vedas,

had entered Hinduism. As a result those who were practising detachment and sanyasa were trying to reside away from society.

As the social and historical development took place there came about phases of activity and renunciation. The distinction between activity and renunciation or detachment is not rigid but just as the age of Vedic civilization was an age of activity and then later in Aranyakas and Upanishads the phase of contemplation and detachment occurred, in like manner one can see such phases in the development of civilization. The meaning of activity is at times restricted to religious rituals external mechanism and formal ceremony. This meaning is not proper. At one stage of civilization owing to the force of authority and under the influence of rigid caste-system, the ritualistic activity accelerated and there was violence of animals. At that time Buddhism and Jainism emerged as powerful forces and both the religions strongly opposed this 'activity'. They showed the meaning of true moral activity and the aim of moral life. This stage is quite significant in the history of Indian civilization because along with detachment it suggests the path of true religion.

In the concepts of Buddhist religion and Advait Vedānta the ideas of illusoriness and momentariness of life and the world can be observed, especially the impact of the life of Buddha is not limited to India but its influence can be seen throughout Asia and its people. This can be seen in its religions, painting, art and cultural history. In the Vedānta advocated by Bhartruhari, Gaudapāda and Śaṅkarāchārya there is an extreme of Indian philosophical concept. There is a defence of Upanishadic philosophy but from the point of view of the development of life, its main aim is shown as control by the method of detachment and renunciation.

In the literature of Purāṇ, Smṛiti and specially in Sāṅkhya philosophy the concept of liberation by proper discrimination is suggested since antiquity to modern times. In Jain philosophy also there is an emphasis on rigid self-discipline, control and discrimination. From one point of view in almost all systems of philosophy in India, mind, avidya and ego are regarded as main hurdles of liberation. In Sāṅkhya philosophy of Kapila and Ishwarkrishṇa it is thought that one can get long-standing liberation by realizing discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣha. This is also a path of austerity. In the Yoga-Darshana of Patañjali, a systematic path is recommended for this purpose. It leads to the state of Samādhi and it gets with the internal instruments and layers of mind and personality. When we are discussing the topic of liberation then it should be made clear that the desire to get liberation is a constant aspiration similar to

those of Dharma and Artha. It is not advisable to join it with logical and metaphysical reasoning. It is important to note that the human mind intends to get freedom from worldly misery of all the three Gunas and various other psychological hurdles. Its aspiration for transcendental value and higher mind is not only the mark of intellectual development but it is an endeavour of its essence as human being and its experience. It is true that in the history of philosophy the subject of liberation is associated with its ideology and contemplation. The concept of liberation of Jiva and Atman is related with the point of view of Truth and Reality.

An attempt is made to distinguish between freedom and liberation and it is said that freedom is a political ideal whereas liberation is philosophical and spiritual ideal. However from the psychological point of view every individual likes freedom and desire to get liberation is constant in humanity and it is this constant aspiration which ultimately leads human being towards the endeavour of liberation. As I said earlier man selects either austerity or love as an alternative and accepting the one makes an effort to get liberation. He either welcomes the hurdles appearing on the way by including it or by renouncing it as a stage in human progress. As contemporary British philosopher Wittgenstein says that the ladder through which man achieves the aim is to be ultimately thrown away, similarly the stages through which man attains the aim of liberation are on the one hand done away with and he forgets the stages after having realised it. He even attempts to destroy the memory of it. On the other hand he tries to include, change and transform the hurdles and instruments of liberation.

From philosophical point of view Jaina philosophy attempts to expound contemplative and pragmatic system as well as a way of conduct to resolve the bond and internal 'Kashāy' of individual by the principle of Dravya and consciousness. It establishes the Reality of Matter and Consciousness and propounds Aṇu-Vrata and Mahā-Vrata to eliminate ignorance, passion, desire and Karma. So long as Jiva is not removed from the object it is not possible to get liberation from attachment of the object. In Sāṅkhya philosophy this whole vicious circle is called 'Prakṛiti' and to dissociate consciousness from Prakṛiti the path of Yoga has been suggested. Nature is complex and it is not easy to get detached from its attachment and even if one calls it a detachment it may prove to be artificial. Therefore till one is totally detached from it, real liberation is not possible. This was the ambition of ancient person to get liberation from the results of Prakṛiti. It was a struggle not only of the Middle-age Man but it is a directive for the progress of Modern Man.

In Reality the moral and religious factor depend upon the victory of Purusha over the regulation of Prakriti. For that purpose the hypothesis of God or Supreme Reality is not required. It is the moral desire of man and it is in its concretisation that human effort is engaged incessantly. One cannot be dogmatic regarding the object of liberation. As we evidently see that liberation is an inner inspiration and craving of human person it cannot be circumscribed within mental and cognitive limits. It is not that one can get liberation by following only a particular path and one cannot get it if one does not follow a specific path and approach of liberation. Just as to become moral it is not proper a norm and imperative from outside and if it is imposed in that manner then it cannot spread and imbibe in mind of the individual, and in the system of social life. The it would be a superficial endeavour of man. For that purpose man gives sacrifice, he gives away everything and he is absorbed in day and night to realise it. This would never happen had it been a superficial imposition and make-belief. If morality is artificial then just as in field of art, painting, music and sculpture persons are inclined to merge in the object and absorb themselves in them, morality would not hold the attention of moral persons and attract to engage them. In reality it is not so. There are persons in the world who occupy themselves in moral endeavour and attempt to identify with moral norms and values in order to better social, cultural and human factors of life and the world. This fact shows that to get liberation is a moral endeavour. In Jain philosophy as well as in Sankhya the moral endeavour is articulated in which Jiva and Purusha control and win over the material element and its complexity by the help of consciousness.

In order to realise moral effort it is essential to show the guideline to be followed by human will in accordance with the circumstances of things, objects and nature. By attaining control and victory over nature circumstances conscious human being obtains this guideline. In Buddhist and Jain religions internal passions and desires in human being work as natural elements in the Jiva. For achieving control over them the path of Shila and Nirjara in Buddhist and Jain religions respectively have been propounded. In Indian tradition it may be observed that when ever a new path is suggested in path either of knowledge or that Action then it goes to the extreme. This can be observed in the lives of Gautam Buddha and Lord Mahavir. In brief this path of discipline clearly shows that the cultivation of Shila, control and to burn the Kashāya and Karma are possible in the path of liberation of Man. Later the Yoga of Patanjali lends support to this possibility. In Vedānta philosophy also mind, ego, projection of conscious Vrittis, Adhyāsa work as hurdles in the liberation of human person.

The purport of this discussion is that it is essential and natural in human life and progress that human person aspires for liberation and it does not require any hypothesis or philosophical principle to pursue this craving. Of course it does not negate the intellectual effort for philosophical principle. All that it is said is that there is no clining to one principle of liberation for attaining it. Śaṅkarāchārya calls it 'Mumukshatva' and holds it essential for one who desires knowledge of Reality. It is not certain where this aspiration for liberation would lead to and which hypothesis. At one stage of effort one may believe that the basis of desire to get liberation lies in getting detachment from misery and evil. Human person intends to get liberation from suffering, pain, torture and evil found in life. It is the path of knowledge which helps him in getting liberation from suffering and evil. As Spinoza has said that Man is afraid constantly because of his ignorance of the causes of events of the world. Once he knows the true cause of these events in the world he will not have a false imagination about harming and creating chaos in society. We may take the example of solar or lunar eclipse in this connection. Eclipse is regarded as an evil phenomenon from religious point of view, but if the cause of eclipse is known properly then there is nothing fearful about it. Similarly one can think about physical and mental illness. Human being will be immensely benefited by knowing its true cause.

Thus the path of knowledge opens the door of liberation for human being. This possibility requires to be properly thought. Just as the bonds of nature can be resolved by discovering principle behind its working, instrument and force other than nature and by controlling it one can get true liberation, similarly by the supposition and development of mind, matter and spirit, human being reflects about the possibility of achieving liberation. Man is anxious to know at certain stage of his development the fact of liberation and the distinction between mind, matter and consciousness. Besides that there are feeling, emotion, sentiment, will-power and other mental dispositions. Liberation does not mean that other ancillary mental states are entirely destroyed.

So long as positive consciousness and liberation are not attained, the negative elements such as pain and passivity continue to remain. So long as cause and effect are not properly resolved, its remnants and other subsidiary elements continue to have their impact. If the distinction between modes of consciousness and pure consciousness is understood properly then so long as the modes of consciousness (Chitta Vrittis) continue to persist the individual does not experience liberation. A person may have the knowledge of liberation, but

this knowledge and its mental acceptance are not equivalent to its realization. If its knowledge is considered to be significant the problem of error, illusion, distortion and super-imposition should be properly thought over by the seeker of liberation.

In philosophical tradition and in the history of philosophy the principles of Advaita Vedānta and Vishishtādvaita philosophies have been propounded later in time. However their sources can be observed in Shruti and Smṛiti literature. One can observe the sources of its principles in Bhagavad Geeta, Pancharatra and Brahma Sutra. In this context a question arises as regards the necessity of presupposing the principles of Absolute Brahman in Advaita Vedānta and in Vishishtādvaita. We had seen earlier that if the seeker of liberation is occupied in removing errors and illusion then he will not remain satisfied by abolition of modes of consciousness, desire and passions alone, but he will be eager to annihilate ego and grasp the essence of self. Just as in Jain philosophy 'Kevali Jnana' is regarded as highest, knowledge and consciousness are held to be supreme, similarly believing the self to be Transcendent he can regard liberation as its final limit. Advaita Vedānta holds its experience of liberation to be integral and comprehensive. Human being who realizes this experience regards its consciousness which is universal as Reality which transcends ego. Having transcended egoistic consciousness it attempts to determine the steps for establishing identity with Absolute Brahman.

Self is abiding and pure consciousness and it is held to be permanent. It is self-liberated and it experiences bliss on that account. The bliss and satisfaction which are experienced here in knowledge by discrimination and identity. This experience in Advaita Vedānta stands with certainty. Of course there are differences of opinion as regards the nature of knowledge and ignorance (Avidyā) yet as regards liberation there is the experience which remains certain which is commonly felt. It is necessary to discuss its nature as there is unique concept of self prevailing in different philosophical tendencies and among philosophers owing to social, historical and cultural influences. For instance, according to Jain philosophy there is power of activity in the Jiva. There are in the Jiva power of knowledge, effort, faith and will-power. These are inseparably related with its essence. On the contrary according to Sankhya philosophy Purusha is inactive. Again in Jain philosophy there are influences (samskaras) in Jiva according to the way in which it thinks and these influences are stored in the subtle body called 'Pudgala' and after death this subtle body is carried forward to another birth. There is no place in the world where Jiva does not exist either in gross or in subtle body.

The tradition of Sāṅkhya-Yoga is different from Jain tradition. There is no expansion or contraction in consciousness and it does not accept the qualification of the substance. In Jain tradition there is merit or demerit in the nature of Jīva and consequently there is decrease or increase of qualities. However this is not accepted in Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition, as the consciousness has no agency of action or it does not enjoy the merit or demerit. It does not accept the quality or Dharma as possessed by Puruṣa.

The problem of elimination of ego, 'I' in the experience of liberation ought to be thought over. This was done by Acharyas in the age of Darśana in Middle ages. Moreover they have also discussed the nature of Supreme Reality, its power, its grace and the reason why it is essential to presuppose such Transcendent Reality. It is of course essential to note what has been thought over by Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Jain philosophy because later Darśanas have taken cognizance as a method and step in liberation. It is not possible to attain the state of identity as propounded in Vedānta without the help of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. From the point of view of liberation and its methods there have been three approaches in Indian philosophy, (1) Sāṅkhya-Yoga, (2) Advaita Vedānta and (3) Bhakti-Vedānta in which are included Rāmānujāchārya, Śrīkantha, Mahā Prabhū Chaitanya, Madhyachārya and Śrī Vallabhāchārya. In three Darśanas a state of liberation has been propounded and the seeker of liberation finds satisfaction in any one or all the three philosophies and experiences held by them as supreme. One who propounds the philosophy of liberation attempts to achieve this state of liberation and holds that the effort is fulfilled. Of course there are different problems regarding the nature of knowledge, knower and the elimination of Avidya raised and discussed in Advaita Vedānta and post-Vedāntin schools of Indian philosophy.

In Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Jain and Buddhist philosophies it is held that the activity of Prakṛit, lower Karmas, Ashrava and ignorance are removed as well as properly controlled by discriminative knowledge, detachment, will-power, character, faith and cultivation of positive moral virtues. This is an inevitable step of human being in way of controlling nature. It is possible that the seeker of liberation attains valuable satisfaction in this achievement and state of consciousness. In this connection when one goes beyond nature and attempts to identify with Puruṣa and consciousness then it is felt as if it is Universal consciousness, Hiraṇyagarbha, Kevalijñāna and Reality called Brahman. A subject which cannot be predicated or given a quality or adjective, such a featureless Reality is called Absolute. To identify with such as Absolute is regarded as state of liberation. It is not true to say this is propounded in Advaita Vedānta alone. In Buddhist philosophy,

Madhyamika Darshana, Puranas, Shaiva Siddhanta and in Tantra such a Reality as attributeless and indeterminate has been propounded. It is probable that such a path takes the form of detachment, renunciation and static liberation. In Advaita Vedānta, especially in the philosophy of Śaṅkarāchārya there is over-emphasis on detachment and renunciation. The later Advaita-Vedāntins have adopted a middle-path attitude in this connection as they had to face the approach of devotion to Supreme Reality which was forceful after eleventh century in the country. However they have maintained the supremacy of the path of knowledge.

As the importance of the path of knowledge increased and action was held to be opposite of knowledge or a subordinate instrument, in Vishishtādvaita philosophy the dominance of the path of devotion was marked evidently. In Vishishtādvaita philosophy the Personal aspect of Supreme Brahman is propounded in a unique way. There is the relationship of inner love, surrender, utter selflessness between man and God. As a result the devotee develops the character of dispassionate, righteous and pure individuality. The devotee establishes with Personal Brahman the relationship of Saroopya, Sadharmya and Salokya by the method of Ātma-Nivedana (Self-surrender). There is the relationship of power between consciousness and Supreme Reality. Rāmānujāchārya does not accept the view that Jiva is totally absorbed in Brahman. There is the relational consciousness between Jiva and Brahman. In Tantra literature, Shākta Siddhanta and Shaiva Siddhanta the Transcendent truth of relational consciousness has been accepted. The person who attaches more importance to the path of devotion than those of knowledge and activity attempts to achieve liberation by this path and instrument alone.

It is natural that the philosophy in which a specific aim and view of liberation are regarded as supreme will hold other aims and instrument of liberation as inferior in comparison. In the fold of Advaita Vedānta the aim and instrument of liberation which is 'Knowledge' will be regarded as the most superior from the point of view of Advaita Vedānta. The above said three views and levels of Liberation will give satisfaction either at one stage or another to the seeker of liberation. These three achievements, realizations and its instruments will give proper responses to human beings in relation with its aspirations. Human person may achieve the experience as Jivan Mukta without establishing relationship with either Impersonal or Personal Brahman and may experience Purusha or Pure experience. This state of liberation is quite possible and legitimate at its level. It is not necessary to get rational justification or support of scripture as Prashthan Trayi for its

legitimising. It is to be regarded as an experience of the seeker of liberation. When for example in Bhagavad Geeta the state beyond the three Gunas is upheld and described then it is not necessary to build up its relationship with Purushottama.

The advocate of Impersonal Absolute will hold monistic position in which matter and consciousness are totally absorbed in Brahman. In order to support this position the specific devotion, Personality, Avatar and Personal God will be held to be of inferior position in comparison with Absolute Impersonal Brahman. Among modern Indian thinkers Dr. Radhakrishnan holds such a view. He writes in 'Hindu View of Life'. 'The worshippers of the Absolute are highest in rank, second to them are the worshippers of the personal God, then come the worshippers of incarnation like Rama, Krishna and Buddha, below them are those who worship ancestors, deities and sages, and lowest of all are the worshippers of petty forces and spirits.'⁶ As against the upholders of featureless Absolute, the devotees of personal Brahman who believe that true liberation consists in Sarupya, sālōkya and sādharma relationship with ultimately Real they will not be absolutely identical with Impersonal Absolute as final and ultimate. This is not the case in Hindu religion and philosophy alone. This is found among the votaries of Impersonal and Personal in the traditions of different great religions and philosophies of the world. Just as Jesus Christ says, 'I and my Father are one'. Mr. Eckhart (1260-1327 A. D.) utters certain sayings which are similar to "तत्त्वमसि" of Chhāndogya Upanishad. However in different context Jesus himself speaks differently, 'The Father is greater than I' 6-1. In Shvetāshvatar Upanishad it is said that Atman is a part of God and it is not identical with it.⁷

Moreover it cannot be said that those who have achieved liberation by devotion, love and surrendering to Personal God have got a different life-style from those persons who have achieved it by unity and identity with impersonal Brahman. In both the cases and persons one can observe detachment, discrimination, Jeevan-Mukti and totality of life. Those who have become great benevolent and visionary activists and saints have possessed among themselves the devotion to personal Absolute and intense love for God. It may be that keeping in view their religion and institution, their scriptures they may differ in external observance of rituals and religious practices. However those individuals who attained this realization have proved intensely beneficial for the welfare and progress of mankind.

When we are discussing about the aspiration of liberation through the experience of Personal and Impersonal Absolute then we should observe the

possibility of solipsistic liberation. In solipsistic liberation the Absolute is conceived as 'self-liberated' and the whole external world is reduced to the Absolute and it is believed that Absolute is nothing but the self. But this is a negative type of liberation. It is not the aspiration of self to get such a liberation. It is probable that in case of seeking for liberation and in devotion to personal God the self is denied and subsequently to reinforce this there is the permanent relation between self and Absolute. It is necessary to mention this as the Absolute has many aspects. In the state of liberation such as 'solipsistic liberation' one may feel totally absorbed in the self with the result that in such a state the rest of the aspects of Reality such as knowledge, life and value are lost sight of. Reality is here not looked upon as 'Object' but as pure subject and to conceive of it as given is forgotten by the self. Here the main object is considered to be the state of self and the measure and object of liberation are set aside. There is no object and its consciousness as well as Reality are negated. The seeker and aspirant of liberation is content with the solitary state of self and element such as the 'Other' is not accepted therein. However this position regarding Supreme Reality is defective for if that is the position regarding Supreme Reality then even Supreme Reality remains an object. Therein 'I' or self is required to be related with the Other. Even Nothingness as Supreme Reality is a predicate of Reality. Therefore it is not proper to find contentment in this state of liberation. It may be said that Lord Buddha recognised such a solipsistic state of liberation and in order to avoid it and let the seeker of liberation rise higher to realize the lofty object of liberation he exhorted his disciples, *सुखद्वारणं गच्छामि* or 'I go to the resort of the organisation.' There is an object distinct from self in case of liberation and this is the import of Lord Buddha exhorting his disciples.

There are three states of liberation—Jeevan Mukta, Identity with featureless Absolute and surrendering to Personal God; and in these three states of the aspirant of liberation one can observe certain common moral and elevatory characteristics conducive to abiding cultivation of self and other ideal values. These qualities are internal peace of mind, steadiness of purpose, equanimity, internal joy, friendliness and creative endeavour. It is difficult to say in advance which one of these three paths would be adopted and followed by the seeker of liberation to achieve his goal. It depends to a large extent upon the temperament and inclination of the individual. However it is to be borne in mind that in these different paths of liberation there are certain similarities which look upon and result from the endeavour and path of liberation as moral purification and social uplift. He would find contentment in the path of Jeevan Mukta and accepting the

nature of Supreme Reality he would cultivate and emanate distinct moral qualities. The meaning of this state of Jeevan Mukta is to achieve control over nature, knowledge of individuality and active ideal qualities. It is doubtless that by achieving the state of Jeevan Mukta various physical, vital and mental maladies and weaknesses are removed. The measures of resolving such illnesses, weaknesses and functional disorders are not only advocated in adequate philosophy of life and liberation but in modern philosophy of science, Holistic Psychology and Humanistic medical therapeutics as well. Several applied devices in social sciences and Humanistic philosophy are employed for individual and social upliftment. However these cures and their justification in principle do not adequately explain the experiences of mystics, saints and seekers of liberation. They do not sufficiently respond to the demands of aspirant of liberation.

These three fundamental endeavours of liberation can be classified under the philosophical principles of (1) Dualism or Pluralism, (2) Absolute Idealism and (3) Theistic Monism. These three principles and aim of realization satisfy alternatively the seeker of liberation. It is possible that owing to realization and resulting contentment the led to another seeker is not led to another kind of the state of liberation. Dualism or Pluralism indicate the possibility of Jeevan Mukta as the principle of liberation. Somebody may criticise it as insufficient but even while bearing this criticism the seeker may feel that it expresses adequately the aspiration of liberation. It supports the moral and valuational perfection. Sankhya, Jainism and to a certain extent Buddhist philosophy may be included in this approach. In modern times the concept of Jeevan Mukta has been largely accepted and specifically considered for altruistic and Humanistic ideals.

During Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries Indian religions in general and Hinduism in particular have evolved humanistic approaches to philosophical, moral and spiritual problems of human and collective life. Swami Sahajananda, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Rabindranath Tagore, Swami Vivekananda, Shri Raman Maharshi, Mahatma Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo have propounded their views of liberation as well as realization. They have thought even the issues of applying the concept of liberation and detachment to modern conflicting life, bodily and mental suffering, collective welfare and evils of mechanical, technological and conditioned social life. They have endeavoured to articulate how moral virtues and contemplative life can be reconciled with modern complexities of individual and social life. Modern Indian Renaissance in religion, philosophy, literature and science reveal a new avenue in Indian way of national culture and integration of life.

Modern life is not as simple as it was in ancient time and in Middle age. The progress of science, technology, modern inventions their applications in facilitating civilization and cultural communication have made modern life immensely complex. The necessity of moral detachment, purity and inner withdrawal have become imperative on account of modern complexity of life. Industrial revolution in Europe had had its major impact not only upon Europe but upon other countries in Asia and U. S. A. as well. Factories, Highpower industries, commercial agencies and technological agencies and technological advance have infiltrated the elements of routine, mechanical habits, boredom, fatigue and neurological maladjustments. To cope up with the routine of life in day-to-day matters modern man requires mental panacea for better adjustment. During last two hundred years people everywhere are trying to inhabit in urban environment. They are in search of better conditions of living, new avenues of livelihood and economic elevation. In modern times man has been enslaved by political ideologies and devices. New ways of achieving power, rule and Government have put immense pressure over the liberty of the individual and social groups. On the one hand there is authority trying to regiment individuals and groups, make them parts and units of larger organisation, minimising the status of the individual and on the other hand there is liberty without proper guideline ensuing deterioration in individual and collective life. In modern times human individual is required to forge a middle path between restraint of freedom and unbridled liberty. Such an intellectual effort needs aspiration to liberate from the forces of vital desires, organic passions, psychological ego, social reactions, inhibitions and dynamic myopia. Modern man is not only maladjusted from psychological point of view but is mentally deficient in comprehending the perspectives of life.

In current century nations of the world have witnessed two world-wars and its consequent massacre, loss of life of millions of people, their home, belongings, kith and kin. Even now the pangs of colossal tragedy are vibrating among the minds and lives of certain races and people. Unless a new way of life, Ethics, sense of 'Awareness' and integration of norms and values are brought to the mind of modern Man it is not possible to give abiding peace, security and way to experience Reality to mankind. The ancient path of Detachment as well as the values of Jeevan Mukta, identity with the Absolute and surrender to Supreme God are capable of rejuvenating the mind and heart of people in modern times. Modern world can no longer live by separation, divergence of creeds and dogmas of ideology. Modern Man requires a new sense of liberation which is not bound to particular system of thought, commitment and fixed system. True liberation consists in integrating, changing and transforming the methods

and steps of bringing discipline, rule and control over nature. In this direction modern thinkers of Renascent India have contributed radically to bring forward and mould human personality and society into free and creative spirit.

In modern thought and in the concept of detachment and liberation there is found distinct change in its outlook. Instead of scripture, text-book and Shruti, it is humanity as a whole, human individuality, nation and her solidarity which play the larger role. These ideas were dominant in one or another context previously but therein scripture, religious authority were given more importance. In modern India Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, Lokmanya Tilak, Radhakrishnan and Gandhiji have written commentaries on Upanishads, Brahma Sutras and Bhagavad Geeta. In their interpretations they do not consider religious authority as central and dominant. Various experiences, human potentialities, knowledge of ultimate Reality, states of self and Psychic Being, action in relation to society and nation and divergent paths to achieve knowledge and realization of aims of life have been taken into account by these thinkers and philosophers. They have considered modern India, her freedom, unity, culture, her national and international status in the world. They have gone beyond the considerations of caste, sex, religion and class. In fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a distinction was made between 'Maryādā Mārg' and 'Pushti Mārg' and it was said that certain caste and class did not deserve specific liberation. Such a distinction of class is abandoned in modern thought. Swami Vivekananda propounded the concept of *Daivdranārāyana* keeping in view the poor and downtrodden in India.

Lokmanya Tilak gave a national status to detached Karmayoga of Bhagvad Geetā. The vow of Non-violence in Jain philosophy was made applicable by Gnadhiji in national political life, aim of public welfare and in the technique of Satyagraha. Achārya Tulsi is advocating and attempting to put the doctrine of *Anu Vrata* on mass scale in its practise. Non-violence is not only an individual virtue but it is the most important instrument of collective welfare and benevolence. This truth was realized and practised for the uplift of people in modern times. The merit of compassion found in Buddhist philosophy was applied in matters of public life and interest and given specific significance. The United Nations Organisation has held as one of its noble aims as 'never to resort to war in solving the problems of mankind'. Having seen two world wars with its disastrous consequences and innumerable loss of life the leaders of the world decided not to wage war under any circumstance. During last four decades with the help of United Nations Organisation such a war has been averted and strained relations among nations have been eased. This is the most significant achievement in international relations in modern times.

The ideals of Sarvodaya, Loksangrha and collective welfare have influenced various institutions and society at large. In modern India the virtue of compassion, the ideal of Jeevan Mukta and concept of collective liberation have gained recognition in public work and welfare activities. This may not be perceived concretely but it can be seen in the aims adopted by thinkers and leaders working for national interest. Kedarnathji writes in his book 'Vivek ane Sadhana' that "The hope, desire and inclinations for which human being forgets his humanity is likely to harm all that is worth in human being. Men should recognise humanistic spirit and he should cultivate control, carefulness, patience and should endeavour for clear and safe way with egolessness and discrimination in all the instances of duty, activity, joy, interest, desire, will, feeling and reparation. He should not forget humanity, Human action and human religion are to be constantly remembered. The power of the universe has passed through God and from God it has reached human personality. This charitable attitude of mankind has become pure and it is enriched by human virtues. It is to be offered for future welfare of mankind. This is the gist of all religions. This is the climax of devotion and philosophy."⁷

In Mahabharata, 'Shyenaipotokhyan' the king Aushinor Shivi expresses his compassion and wills the welfare of all organisms and whole mankind. It is expressed in the following verse,

न त्वहं कमिये राज्यं न स्वर्गं नापुनर्भवम् ।
प्राणिनां दुःखतप्तानां कामये दुःख नाशनम् ॥

'I do not desire kingdom, heaven or liberation. I desire the destruction of suffering through which animals and other organisms are passing through and tortured.'⁸

In Shrimad Bhagavata Rantidev says as follows, न कामयेऽहं गतिमीश्वरात् परमशुद्धियुक्तमपुनर्भवम् । आर्तिप्रबन्धेऽखिलदेहभाजान्तः स्थितो येन भवन्ति भदुःखा ॥ 'I do desire supreme state and liberation from eight types of suffering. I do not desire liberation but I desire that I should undertake their suffering so that they are free from pain.'⁹

In Markendeya Purāṇa King Vipaschita says, न स्वर्गे ब्रह्मलोके वा तत् सुखं प्राप्यते नरैः । यदा तज्जन्तुनिर्वाण दानोत्थमिति मे मतिः ॥

The happiness which one attains by removing the suffering of animals is not possible to attain even in heaven. It cannot be attained even in Brahmloka.'¹⁰

In ancient value of compassion can be observed as being materialised in modern public life to a great extent. As I said earlier there are three

main types of liberation conceived in Indian tradition such as those of Jeevan Mukta, identity with the Absolute and utter devotion to the Supreme personal God. They have equal status and they are being substantiated in writings of modern thinkers and saints. The seeker of liberation is satisfied by any one path of liberation and it is not possible to negate any one path as it may lead the aspirant to the destined goal. The aim of welfare, liberation of total mankind can be seen to be taking shape during last one hundred years and more. Modern India can be seen to have been committed to the aim of social welfare, Sarvodaya and Lok Sangraha as related with the whole mankind. They may be seen in the current trends of public life and let us expect that these aims are realized gradually in times to come.

Notes and References :

1. Rik. 10-191-2.
2. Purusha Sukta-17.
3. Isha Upanished, 1.
4. Bhāratiya Tattvavidyā—Pandit Sukhlalji@ Maharaja Sayaji Rao Vishva Vidyalaya, Vadodara-1958. P. 67. According to the view of Pandit Sukhlalji. 'In Mahābhārata three views known as those of Sāṅkhya have been noted. According to one view there are twenty four elements. There is second view holding free and infinite Purushas known as 'Twenty five elements' and there is third view in which distinct from Purushas there is one Brahman with the result that there are totally twenty six elements. It appears that in source there may be these three divergent ideas and one the basis of these three ideas the Āchāryas later on developed these three interpretations and sought substantiation of the Upanishads.
5. Shri Krishna Yajurvediya Shvetāshvetara Upanishad : 1.8.
6. Hindu view of Life : Dr. S. Radhakrishnan : Allen & Unwin, London : 1927. 6-1, Jn. 14-28, (N.T.) 8-19, St. John. P. 24.
7. 'Viveka ane Sādhana'. : Kedarnathji. : Ed. Kishorilal Mashruwala and Ramanlal Modi : Navjivan Prakashan : Ahmedabad. : 1956. P. 33.
8. Mahābhārata : Shyena kapoto Akhyāna : a verse in the collected verse book of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya.
9. Shrimad Bhāgavata : 9-12-12.
10. Markedeya Purana. : 15-16.
(Lecture delivered as Shri Kasturbhai Lalbhai lecture in L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1989-90)

2 The 'Jyotish Yantra' (Astrolabe) at the L. D. Institute.

The study of the instruments and technology to any science is one of the essential steps for understanding its evolution. Instruments which have survived from various periods in the past will provide the most concrete evidence of the corresponding stages in the evolution of the particular science to which they relate. The collection and systematic arrangement of scientific instruments to illustrate the evolution of science and technology in India has not been attempted in any of our museums. This is largely due to the absence of interest in the preservation of objects of historical value, and partly due to the great decline of the scientific spirit in India which resulted from foreign domination.

Various kinds of mechanical devices are mentioned in our sastras and other early literary works in Indian languages, but few of them exist today. Only some items associated with historical personages or having some sentimental value have been preserved, at times by persons who had no idea of their value.

Though astronomy is one of the oldest among the sciences, and coupled with astrology one of the most widely cultivated, not many early astronomical instruments are found in India today. The well known collection of such instruments at Jaipur owes its origin to Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh II (1686-1743), the famous astronomer prince who built the astronomical observatories (Jantar Mantar) at Jaipur, Delhi, Banaras and Ujjan, which still survive as historical monuments at these places. He has also written a book about the astrolabe (Yantra Raja Rachana). The astrolabe appears to have played the most important part in Jai Singh's work. Jai Singh himself tells us that he first constructed, 'according to Mussulman books', instruments of brass. His collection of metal instruments which Kaye found at Jaipur included Arabic and Persian astrolabes dating from the time of Shah Jahan.

In the middle ages the astroable was one of the chief astronomical instruments. The Arbas perfected it at a very early date and it remained one of the principal astronomical instruments until about the 17th century. The Hindu name for the astrolabe is Yantra Raja. The earliest Hindu work on this instrument is by Mahendra Suri, written in A.D. 1370. It was usually of brass and varied in diameter from a couple of inches to several feet.

The mariner's astrolabe (as used by Columbus) was adapted from that of the astronomers about A.D. 1480. It was used to find the hour during day by the sun and during night by the stars, the length of day time in any season, the longitude of a place in relation to another, the declination and right ascension of stars, and the heights of objects like a minaret. Before they learnt to use the astrolabe, sailors always used to keep within sight of the shore. Its use for determining the ship's position by means of stellar observations transformed the art of navigation and made world-wide sailing quite practicable.

The astrolabe which the L. D. Institute at Anmedabad has in its collections is a flat brass instrument which was purchased in 1959 from a dealer in Marwar. It is about 28 cm. in diameter and belongs to the type known as *astrolabium planisphaerum*. It consists of three pieces, held together by a detachable bolt and wedge, at the centre. (a) The base plate, (plate I a) *umm* or *matter* (mother-plate), has lines, etc., engraved on both sides. This base plate differs from the 'matter' of other astrolabes in being quite flat without a raised edge or '*Kuffa*' or rim. On its circumference 60 divisions are marked and numbered clockwise, and each is subdivided into six parts. (b) A slightly smaller open-work disc, called *ankabut* ('spider') or *aranea* rests on the base-plate. It combines two overlapping circles, one of which is concentric with the *matter* and the other is eccentric. The former has no graduations on it but carries several pointers on each of which the name of the *Nakshatras* is inscribed. (See Appendix A) The pointers are the *Shazaya* or splinters. The eccentric circle has the signs of the zodiac (*Rasis*) (See Appendix A) marked on it. The *ankabut* comprises, besides these two circles, a straight strip, the *matsyodhara*, which forms the diameter of the concentric circle. (c) The sight rule or alidade, a flat straight strip (Plate I b) whose length equals the diameter of the base plate, is fixed on its other side. One of its edges corresponds exactly to the diameter of the main disc. It carries two vertical supports on which a thin straight cylindrical tube is fixed so that the line of sight is exactly above and parallel to the diameter. This is the essential sighting part, and is an advance in design, found only in this instrument, in India. The alidade and the graduated circumference on the back of the astrolabe are the parts of the instrument actually used in making observations. The *ankabut* the graduated circumference on the back of the astrolabe are the parts of the instrument actually used in making observations. The *ankabut*, the graduated circle on the raised edge (*kuffa*) of the *mater* and the 'tablets' from a very efficient calculating machine.

Since the instrument has a single disc; it has evidently been designed for a single latitude. The position of the stereographic projection inscribed

on the back of the base plate indicates that it has been made for the latitude of 28° .

The letters and numbers used for inscribing the names etc., on the instrument were closely examined by Pandit Lakshmanbhai and Dr. Malvnia, and found to contain a mixture of Jain, modern Gujarati and other (non-Jain) types of characters. From the shapes of these characters it was inferred that the instrument is about 150-200 years old.

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Appendix A

1. Marici
2. Brahmahrida ब्रह्महृद, (Capella a Aurigae ?)
3. Pu. Ba. (Purva Bhadrpada) पूर्वभाद्रपद (SHEAT ALPHERATS, B PEGASI)
4. Abhijit अभिजित् (WEGA, a LYRAE)
5. Pu. Pha. (Pūrva Phālguni) (LIONIS-ZOSMA)
6. Matsyodara मत्स्योदर (MIRACH, B ANDROMEDAE)
7. Swati स्वाती (ARCTURUS, a of BOOTES)
8. Kanya (कन्या)
9. Megha
10. Sinha (सिंह)
11. Karka (कर्कट)
12. Mithuna (मिथुन)
13. Vrisho(ba) (वृष)
- 14.
15. Mesha (मेघ)
16. Meena (मीन)
17. Ashtamu(ka) ऋषामुख (E PEGASI)
18. Sravana श्रवणा (ALTHAYR, a AQUILAE)

19. Dhana (Dhanus) (धनुस)
20. Vrishika (वृश्चिक)
21. Tula (तुला)
22. Magha मघा (REGULUS, *a* LEONIS)
23. Ardhra (आर्द्रा) (BED ALGUEUZE, *a* ORIONIS)
24. Rohini रोहिणी (ALDEBARAN, *a* TAURI)
25. Kumbha (कुम्भ)
26. Makara (मकर)
27. Chitra चित्र (AZIMECH, SPICA VIRGINIS, *a* VIRGINIS)
28. Lu (is it Lubdaka ?) लुब्धक (SIRIUS, *a* CĀNIS MAJORIS)
29. Sa. Mu. (Samudrapaksha ?) समुद्रपक्षी (DENEK KAITOZ, (*i.* CETI ?)

22-11-1975 (L. D. Institute) names made out from the instrument itself by Pandit Lakshmanbhai.

The bhāṣya (commentary) of Śrī Vallabhācārya (V.) on the Brahma-sūtras (B.S.) of Bādarāyaṇa (A.B.) is known as Anu Bhāṣya (A. B.) Somehow it has received the same attention as it really deserves at the hands of Vedāntists. To substantiate this thesis it is proposed to give here a critical review of the Dr. V. S. Ghate in his "The Vedānta" as regards the A.B. of V.

In his comparative study of the bhāṣyas of the five great ācāryas, viz. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya (Ś), Śrī Rāmānujācārya (R.), Śrī Nimbārkaācārya (N.), Śrī Madhvācārya (M.) and Śrī Vallabhācārya (V.), Dr. Ghate has given the palm of superiority to N. While doing this he has passed several remarks as regards A.B. which deserve to be reviewed and refuted in the light of a fresh critical study of A.B. Moreover, there are some other remarks passed by him as a result of some misunderstanding of the real purport of B.S. These also deserve to be reviewed and controverted.

While passing all remarks Dr. Ghate declares his chief object as follows¹ :-

"The question before us is one purely of literary criticism and not one of philosophy proper. Here is a literary product before us and here we have so many interpretations of it; and our object is to see which of these if any, has faithfully represented the natural and straightforward meaning of the original, apart from the inherent value of the doctrines propounded by them." From this it becomes clear therefore that Dr. Ghate did not study the five bhāṣyas from the point of their inherent philosophical values. His aim was purely literary criticism which led him to do grave injustice to the great ācāryas.

It should be borne in mind that the extremes like 'purely literary' and 'purely philosophical' are detrimental to the very spirit of the works like B.S. which are primarily philosophical. Here, it is philosophy that counts more than anything else. Again, the five bhāṣyas were certainly written for philosophical purposes and not as purely literary products as the learned doctor would have us believe.

Here an attempt has been made to present a true and faithful interpretation and evaluation of only some of those parts of A.B. which have been misinterpreted or misrepresented by Dr. Ghate.

- (1) On B.S. I.ii.8 Dr. Ghate remarks² : "In sūtra 7, it is interesting to note that the word 'tad-vyapadeśāt' lit. 'owing to the mention of that' is explained by all meaning 'alpatva (aṇutva)-vyapadeśāt, i.e. 'owing to the mention of minuteness' and as stating one of the reasons in favour of the jīva being referred to in the passage in question. Does it not imply an admission, on the part of the sūtrakāra, of the minuteness of the jīva, accepted by all except Śāṅkara, according to whom alone the jīva is as omnipresent as the Brahman ?"

The learned doctor here indirectly reads between the lines and makes the sūtrakāra commit himself by declaring the 'aṇutva' or minuteness of the jīva. Be it noted that there is no such clear-cut statement so that the above remark can be justified. The sūtrakāra, as a matter of fact, simply establishes the all-pervasiveness of Brahman by refuting its aṇutva, likely to be superimposed on its residence in the heart-sky. It is true that the sūtrakāra has elsewhere dwelt upon the aṇutva of jīva. But it is pointless to bring in the discussion of a topic where it is not so expressly or necessarily stated.

There is no denying the fact that all the bhāṣyakāras here unanimously explained the word 'tad-vyapadeśāt' as meaning 'because of the mention of minuteness'.³

But in his over-enthusiasm to show the aṇutva of jīva, Dr. Ghate has outright disregarded the context; for he has forgotten that the word 'tad-vyapadeśāt' presents the argument of the Pūrvapankṣin (the upholder of the prima facie view). It is totally against the common canons of textual interpretation to foist the prima facie view on that of the Siddhāntin. However, important and correct may be a statement, it will totally lose its force and value in 'asthāna' or wrong (improper) place, so to say. It may be argued just in the opposite way for establishing the all-pervasiveness of jīva, as Ś. has already done. But that is also out of place here.

- (2) On P. 70, Dr. Ghate passes the remark "Sūtra 13 (i.e. II.i. 13). is very interesting, since each commentator has own peculiar way of interpreting it."

Further on p. 72, he remarks : 'And moreover, the question of the difference or non-difference between bhokṭṛ and bhogya seems to be rather out of place, in spite of the explanation given by Vallabha,' and that 'the sūtrakāra would naturally occupy himself with...the relation between Brahman and jīva as cause and effect'.

Now it should be borne in mind at the outset that these *adhikaraṇas* are important to understand the theory of causation according to the B.S. in general and each *bhāṣyakāra* in particular.

The *sūtrakāra* has begun the consideration of the relation between the cause, Brahman and its effect, world. This difference continues even though the effect gets absorbed in the cause at the time of dissolution (*pralaya*). Still it does not contaminate the cause by its peculiar qualities which give it separate existence. Here V. proceeds in the same manner to show the untenability of the incongruity in the relation of the *bhoktṛ* and the *bhogyā*.

To an impartial critic the above remarks of Dr. Ghate do not appear as fully convincing. The question of the difference between *bhoktṛ* and *bhogyā* arises here in a thoroughly logical way. So it cannot be said to be 'rather out of place' as Dr. Ghate remarks. As a matter of fact, he has somehow missed the exact point here, when he says that 'the *sūtrakāra* would naturally occupy himself with....the relation between Brahman and jiva as cause and effect.' The question that arises in a very natural way is the relation between the two objects (things) in the effect which are to be regarded as different even after their absorption in their one single cause. Hence, it cannot be said that 'the way in which R. explains this *sūtra* is the most natural, and the question referred to is also quite in place here.' If this would have been the purport, then V., who is in a way an antagonist of Ś. and who accepts the enjoyment of *Līla* or *Kṛīḍa* by the Lord as done by R. to some extent would readily have explained this *sūtra* along those lines. But it is really not proper to think of the enjoyership (*bhoktṛtva*) of Brahman in the same way as R. tries to establish it. It is not the question of enjoyership that arises due to the *sa-śarīratva* (the state of being embodied) because it is out of place here. Again the relation between Brahman and jiva is shown in the first *adhyāya* and also in the third *pāda* of the second *adhyāya*. So in all probability the question of the continuance of difference between *bhoktṛ* and *bhogyā* even after their absorption in the same cause is quite proper here and also most natural in sequence.

(3) On B.S. II. iii. 18 (*Jñā' ta eva*) Dr. Ghate wrongly remarks⁴ : 'V...interprets the *sūtra* (18) as stating the *prima facie* view.' The correct interpretation of A.B. on it shows that V. refutes the view of the *Māyāvādin*.

Similarly, it is not reasonable to remark : 'this interpretation of the *sūtra* is far-fetched.'⁵ For if the views of R. and N. be acceptable, since

the word 'jñāh' can mean only 'one who knows,' then V.'s explanation is equally acceptable and natural. of course, his refutation of the Māyāvādin here is out of place. But the same is the case with other Bhāṣyakāras who come after Ś.

(4) Sūtra II. iv. 13 is not an independent adhikaraṇa according to V. Still Dr. Ghate has wrongly remarked,⁸ "sūtra 13,... forms an independent adhi. according to all commentators without exception."

Similarly sūtra II. iv. 14 is not 'almost obscure and far from satisfactory.'⁷ For V. state that the Vāk (speech) etc. function under the supervision of their respective superintending deities like Agni and others, who, according to Śruti, enter them and assume their forms. He quotes the Bhāgavata (II. X. 8) in support. All bhāṣyakāras agree as regards the purport of this adhi.

(5) The remarks of Dr. Ghate on B.S. III. ii. 3⁸ and his rather long discussion show that he is somewhat perplexed to find N. not coming upto the mark as he follows R. So he has to declare,"... "this way of interpretation as given by Bhāskara (B.) to be better." Then he remarks that V. also follows B. with slight difference. Now as the bhāṣyas of B. and V. stand, the view of Dr. Ghate is untenable. As Puruṣottamaji points out the difference between the views of these ācāryas, it becomes clear that V. does not follow B. On the contrary, he criticises B.'s view. According to B. this dream-world is the creation of the jīva and not the Lord because (both) pleasure and pain are found there. Therefore, it is only due to the perception of the object that is remembered. and so it is created by the jīva. As against this V. specifically states that the Lord creates the dream-world in order to delude the jīvas, so it is not real.

(6) It is true that the interpretation of the adhi. comprising of B. S. III. ii. 11-21 is full of difficulties as Dr. Ghate states.¹⁰ Still it is to be examined whether it is next to impossible to decide which of the interpretations is more natural than the rest.

In the light of the interpretations given by various bhāṣakāras, it can be concluded that R., N. and M. are unanimous as regards the meaning of the word 'sthāna' in B.S. III. ii. 11 and their purport is similar in general. According to the 'sthāna' denotes the states, viz. waking, dream and deep-sleep, of jīva. Dr. P. M. Modi¹¹ reiterates this when he says, "Therefore, sthāna in this sūtra means the states of jāgarita, svapna and suṣupti."

But Ś. and V. do not admit this meaning of sthāna. The two views of unknown Vedic ācāryas, quoted and refuted by V., show that the view

accepted by Ś. was generally in vogue. V. has refuted it twice; once at the hands of the Ekadeśin and himself.

Though the meaning of 'sthāna' as 'state' is obviously accepted, the meaning, given by Ś. and V., is not at all unsatisfactory. So the contention of Prof. R. D. Karmarkar,¹² "...it seems probable that R. and Keśava have laid their finger on the right point..." is not tenable. On the contrary, the meaning of Ś. and V. is nearer to the purport, because 'ubhayalingatva' or being possessed with two-fold attributes is more directly connected with the sthānas or adjuncts with which the Para i.e. supreme soul becomes connected. So it is not the question here whether the Para can be called 'ubhayalinga' due to His connection with the different states. If such would have been the case, then the words 'rūpavat' and 'arūpavat' ought to have been regarded as understood. Dr. P. M. Modi¹³ has actually been led to such a conclusion and Dr. S. K. Belvalkar¹⁴ has referred to it in passing. Of course, he has failed to appreciate the view of V. in its true light.

True that the word 'arūpavat' is not far to seek as it occurs in B. S. III. ii. 14. But 'apakarṣa' or reverse stretching of a word in sūtra is rarely accepted in B.S. Again however important the word 'arūpavat' may be because of its similarity with the discussion of puruṣavidha and apuruṣavidha found in Yāskas' Nirukta,¹⁵ it is not proper to foist those ideas on the sūtrakāra by petitioprincipil. Once this is understood in its true light, there does not arise any doubt as regards the interpretation of this part.

(7) Dr. Ghate is absolutely wrong when he says¹⁶ that 'according to V. all these sūtras (B.S. III. ii. 11-21) from one adhikaraṇa.' Because it becomes clear from the text of A. B. as it stands that according to V. there are three adhikaraṇas comprising of sūtras 11-13, 14-18 & 19-22.¹⁷

(8) In B.S. III. ii. 27 Dr. Ghate¹⁸ has favoured N. Whereas Dr. Belvalkar¹⁹ sides with Ś. by showing that the sūtrakāra may have been content to allow the matter to be adjudicated at the court of Śākṣātākāra. Prof. Karmarkar²⁰ gives the palm of superiority to Keśava. Dr. Thibaut²¹ though usually favouring R., has remarked, "whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence and strictness of reasoning."

This sūtra is very important. It establishes the two fold character of Brahman and not two kinds of Brahman, viz. Saguna or apara and nirguna or para as Ś. would have it. It is shown on the authority of śruti, that Brahman possesses all contradictory qualities without giving rise to any inconsistency.²²

In the light of the comparison of various bhāṣyas it becomes clear that the interpretation of V. is possessed of all the qualities that Dr. Thibaut has missed in those of others. For V. has not ignored any important word in these sūtras as Ś. and R. have done. The meanings of several words like 'karamapi' and 'abhyāsāt' in B.S. III. ii. 25 and 'atah' in B.S. III. ii. 26, given by V., are quite coherent in the context. So it would be quite proper to say that the A.P. is precise, consistent and reasonable.

(9) From the comparison of the several interpretations of B.S. III. ii. 11-30 Dr. Ghate comes to some conclusions²³ which deserve to be reviewed in this connection.

(a) He says that there is not the least reference to the māyā. It is true that the sūtrakāra uses the word 'māyā' only once.²⁴ But there Ś. has not tried in the least to bring out his doctrine of māyā. So it is pointless to criticise him on this score.

(b) His another conclusion is that 'the sūtrakāra's attempt to reconcile passages of a radically opposite character, regarding the nature of the Brahman and its relation to the jiva and the non-sentient matter, has not led to any decisive result.'²⁵ This is not admissible because the sūtrakāra definitely says that the Brahman is possessed of twofold character. Except Ś. all ācāryas come to this conclusion.

(c) His third conclusion is that 'If however we want to see some definite system in the sūtras, the most probable one, as far as these sūtras go, would be the doctrine of Bhedābheda, which sees both bheda and abheda, without involving any third principle to reconcile.'²⁶ This is a partial truth. For V. also has said that difference and non-difference do exist in the case of Brahman. As the word 'ubhayavyapadeśa' in B.S. III. ii. 27 implies, the sūtrakāra is more interested in establishing the twofold character of Brahman. The examples do not go against this as Dr. Ghate thinks. But, on the contrary, they support it. The relation between 'ahi' and 'kuṇḍala' and 'prakāśa and its 'āśraya' does establish the bheda and abheda. But, be it remembered that any example cannot be applied on all the four in this Śūtra. So the sūtrakāra has resorted to the very significant method of using the affix 'vat' in such crucial cases. Though the bheda and abheda are contradictory, they can be asserted of Brahman because its very nature is such.²⁷

The use of the particle 'Vā' in B.S. III. ii. 28 & 29, does not militate against the above conclusion as Dr. Ghate contends. As a matter of fact the sūtrakāra wants to bring home his doctrine that Brahman is possessed

of twofold character even though they appear contradictory. There is no doubt as to how they can reside in the same Brahman for the followers of the vedes.

(10) Dr. Ghate remarks that the third pāda of the third adhyāya²⁸ is not of importance from the stand-point adopted by him. Of course, Dr. Modi²⁹ specifically points out that the most important portion of the entire Brahmasūtra is Pāda 3 of Adhyāya-III. The question of the uniformity of upāsana was really very important and deserved to be settled. The topic of the combination or otherwise of guṇas at the time of meditation was crucial. This problem has both theoretical and practical importance. A.B. has shown this quite clearly.

(11) Dr. Ghate³⁰ shows some drawbacks in the interpretation of B.S. III. iv. 51 by Ś. and R. and adds: 'To me, this (N.'s) appears to be the most natural and straightforward way of construing the sūtra not open to any of the objections suggested above....' He cites the example of M. in support.

As a matter of fact, it is not so easy to decide as to which of the interpretations is the most natural one. So the palm of superiority extended to N. by Dr. Ghate betrays nothing but his partiality for N. It is equally possible to raise objections against the interpretation of N. also.

The detailed study of the bhāṣyas shows that the whole context, shown by Viṅṭheśa³¹ in the portion of A.B. under consideration, is equally acceptable. The word 'muktiphala' is interpreted in its true sense in A.B. only. The meaning of this sūtra according to A.B. is: "Thus there is uncertainty as regards the fruit liberation (muktiphala, which is in the form of the enjoyment of the bliss of bhajana). Because of the decision (arrived at on the basis of the repeated mention of non-return in the Śruti) his state is mukti."

(12) Dr. Ghate³² remarks in the beginning of B.S. IV. I that V. proposes another explanation of this adhikaraṇa (IV. i. 1), because he wants to show that this chapter is on phala and should refer to phala only and not sādhanā. "This explanation is no doubt not satisfactory; and, besides, the word 'āvṛtti' has to be repeated twice."

It is obvious that the discussion of sādhanā is rather strange, if not absolutely irrelevant, in the chapter on phala. True that the sādhanas have already been dwelt upon in just the preceding two long pādas. Still each of the bhāṣyakāras has tried to show its consistency. A.B. has given

two explanations for this purpose. The first sentence of A.B.³³ means, "Though this chapter deals with phala, there is the mention of such means like śravaṇa, in order to show that it is internal (antarāṅga) means". Thea Viṭhaleśa justifies the inclusion of means in this pāda by saying that even the indirect knowledge of Ātman is as good as an avāntara (subordinate) phala. In the path of bhakti this avāntara phala in the form of indirect knowledge is indeed included in the phala itself, because it is sajātiya (of the same genus) as the parama (highest) phala.

To justify the second interpretation, Viṭhaleśa says that the inconsistency of the discussion of means in the chapter on phala still arises because the word 'draṣṭavyaḥ' (is to be visualised) may be construed afterwards, i.e. last in order after śrotavyaḥ, etc. on the maxim that the ārtihakrama (the sequence of meaning) is more powerful than that of śabda. In that explanation, it is found that karma, jñāna and bhakti are meant for a hina (low), a madhyama (middle order) and an uttama (best) (aspirant) respectively, for the accomplishment of the goal either directly or indirectly. Their characteristics being established in the third adhyāya, the present one deals with the fruits of those paths. Here, first of all, the fruits of Karma is described because it is to be followed as the means for jñāna and bhakti which are the uttama and the atyuttama respectively. It is not to be performed independently. Its fruit is asakṛt āvṛtti (more than once repetition). The word asakṛt is to be construed with both āvṛtti and upadeśāt.

This proves beyond doubt that the remarks of Dr. Ghate are not satisfactory and also baseless. Even a casual reading of A.B. on this adhikaraṇa shows clearly that the word 'āvṛtti' has not at all been repeated twice. It is the word 'asakṛt' which has been construed with both āvṛtti and upadeśāt, as shown above.

(13) Dr. Ghate remarks³⁴ that the word 'upagama' in B.S. IV. i. 3 more usually means 'attending upon', 'adoring', 'contemplation' than 'entering into' or 'being one with'. But A.B.³⁵ makes it very clear that both these meanings, usual and unusual, are by the bhāṣvakāras.³⁶

(14) In B.S. IV. i. 12 there are two readings, viz. 'prāyaṇa' and 'prayāṇa'. Their respective meaning is 'mokṣa' and 'deparature or death.'

Ś. accepts 'prāyaṇa' and explains it as 'departure or death.' Hence Dr. Ghate³⁷ has been led to conclude that 'but this meaning (mokṣa) of the word 'prāyaṇa' is without doubt unusal.' Further, he remarks : 'V.'s explanation is quite fantastic and sectarian in character, referring to two kinds of devotees.....'

It becomes evident from A.B. that Viṅhaleśa relies on the Bhā.³⁸ for the meaning of the word 'prāyapa' used here. It is sectarian in so far as it solely depends upon the Bhā. But it is not in the least fantastic, when it is said that the word 'prāyapa' denotes that the Lord Himself is the supreme and transcendental fruit fit to be attained as the puruṣārtha.³⁹ Puruṣottamaji explains the word etymologically as the best goal i.e. fault⁴⁰ ! Yogi Gopeśvaraṇi further explains this as 'the best transcendental (other-worldly) object to be attained through the cultivation of the feeling that everything is the 'soul.'⁴¹

(15) Dr. Ghate has taken note of the peculiar way in which the sūtrakāra employs such negative words as 'avibhāga' (B.S. IV. iv. 4), 'ananyatva' (B.S. II. i. 14), etc. But it is far from convincing to say that 'The sūtrakāra was either not prepared to specify the idea too strictly.'⁴²

There is no definite criterion for specification and strictness of idea so far as the philosophical works like the B.S. are concerned. The sūtrakāra has begun with the idea of concretising the vague concepts or ideas and giving the garb of proper expression to those which were beyond the reach of speech. In doing this, he would have kept before him perfection and specific assertion of the highest truth. He would have adopted such a method, as found here, for reconciling the mutually contradictory ideas. Dr. Ghate seems to have lost sight of such negative famous upanishadic passage as 'neti neti.'⁴³

These are some of the glaring examples which deserve notice for the correct appreciation of the A.B. of V. It becomes quite clear from the above discussion that A.B. is also equally important as the bhāṣyas of other ācāryas and there is no reason why undue criticism should be levelled against it. With due deference to the learned doctor, an attempt has been made in this research paper to review and refute some of his statements. Without even the slightest tinge of malice or ill-feeling to the great Vedāntist, the results of a fresh critical study of A.B. have been put before the oriental scholars in an honest and humble way.

If should be added in the end, to the credit of Dr. Ghate, that he has praised V. at some places.⁴⁴ But such cases are rare. On the whole, he has criticised the interpretations of V. and labelled them as fantastic, sectarian and far from satisfactory. The foregoing review proves for certain that such is not the case and Dr. Ghate passed his remarks with some prejudice. If this attempt serves as an eye-opener for the Vedāntists and if A.B. be studied in its true perspective and appreciated properly, I, will consider my effort amply rewarded.

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1. cf. V.S., p. 50
2. Ibid., p. 57
3. cf. (1) Ś.B. - Aniyastva-vyapadeśāt. (p. 67)
 (2) B.B. - Sva-Śabdena ca vyapadeśādānīyān. (p. 39)
 (3) R.B. - Tad-vyapadeśaḥ, alpatva-vyapadeśaḥ. (p. 342)
 (4) N.B. - Alpatva-vyapadeśāt. (p. 178)
 (5) A.B. - Vrihyādi-tulyatvācca. (p. 56)
 (6) V.B. = alpatva-śruteḥ.
4. V.S., p-85
5. Ibid. p-85
6. Ibid. p-103
7. Ibid. p-104
8. Ibid. pp-111-112
9. cf. B.P. p-876 Tattheśvareṇa jīva-vyāmohanādyartham svapnasṛ
 kriyate iti na tasyāḥ satyatvamityarthaḥ.
10. V.S., p-113
11. cf. A critique of the Brahmasūtras, Vol. I, p-3
12. cf. Comparison of the bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Vallabha &
 Keśavakāśmīrin.
13. Ibid. Vol. I, p-4
14. cf. - Vedānta Philosophy, Part I, pp-165-166 (1929)
15. cf. - Yāska's Nirukta, Vol. I, Ch. VII. pp-102, 103, Edited by V.
 Rajawade.
16. Ibid. p-117
17. cf. A.B., pp-189-190, 191-194, 194-195.
18. Ibid. pp-120, 121 & 123.
19. Ibid. p-167
20. Ibid.
21. cf. S.B.E. Vol. XXXIV, The Vedānta sūtras with the commentary
 Śaṅkarācārya, (Part-I), translated by George Thibautit, Intro. p. X
22. cf. A.B., p. 198 - 'Vedādeva brahmasvarūpajñānam.....brah
 tūbhayarūpam....ubhayarūpeṇa nirguṇatvenānantaguṇatvena sarv
 iruddhadharmeṇa rūpeṇa vyapadeśāt....ataḥ sarvaviruddhadharmī
 āmāśrayo bhagavān.'
23. of, cit. pp. 122-123
4. cf. B.S. III. ii. 3 - Māyāmātram tu Kārtsnyenānabhivyaktasvarūpatv
25. of. cit. p. 123
26. Ibid. p. 123

27. cf. A.B. I. i. 3 (p. 15), 14 (p. 19);
 I. ii. 22 (p. 66), 24 (p. 68), 32 (p. 73);
 I. iii. 15 (p. 81), 16 (p. 82), 21 (p. 85);
 II. i. 27 + 28 (p. 127);
 III. ii. 18 (p. 194), 21 (p. 195), 27 (p. 198);
 III. iii. 19 (p. 224), 25 (p. 229).
28. Ibid. p. 127
29. Ibid. Vol. I, Intro. pp. XIII-XV.
30. Ibid. p. 131.
31. cf. A.B. p. 300
32. op. cit. p. 133
33. Ibid. p. 302
34. op. cit. p. 133
35. Ibid. p. 306
36. cf. B.P. (p. 14) -
 '.... ātmatvenaiva bhagavantamupāsate..... ātmānaṁ sāṅgātkaṛoti.
 Tataḥ prārabdhasamāptau brahmanyeva praviṣṭo bhavattī mukhyaṁ
 jñāninaḥ phalamupagacchantītyanenoktaṁ..... prakṛtaṁ brahma
 ātmā svātmā iti evamprakāreṇa upagacchantyanubhavanti. Tatkratu-
 nyāyena tatprāpuvanti.....
 And cf. Raś; (p. 14) -
 'upagacchantītyasyopāsate praviṣantītyarthadvayam. Yadvā. Upāsate
 nāma praviṣantītyarthaḥ.... jñānina upa samīpe sthītvā yathāyogyam
 kurvanti (p. 15) nāma dehāpagame tatraiva praviṣṭā bhavanti yathā-
 yogyam sattām kurvantītyarthaḥ. (p. 18) upa samīpe eveti bhāṣyārtho
 noktaḥ sa Ucyate. Jñānena svarūpasthityā vāstavikāṇavaḥ mahattvār-
 thamupa samīpa eva gacchanti, yato'kṣarātmake svamahadrūpe
 vibhūtyātmake pratimādvāveva praviṣṭā bhavanti.
37. Ibid. p. 135
38. cf. XI. xi. 48 - 'prāyaṇaṁ hi satāmaham.'
39. cf. A.B. p. 310
40. cf. Bhāṣyaprakāśa, p. 38 - 'Prakṛṣṭamayanaṁ prāyaṇamīti yogāttā-
 dṛṣaṁ phalamucyate'.
41. cf. Raśmi, p. 38 - 'Ayanam prāpyam prakṛṣṭam paramam pāralau-
 kikaṁ sarvātmabhāvalabhyam.'
42. Ibid. p. 150
43. cf. Br. up. III. ix. 26, IV. ii. 4, IV. v. 15.

44. Ibid. p. 74 (B.S. II. i. 14), p. 89 (B.S. II. iii. 29), p. 101 (B.S. II. iv. 1), pp. 148 & 164 (B.S. IV. iii-16).

ABBREVIATIONS :

- A.B. = Aṇubhāṣyam
 Adhi. = Adhikaraṇa
 B. = Śrī Bhāskarācārya
 B.B. = Bhāskarabhāṣyam
 Bhā. = Śrīmadbhāṣyagavatam.
 B.P. = Bhāṣyaprakāśa
 Br. Up. = Brhadāranyakopaniṣad
 B.S. = Brahmasūtras
 M. = Śrī Madhavācārya
 M.B. = Madhavabhāṣyam
 N. = Śrī Nimbārkaācārya
 N.B. = Nimbārkaabhāṣyam
 R. = Śrī Rāmānujācārya
 R.B. = Śrībhāṣyam
 Raś. = Raśmi
 Ś.B. = Śāṅkarabhāṣyam
 Ś. = Śrī Śāṅkarācārya
 V. = Śrī Vallabhācārya
 V.B. = Vijñānabhikṣubhāṣyam
 V.S. = The Vedānta by V.S. Ghatge

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4 A FORGED AGARVA COPPER-PLATE GRANT OF SAHASRĀRJUNA
(Kārtavīrya)

Pravinchandra Parikh*

Bharati Shelat +

A set of copper-plates was discovered in 1935 by shri Mangalbhai Baraiya while digging in the hollow of Galateshvar near Dakor. (Dist. Kaira). Copper-plates were lying in a cauldron. They were purchased by Shri Ramanbhai Somabhai Shah of Agarva from him and were preserved at his place for about forty years. Recently the plates are brought to the B. J. Institute for discernment through the attempts of the former author of this article and Prof. K. K. Shastri. On the whole the plates are preserved in a good condition. We are very much thankful to Shri Ramanbhai and his family members for allowing us to read and edit the Inscription.

The *Copper-plates* are two in number each one measuring 26 cms. in length and 20.5 cms. in height. The plates are fastened together by one ring, which is 1.5 cms. in diameter. Total weight of these plates along with the extant ring is about 2 kgs. and 150 grams. The plates are inscribed on the inner side only. The inscribed portion measures 25 cms. × 19.5 cms.

The record consists of 40 lines, 20 being inscribed on the inner side of each plate. The average number of letters in each line is 29-30 and the average size of the letters is 0.8 × 0.8 cms.

The record is *incised* in the Nāgarī characters of about 9th cent. A. D. It commences with the usual benedictory word स्वस्ति. The *Language* of the record is Sanskrit. Except for seven benedictive verses at the end, the whole record is in prose throughout. Following are the *orthographical* peculiarities of individual characters :

1. The doubling of the consonant following 'r' in a conjunct. See °Sṛārijuna (L. 38), Ācandārkkārṇava (L. 15), Parvvaṇi (L. 22), dharmārththu (L. 29), Pārththive° (L. 31), dharmmakriyārththi °(L. 34), caravārththi (L. 38) etc.

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2. Letter 'dh' appears well-developed, though it is not yet joined to the right-hand vertical; See ⁰bhyudhita (L. 5), ⁰nubodha⁰ (L. 10), vasudhā (L. 27), dharmnā ⁰(L. 29, 32), dharmmadhi⁰ (L. 36) etc.
3. The cursive loop of the right side attached to the lower end in letter 'bh' is joined slightly higher from the lower end; See vibhava (L. 1), ⁰nābhi (L. 4), bhānn (L. 5), jasobhi⁰ (L. 22), bhagavatā (L. 24), bhāv-
inaḥ (L. 31) etc.
4. Initial 'i' and 'ī' are not joined with the lines on the top; See ⁰diva (L. 4), ⁰vīrya (L. 5), Simā (L. 15), Vindhyā (L. 26) etc.
5. The length of the three vertical lines on the right, in the middle and on the left sides in letter 'na' is the same. 'All these three vertical lines seem to be straight; See ⁰Sāreṇa (L. 24), ⁰rpāṇām (L. 32).⁰ Karaṇam (L. 36) etc.
6. In letter 'kṣa' the middle horizontal line is cut and made like a chāpa by cutting it with the vertical line; See ⁰kamkṣa (L. 1), kṣītau (L. 4), kṣoṇi⁰ (L. 7), kṣīti (L. 15) etc.

At some places the writing is complicated; e.g. Mahipradyaṇa (L. 2), ruharo (L. 3), Sadevānupitri-manuṣyasyasārcci ⁰(L. 23), bhumeraṇpūradham-
aṅgulaṁ (L. 25), gatsacurājaṁ (L. 34) etc. In a few cases the words are written incorrectly; e.g. 'Vaiuso' instead of Vaiśo (L. 2), Sayanā instead of Śayanā (L. 4), Viśvaṁ instead of Viśvaṁ (L. 6), Śīla instead of Śīla (L. 8), kalmasaṁ instead of kalmaṣaṁ (L. 9), Madhyandina in place of mādhya-
andina (L. 17), ⁰kriyosapyaṇārthaṁ in place of ⁰kriyotsarpaṇārthaṁ (L. 21), rāṭmanasya in place of ⁰rāṭmanah, Narmadāya in place of Narmadāyāḥ (L. 22), sargreṇa in place of sargeṇa (L. 23), purasareṇa in place of puraḥ-
sareṇa (L. 24), sreṣṭha in place of śreṣṭhaḥ (L. 31), dharmāsetu in place of dharmasetu ⁰(L. 32), dvamsajairanne in place of ⁰dvamsajairanyai (L. 33), sasikara in place of Śasikara etc. At one place the anusvāra is dropped, e.g. parththivendrān (L. 31).

Summary of the copper-plate :

In treta yuga, Vibhava saṁvatsara on Monday, the day of Kārttiki (Pūrṇimā), there had been the great solar dynasty illuminated by the fame, as if nectar, of king Vikrama, beyond seven seas (L. 1-3). There had been king Kṛtavīrya whose flag shining by the enmity of Indra's valour, whose sole dwelling is born entity and valour, protector of the world, like Viṣṇu by sleeping in ocean, like Brahmā risen from the naval lotus of viṣṇu (L. 4-7). From him borne king Sahasrārjuna, who was the beauty of the

whole universe and the lamp of the lineage. That Sahasrārjuna, whose valour spreading in Treta age like Kṛṣṇa's śhīla and Bala, who avoids sins and whose pious name is bright, addresses Rājasāmanta, Bhogika, Śaulkika, Rāṣṭriya, Mahattara, Ādhikārika etc. 'You all are informed that village *Upalaheḍa* in the *Upalaheḍika Viśaya*, in the north being *Bheruṇṭi grāma* and the boundary of *Cacāi Bhaṭārikā*, in the south boundaries of *Dahisara* and *Ankulāchā grāmas*, in the west *Āgaravāḍa grāma* and the boundary *Thoḍāsara* and in the north *Vāmāu(sa)ra grāma* and the boundary of *Kosuva lake*, that village is given as a gift to *Āhlāditya* Paṇḍita of *Vatsa* gotra, *Śrīvara* of *Pārāsara* gotra, *Nārāyaṇa Upādhyāya* of *Āvasthiya Atri* gotra, *Somanātha* of *Kanṭhika* gotra and *Bhāskara Dīkṣita* of *Kaunḍinya* gotra, all belong to *yajurvediya*, *Vājasaneyā* and *Mādhyaṇḍina Sākhā*, after remembering 18,000 Brāhmaṇas of *Upalaheḍa* sthāna, with eight boundries and all taxes such as *Udraṅga*, *Upārikar* with all donations, until the existence of the sun, the moon, the ocean and the earth, for the enjoyment of sons and grand sons, for performing of five mahāyājnas and expenses for bali, caru, vaishvadeva etc., for the increase of religious merit and glory of his parents and himself (L. 8-22).

The donation was made with the rite of the libation of water after taking bath at Shukla Tīrtha in river Narmada on the sacred occasion of a lunar eclipse on Monday, the Pūrṇimā of the month Kārttika (L. 22-23).


The grant was made on Monday, the 15th day of the bright half of Kārttika, Vibhava Samvatsara, Treta yuga.

At the end the donor appeals to future kings for sanctioning and maintaining this grant. Seven verses ascribed to Vyāsa are quoted for indicating the religious merit of making and maintaining a grant of land and the religious demerit according to those who confiscate it (L. 26-36).

The royal order was executed by Pandit *Vikrama Sejvāl* of *Mūlasthāna*. The grant terminates with the autograph of king *Sahasrārjuna* (L. 36-38).

COMMENTS

Literally, the record belongs to king Sahasrārjuna of Treta yuga. He is identified with king Kārtavīrya Arjuna, known as Sahasrabāhu Arjuna and Sahasrārjuna, son of Kṛtavīrya of the Haihaya branch of Yadavas of the proto historic period. Haihaya kings were ruling in Madhya Pradesh at this time. Sahasrārjuna conquered Anūpa deśa and Māhishmatī city and made Māhishmatī his capital. He performed many yajnas and conquered the whole Uttarāpatha.¹ Poet Kalidas referred to the abundant power of Sahasrārjuna in the sixth canto of *Raghuvamśa*.²



As for the localities mentioned in the present grant, Upalaheda is identified with modern Upalet of Thasara Taluka, Dist., Kaira. Āgaravāḍa and Thoḍāsara are identified with Agarva and Thasara of the same Taluka and District. Ankulāchā and Vāsāura can be identified with modern Aklachha and vaso of the same Taluka and District. Kosuva Pond is identified with modern Kosam. Dahisara may be identified with Desar of Savali Taluka, Baroda District. We have not been able to identify Bheruṇṭi and cacāi Bhaṭārikā. The latter may be identified with the temple of cancāi Mātā. But this temple is, at present, in Malataj (Dist. Kaira which is very far from Upalet. There may have been some other Cancāi Mātā temple to the east of Upalet.

The administrative officers mentioned in this inscription also appear in the records of Gurjaras of Nāndipurī-Bharukaccha.

Palaeographically, the record belongs to the middle of the 9th cent. A. D. The details regarding the date are incomplete. There is no mention of an era or a year. The record only mentions Monday, Kārtikī (Pūrṇimā), Vibhava samvatsara in Treta yuga and lunar eclipse. Vibhava Samvatsara occurs in V. S. 905 (A. D. 848) according to the system of real Jovian year.³ The tithi well fits in with the week-day according to V. S. 906 (A. D. 849). On that day there also occurred a lunar eclipse. In V. S. 906 Vibhava Samvatsara ended and the next one Śukla began. It seems that like the system of expired years, the system of expired samvatsaras would have been in vogue in those days. The date of the grant corresponds to 4th November, 849 A. D.⁴

The plates are considered to be forged ones on historical and chronological grounds. Some discrepancies may be stated as follows :-

1. Palaeographically the record belongs to the middle of the 9th cent. A. D., while the donor referred to here in the record is Sahasrārjuna of Trata yuga of protohistorical period. The composer might have chosen the name of the king of protohistorical period as the donor; so that no one would be able to verify it. But this fabrication that he created can be made out easily. We find, in the records, many examples of mentioning the names of kings who had been reigning two-three hundred years ago, as the donors. In fact, we neither have come across any tradition of carving the copperplate inscriptions during the period of proto-history, nor have we got any authentic records of the end of the second millennium B. C.⁵

2. In the record, the mentioned date does not contain the full details. Only the Treta yuga, Vibhava Samvatsara, Kārtiki, Somavāsara and a lunar eclipse have been mentioned. There is no mention of an era or the year. The person who made a draft seems to have deliberately dropped to mention the full details of the date in the record.

If this record would belong to king Sahasrārjuna of Treta yuga as mentioned in it, it would be a unique evidence as no inscribed evidence has been found so far and it would be an important link to relate Harappan script on one side and Brāhmi script on the other. But in fact, these copper-plater are inscribed in the Nāgarī script of earlier times prevalent in Gujarat in the 9th cent. A. D. Therefore, it does not have any special importance except the addition of one more forged copperplate.

It is to be noted here that the Brāhmanas of various gotras may have created the grant for their own benefit. Thus the grant is proved to be forged one.

TEXT

Plate I

१. । स्वस्ति आचन्द्रार्कसंक्ष^६ ॥ त्रेतायुगे विभव संवत्सरे कार्तिक्यां मासे । आस्ते सप्तस-
२. सुद्रमुद्रि^७ तमहीप्रयु(१)ग(१)मदविक्रमशोणीपालजसुधावलि^८ श्री सूर्यवंसो(शो)
३. महान् यवाखंडलवीर्यवैरविलसहोद^९ ढकं रुहरो(१) जातसत्त्वपराक्रमैकवसति
४. लो(लो)कोनुपालं(लं) क्षितौ तस्मिन् समुद्रस(श)यनादिष पञ्चनाभः श्रीनाथनाभिनलि-
५. नादिष पद्मसद्मा श्रीकृतवीर्य इति मानुरिवोदयोद्रेरस्युधि^{१०} तकुलसरः
६. कमलायमानः ततः सदर्थिप्रतिपदतुङ्घि विस्व(क्ष)भरमेडलमंडनाय व(व)भूव भूपा-
७. लकुलप्रदीपः शोणीपति श्रीनृप सहस्राञ्जुनपराक्रमस्य त्रेतस्य^{११} प्रहरे यु-
८. गत्य कृष्णस्य सी(शी)लजलनृत्यतरे ततो[ऽ]भूत श्री सहस्राञ्जुन भूभुव(त) वृ^{१२}दहृ^{१३}दो
९. वः कस्मसं(व) हरति क्रीतितपुण्यनामा सवनिव राजसामंतभौगिकसी(शी)लिकि(लिक)-
१०. कराष्ट्रग्राममहत्तराधिकारिकादीनि समनुवो(वो)व्यत्यनु व(वः) संविदितं ऊपल-
११. हेडीकर्मांतः^{१४} नवसतावंत(तः)पाति उपलहेडस्थानकं सा(शा)लानिवेसे(से) पूर्णतः भे-
१२. रुटीग्राम चचाइभटारिकासीमा दक्षिणतः दहिसर अंकुलछा ग्राम-
१३. सीमा पश्चि(क्षि)मतः आगरवाड ग्राम वो(थो?)डासरा ग्राम सीमा उत्(त्)रतः वामा(सा)उरः
१४. ग्राम कोसुव सर सीमा अष्टावाटविमु(छ)इ^{१५} सोद्रेग सोपरिकर सवांदाय समोपेतः
१५. सभ्वादान संभाजास(१)सीमा पर्वतः आचन्द्रार्ककर्णवक्षितिर्यतिसमकालीनपुत्रौ-
१६. ज्ञानवभोग्यस्य उपलहेडस्थानविनिर्ग(र्ग)तः अष्टादस(श)सहस्रब्राह्मणानां^{१६} आ-

१७. हानयि(यि)त्वा^१ यजुर्वेदीय वाजिसनेय म(मा)ध्वंदिनमावा^{१ २} नानागोत्रसमुद्भ-
 १८. वान्*]वच्छ^१स्य गोत्रसंताने आत्मा(ह्ला)द्विष्य पंडित पाराव(श)^२गोत्रसंताने श्रीय-
 १९. २ आर्वास्थिय अत्रिगोत्रसंताने नारायण उपाध कौसि(शि)कगोत्रसंताने सोमना-
 २०. थ जा(शा)ति(ती)य कौडिल(न्य)गोत्रसंताने भास्कर दीक्षित तस्मि-

Plate II

२१. न् सैलेच्छ व(व)लिचर(रु)वैस्व(श्व)देवपंचमहायज्ञादिक्रियोस(स्त)स्व(र्व)गार्थं मातापित्रोरा-
 २२. त्मनस्य^{१ ४} पुन्य(ष्व)ज(य)सो(हो)भिष्टुद्धये कालिकां सोमग्रहणपर्वणि नर्मदाय(याः)
 २३. सु(शु)क्लतीर्थे विधिवत्तु स्नात्वा सदेवानुपिप्ति(तु)धनुष्यस्वस्य^{१ ५} च्छ्वे उदकादितम्रं(ग्यै)-
 २४. णासिष्टः [। *]उक्तं च सकलधर्मं विचार्य पुरः [*]वरेण भगवता व्यासेन मामेका सुवल्ली-
 २५. मेकं च^{१ ०} भूमेरपुद्गलं(म्) । हरं नरकमाप्नोति यावदाहृतसंपूर्वं(वम्) [।। *]
 षष्टिवर्षसहस्रा-
 २६. णि स (स्व)र्गे वसति भूमिदः । आच्छेता(त्ता) चानुमंता च ताने(न्ये)व नरके वसे
 [।। *] विंश्याटवैस्ततो या-
 २७. सु सु(शु)ष्ककोटरवादिनः[।। *] कृष्णसर्पा हि जायंते भूमिदानं हरति ये ॥ बहुभिव-
 (र्वै)मुया भु-
 २८. क्ता राजभिः सगरादिभिः । यस्य यस्य यदा भूमि^{१ ७} तस्य तस्य तदा फल(लम्) ॥
 यानीह दत्ता(त्ता)-
 २९. नि पुरा नरे(रे)द्वै(द्वैः)दा(दा)नानि धर्माध्य(धै)यस(श)स्कराणि[।। *] निमोर्मु(र्)कमात्य-
 प्रतिमानि तानि को ना-
 ३०. म साधुः पुनराददीत[।। *]स्वदत्तां परदत्तां(त्तां) वा यत्नाद्भक्ष नराधिप । महि(हिं) महिषुजा
 ३१. खे(श्रे)ष्ट(ष्टः) दानाच्छ्रेयोनुपालनं(न्म्) ॥ सम्बन्तितां भाविनः (पाथि^{१ ६}वे(वे)द्रां(दान्) ।^{१ ८}
 भूयो भूयो जा(या)चते राम-
 ३२. भद्र(द्रः) । सामान्यो[ऽ *]यं धर्मो(र्मै)सेतु^{१ ०} नृपाणां स्वे स्वे काले पालनीयो भवद्भिः ॥
 यतोऽस्मद्भस(श)जेरं (रं)-
 ३३. ने(न्यै)र्वा भूमिभोगप्रतिभिः [।। *] प्रहतजलतरंगचंचु(च)लं जीवितमवलोक्य स(श)शि(शि)कर
 ३४. रुचिरं गतचुराजं(चौ)पुमि^{२ ०}रमहायोनुमतव्यः पालनि(नी)य(यः)सुचर्मक्रियार्थिजनबन्धु-
 ३५. जनेषु चित रूपं विलोलललनानयनवज्रेषु भक्तिश्चिरं(रम्) । स्वरसुतापतिपादयुग्मे^{२ १}
 ३६. जनितचित्तं(त्त) अधिरोधिनि यस्य लग्नां धर्माधिकरण(णा)धिकस्थितेन पंडित मूलस्था-
 ३७. न(ने) नति विक्रम सेजवाल् इतकेन राजनि(नी)य मातुलि(ली) खा(शा)पितमिति । दिनक-
 ३८. रचरणस्थिज्ञानरत्नस्वहस्तो[ऽ *]यं श्री सहस्राब्जुनं चक्रवर्ति(र्त्ती) देवस्य पुन्य(ष्व)
 ३९. भारनवदुष्टा(नी)भिसंयुक्तं(श्च) । नकं संस्थापितमिति । मंगलं महाश्रीमत्(तम्) ।
 ४०. पूर्वपश्चित पंचकोस(श)सीमा दक्षिणउत्तर सप्त(प्त)कोस(श) सीमा निवारितानि.....

Foot-notes

1. F. E. Pargiter, *Ancient Indian Historical Traditions*, Delhi, 196
151 ff., 265 ff.
2. Kalidas, *Raghuvamśam*, canto VI, verses 38, 43
3. L. D. Swamikannua Pillai, *Indian Ephemeris*, vol. I, part II,
Reprint, 1982, pp. 98 f.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 101
5. Hariprasad G. Shastri, 'Dwarka ane Beṭanā Mahattvanā Abhi
Sārvabhauma Sudhanvānuṅ Tāmrāphalaka', "Dwarka Sarvasamṅ
(ed. Pushkar Gokani and Sureshbhai Dave, Dwarka, 1973), pp.
6. Sākṣī (?)
7. Read ०दि०.
8. Read ०दि०.
9. Read ०तोया :
10. Read ०गान्.
11. Read ०हृदयित्वा.
12. Read ०शाखा.
13. Read ०वत्स०.
14. Read ०आत्मन :
15. Omit ०स्य०.
16. 'न' is extra according to the meter.
17. Read ०मि :
18. Omit daṇḍa.
19. Read ०तु :
20. Read यज्ञश्चिराय चिन्तीतु०मि०.
21. Read ०युग्मे.

N. M. Kansara

The Vedic Grammar of Bhojadeva, the celebrated Bhoja the Great of Dhārā (11th century A.D.) comprises the Eighth Adhyāya of his magnum opus known as the *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa* (*Vyākaraṇa*). It consists of about 822 aphorisms in Sanskrit, distributed into four Pādas, each having 174, 155, 261 and 232 sūtras, respectively. It is perhaps the oldest extant, and hence the first attempt at presenting a wellknit compact Vedic Grammar in Sanskrit by bringing the Pāṇinian tradition upto date. As is well known, the celebrated Pāṇini interspersed his Vedic sūtras into the body of his *Laukikasūtras* in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, topicwise locating them mostly at the end of the respective *prakaraṇa*, irrespective of its being discussed in different *pādas* and different *adhyāyas*. Bhojadeva has tried his best to preserve as much of the original wording of the Pāṇinian Sūtras as possible. But when the situation demanded, he has not hesitated to bring the topic upto date by altering the wording, by adding to the original, by splitting into two or more, of the Pāṇinian sūtras, in a bid to incorporate the *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana, discussion in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, as also comments in the *Kāśikā* of Vāmana-Jayāditya, over and above the *Gaṇapāṭha* and the *Phit-Sūtras* of Śāntanava. The process of modifications in the Pāṇinian sūtras pertaining to the Vedic Grammar can thus be fruitfully traced to all these wellknown sources of Bhojadeva's Vedic Grammar. This exercise, at first attempted by Dr. Chintamani, in tracing the sources of Bhojadeva's Vedic Sūtras to their originals in the Pāṇinian tradition, further helps us to get over the limitations of the manuscriptal evidence in arriving at the correct text of Bhojadeva's Vedic Grammar.

The Critical Text of the *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa-vyākaraṇa* of Bhojadeva was published by the University of Madras in 1937. And the text along with the *Hṛdaya-hāriṇī Vyākhyā* has been published from time to time, in parts, upto the end of the Sixth Adhyāya only. The Mss. for the portion pertaining to the Seventh Adhyāya is preserved in the Adyar

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Sanskrit Manuscripts Library, the Director of which institution informed me that they do not have the Ms. pertaining to the Eighth Adhyāya with the commentary. Perhaps the commentator has left the work incomplete. The comparison of the so far published work with commentary and that in the Critical Edition of Dr. T. R. Chintamani, referred to above, shows considerable variance in readings of the sūtras of the text of the work of Bhojadeva. This holds good for the Eighth Adhyāya, too. On the basis of my comparative study of the work, I have come across occasions on which the scribes of the respective Mss., utilised by Dr. Chintamani for the Critical Text, seem to have committed obvious mistakes in misreading their Ādarśas. And further, certain failings seem to belong to the author of the work, rather than to the scribes of the Mss. concerned. In order to restore the text to its purity and authenticity, I have ventured to suggest here some of the major emendations that are highly essential, leaving the task of revising the whole of the text of the Eighth Adhyāya for future, in the course of preparing the Gujarati Edition of the work.

1. NĀMLĪTO MANTRE// VIII. i. 19//

In the sūtra 'Kāspratyayād ām amantre liṭi' (P. III. i. 35) Pāṇini has negated the use of 'ām' āgama in Liṭ usage in the case of Mantras. Dr. Chintamani's reading 'Maṇe', there needs to be emended as 'Mantre'.

2. SUPYUPASARGAYOH JANASANAKHANAKRMAGAMO VII//
VIII. 1.39//

The Pāṇinian sūtra 'Janasanakhanakriamagamo viṭ' (P. III. ii. 67) has been adopted verbatim by Bhojadeva here. But in the Paninian scheme this sūtra expects by Anuvṛtti the words 'Chandasi', 'Upasarge' and 'Supi' from the previous sūtras, as has been indicated by the Kāśikā : "Chandasi. upasarge. supityanuvartate". It is, therefore, necessary to emend the reading of Dr. Chintamani by adding these words, and read the sūtra as shown above.

3. BHUTE HANAḤ KARMAṆI BRAHMABHRṆAVṚTTEṢU KVIP//
VIII. i. 35//

Pāṇini has given the sūtras 'Bhūte' (P. III. ii. 84), 'Karmaṇi hanaḥ' (P. III. ii. 86) and 'Brahmabhrṇavṛtteṣu kvip' (P. III. ii. 88). Dr. Chintamani's reading of Bhojadeva's sūtra is 'Bhūte hanaḥ kvip'. The previous sūtras of Bhojadeva do not enjoin 'Kvip' termination. Hence, in view of Pāṇinian source, Bhojadeva's sūtra needs to be emended as shown above.

4. TACCHILA-TADDHARMA-TATSĀDHUKĀRIṢU ÑER-ISÑUC
VIII. i. 38//

In the Pāṇinian scheme there are the sūtras 'Ākvestacchilataddarma-tatsādhukāriṣu' (P. III. ii. 134). 'Alaṅkṛṇirākṛṇ...sahacara iṣṇuc' (P. III. ii. 136) and 'Neś chandasi' (P. III. ii. 137). According to the Kāśikā, the Anuvṛtti of 'Tacchila...' etc., is expected in the last sūtra, which has been adopted by Bhojadeva verbatim, as per the reading of Dr. Chinatamani. But there is no provision for such an Anuvṛtti from the previous sūtras of Bhojadeva. The reading, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

5. MUDGALASYĀNUGLICCA// VII. i. 96//

On the Pāṇinian sūtra 'Indra-varuṇa...mātulācāryāṇām ānuk' (P. IV. i. 49) the Mahābhāṣya gives the Vārttika 'Mudgalāc chandasi lic ca'. In view of this Dr. Chintamani's reading of the Bhojadeva's sūtra 'Mudgavasya nuglic ca' (B. VIII. i. 94) needs to be emended as shown above. Further in view of the Pāṇinian sūtras viz. 'Bahvādibhyaś ca', 'Bhuvāś ca' and 'Indra-varuṇa...' (P. IV. i. 45, 47 and 49), the order of Bhojadeva's sūtra needs to be changed and it should be put at (B. VIII. i. 97), after 'Sampraviḥyo bhuvah' (B. VIII. i. 97), consequently effecting the change of the serial numbers of the previous sūtras 95, 96 and 97 as 94, 95 and 96.

6. TILĀN NIṢPHALĀT PIṢJO ĀIT//VIII. i. 10//

On the Pāṇinian sūtra 'Pitṛvya-mātula-mātāmaha-pitāmahaḥ' (P. IV. ii. 36) the Mahābhāṣya gives the following two vārtikas, viz., 'Tilān niṣphalāt piṇja-pejau pratyayau vaktavyau' and 'Piṇjaś chandasi dic ca'. Since Bhojadeva's sūtra is based on this vārtika, and since the word 'piṇja' is connected with the word 'tila', as is evident from the quoted usage 'Tila-piṇjaḥ' as an instance of the application of 'āit', the mention of the words 'Tilān niṣphalāt' is expected here. The reading of Dr. Chintamani, viz., 'Piccho nīḥ' (B. VIII. i. 104), therefore needs to be emended as shown above.

7. SVĀRTHE CHANDASO'KṢARĀṆĀM// VIII. i. 137//

On the Pāṇinian Sūtra 'Vasoh samūhe ca' (P. IV. iv. 140), there is a vārttika, viz., 'Akṣara-samūhe chandasah svārtha upasamīkhyānam'. Bhojadeva's sūtra is based on this vārttika. Consequently, Dr. Chintamani's reading 'Channaso' kṣarāṇām' needs to be emended as shown above.

8. ŚANŚATĀCCHATIBHYO ĀNIR VĀ// VIII. i. 141//

On the Pāṇinian sūtra 'Saṁkhyāyāṁ saṁjñāsamghasūtrādhyāyaneṣu' (P. V. i. 58) there is a vārttika, viz., 'Śaṁsator dīnīś chandasi' and 'Vimśateś ceti vaktavyam'. Bhojadeva seems to have included the latter vārttika by mentioning the ending 'Śati' in the sūtra. Although this sūtra belongs to the Vedic usages as is evident from the vārttika, Bhojadeva has by oversight included it in the Fifth Adhyāya as sūtra (B. V. ii. 65), which would restrict it to Laukika usage only. Since it is not included in this eighth Adhyāya, it should be placed between Bhojadeva's sūtras 'Tadasya parimāṇam' (B. VIII. i, 141) and 'Saptano'ṇ varge' (B. VIII. i. 142), giving the number as above and the serial numbers of the subsequent sūtras should be changed accordingly.

9. NAḤ SAṂKHYĀYĀ ASAMKHYĀDER MAṬ// VIII. i. 148//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Nāntād asaṁkhyāder maṭ' (P. V. ii. 49). In the scheme of Bhojadeva, the sūtra is adopted as 'Naḥ saṁkhyāyāṁ asaṁkhyādeḥ' at B. VIII. i. 148 as per the reading of Dr. Chintamani. In view of the Pāṇinian sūtra 'Thaḥ ca cchandasi' (P. V. ii. 50) and its interpretation by Kāśikā, viz., 'Cakārat pakṣe mad api bhavati/...Maṭ-Paṇcamam indriyam asya'pākṛāman', the mention of 'Maṭ' the Āgama, is expected here. The reading of the sūtra, thus needs to be emended as shown above.

10. PŪRAṆE THAḌ VĀ// VIII. i. 149//

In view of the Pāṇinian sūtra 'Thaḥ ca cchandasi' (P. V. ii. 50) and its interpretation quoted above, the reading 'Pūraṇe thaḍ va paripanthipari-pariṇau paryavasthātari' (B. VIII. i. 149) needs to be split into 'Pūraṇe thaḍ va' and the rest as a separate sūtra, since the later is evidently based on the Pāṇinian sūtra 'Chandasi paripanthi-pariparinau paryavasthātari' (P. V. ii. 89).

11. ANASOR NAPUMSAKĀT TATPURUṢĀT TAḤ VĀ// VIII. i. 169//

The Pāṇinian sūtra in question reads 'Anasantān napuṁsakāc chandasi' (P. V. iv. 103). The sūtra expects the Anuvṛtti of 'tatpuruṣāt' and 'Tāc'. The vārttika 'Anasantān napuṁsakāc chandasi vā-vacanam' on this sūtra makes the injunction optional. The reading 'Aso napuṁsakād bhaj vā' (B. VIII. i. 168) of Dr. Chintamani is thus highly corrupt and needs to be emended as shown above.

12. SAMĀSE 'NAÑ-PÜRVE LYAPAH KIVĀ VĀ// VIII. i. 68//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Kivā'pi chandasi' (P. VIII. i. 38) in which the words 'Samāse 'nañ-pūrve' are expected by Anuvṛtti. Hence his sūtra suffers from the defect of Pāṇinian expectancy. Bhojadeva has merely dropped 'Api' and replaced it by 'Vā'. It is, therefore, necessary to emend the sūtra as shown above.

It should, however, be noted in favour of Bhojadeva that he seems to have incorporated the provision of 'Lyap' in the case of 'A-samāsa' also, in view of the opinion of Kāśikā which adds 'Vā chandasi iti noktam, sarvopādhi-vyabhicārāramham/ tenā'samase'pi lab bhavati.../' as in 'Arcya tñ devān gatah/

13. UC CA// VIII. ii. 76//

Pāṇini has prescribed 'Bahulam chandasi' (P. VII. i. 103). Here the word 'Ṛtaḥ' from the previous sūtra 'Ṛta id dhātoḥ' (P. VII. i. 100) and the word 'Ut' from the previous sūtra 'Ud oṣṭhyapūrvasya' (P. VII. i. 102) are expected by Anuvṛtti. Bhojadeva has adopted (P. VII. i. 100) as B. VIII. ii. 74. However, he has forgotten to incorporate the prescription of P. VII. i. 103 in his scheme. It is, therefore, necessary to add some such sūtra as 'Uc ca' after (B. VIII. i. 74) to provide for Ukārādeṣa of the Dhātus ending in R, as in 'Mitrā-varuṇau tuturiḥ/Dure hy adhvā jaguriḥ/

14. NA PRATHAMĀ-DVIVACANE// VIII. ii. 78//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'prathamāyāś ca dvi-vacane bhāṣāyām' (P. VII. ii. 88), wherein the word 'Yuṣmad-asmaḍoḥ' is expected by Anuvṛtti from the previous sūtra P. VII. ii. 86. This sūtra restricts the Ākārādeṣa for Yuṣmad and Asmad in the field of Laukika Sanskrit usage only. Bhojadeva has adopted this prescription in his sūtra 'Yuṣmad-asmaḍor at' (B. VIII. ii. 76), and the Pāṇinian restriction about 'Bhāṣāyām' has been adopted in the sūtra 'Na prathamā-dvivacane' (B. VIII. ii. 75). In view of the fact that the words 'Yuṣmad-asmaḍoḥ' of the (B. VIII. ii. 76) are expected by Anuvṛtti in (B. VIII. ii. 75), the order of these two sūtras, as accepted by Dr. Chintamani, needs to be reversed and the reading 'divivacanam' should be emended as 'Dvivacane'.

15. SANIMŚASANIVĀMSAM// VIII. ii. 84//
NET PAVAKĀDINĀM// VIII. ii. 85//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Sanimsasanivāmsam' (P. VIII. ii. 69) and on another Paninian sūtra 'Na yāsayoḥ' (P. VIII. ii. 45) Kātyāyana has given the vārt-

rika 'Pāvakādīnām chandasy upasamkhyānam'. The word 'It' is expected by Anuvṛtti in this latter Pāṇinian sūtra from the previous one 'Pratyaya-sthāt kat purvasyāta id apyasyupah' (P. VII. iii. 44). Dr. Chintamani reads the Bhojadeva's sūtra as 'Sanirāsasanivāṁsam-netāvakādīnam' (B. VIII. ii. 82). Clearly the scribes have mixed up the two independent sūtras. The reading, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

16. TURUSTUŚAMYAMIBHYA IT SĀRVADHĀTUKASYA//
VIII. ii. 88//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Turustuśamyamaḥ sārvaadhātuke' (P. VII. iii. 95), wherein the word 'It' is expected by Anuvṛtti from the previous sūtra 'Bruva it' (P. VII. iii. 92). The Kāśikā informs us about the opinion of the School of Āpiśālī, with reference to this sūtra, viz., Āpiśālās turustuśamyamaḥ sārvaadhātukāsuc chandasī paṭhanti/ Tatra sarveṣām eva chandasi viśaye vidhir ayam bhavati/ 'This is the reason why Bhojadeva has incorporated the P. VII. iii. 95 here. But, in view of the Anuvṛtti expected in the Pāṇinian sūtra, and in view of the lack of the provision for the same here, the expectancy arises. Dr. Chintamani reads 'Tukastuśamyāmabhyā it' (B. VIII. ii. 85) and 'Sārvaadhātukasya' (B. VIII. ii. 86) as two separate independent sūtras. This reading, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

17. SAMBUDHYĀDIṢU GUṆĀDAYAḥ PRĀG LIṬAḥ // VIII. ii. 94//
NITYAM UR ṚTAḥ// VIII. ii. 95//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Jasi ca' (P. VII. iii. 109), on which Kāṭyāyana has given the vārttika 'Jasūdiṣu chandasi vā vacanam, prāṇ-ṇau caṇy upadhāyā hrasva (P. VII. iv. 1) ity etasmāt'. Now, the above Pāṇinian sūtra expects the words 'Sambuddhau' from (P. VII. iii. 106) and 'Hrasvasya guṇaḥ' from (P. VII. iii. 108.) And Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Nityam chandasi' (P. VII. iv. 8) in which the words 'Uḥ' and 'Ṛtaḥ' are expected by Anuvṛtti from the previous sūtra 'Ur ṛtaḥ' (P. VII. iii. 7). Dr. Chintamani reads Bhojadeva's sūtra as 'Sambudhyādiṣu guṇādayaḥ prāg-liṭaḥ nityam arut' (B. VIII. ii. 9). Clearly, the scribe has made the mistake in combining the two independent sūtras, and Dr. Chintamani seems to have accepted the mistake into in his reading. The reading, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

18. SASŪVA// VIII. ii. 107//
ŚLĀV ABHYASASY ET// VIII. ii. 108//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Sasūveti Nigame' (P. VII. iv. 74) and 'Bahulam chandasi' (P. VII. 78). In the latter sūtra the words 'Abhyāsasya,' 'Ślan'

and 'It' are expected by Anuvṛtti from the previous sūtra 'Atra lopo 'bhyāsasya' (P. VII. iv. 58), 'Nijāntrayāṇām guṇaḥ ślau' (P. VII. iv. 75) and 'Bhṛṇām it' (P. VII. iv. 76), respectively. And Bhojadeva has formulated his sūtra on the basis of all these elements. Dr. Chintamani reads Bhojadeva's sūtra as 'Śasuvāśāṅvabhyasasyet' (B. VIII. ii. 10). Clearly, these two are two independent sūtras, and the scribes have combined them due to ignorance of the subject. The reading, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

19. NABHASVAD-AN̄GIRASVAN-MANUṢVAD-VṚṢAṆVASU- VṚṢA-
NAŚVAŚ CA// VIII. ii. 121//
AYASMAYA-SAR̥KVATĀDAYAḥ // VIII. ii. 122//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Yaci bham' (P. I. iv. 18) on which Kātyāyana has given the Vārttikas 'Nabho 'ngiromanuṣāṁ vatyupasaṁkhyānam' and 'Vṛṣaṇvasvasvayoh'. The Kāśikā has applied the rule and supplied the examples 'Nabhasvat', 'Angirasvat' and 'manuṣvat' for the first Vārttika, and 'Vṛṣaṇvasu' and 'Vṛṣaṇaśva' for the second one. Then, Pāṇini has another sūtra 'Ayasmayādini cchandaśi' (P. I. iv. 20), on which the Kāśikā has remarked 'Kvacid ubhayam api bhavati—“sa suṣubhā sar̥kvatā gapena”'. Obviously, the coalescence '-svat+manu-' as '-svanmanu-' and the ending syllable '-śca-' in '-vṛṣaṇaśvaścina' dictate that the portion 'Nabhasva... vṛṣaṇaśvaś ca' forms one sūtra, and the rest another independent sūtra. Dr. Chintamani reads Bhojadeva's sūtra as 'Nabhascadamśisvanuṣyavṛṣanavatsu vṛṣaṇaścāyasmayasar̥kvadādayaḥ' which is corrupt due to scribal errors. The sūtra, therefore, needs to be split up into two, and emended as shown above.

20. NA RAPARA-SR̥PI-SR̥JI-SPR̥ŚI-SPR̥HĀM// VIII. ii. 149//
SAVANA-SUTA-SĀMA-SAVANAMUKHĀNĀM DVIRUKTAU//
VIII. ii. 150

Pāṇini gives the sūtra 'Na raparas̥pīs̥r̥jis̥p̥r̥śis̥p̥r̥hisavanādinām' (P. VIII. iii. 110). The Kāśikā lists under Savanādi-gana the following: 'Savanādinām-savane 2, sūte 2, sāme 2, savanamukhe 2.' Evidently, Bhojadeva has, while adopting the sūtra, split it into two by separating the portion 'savanādinām' and substituting it by the members of the Savanādi-gana as given by the Kāśikā. Dr. Chintamani reads them as one sūtra (B. VIII. ii. 144), which is corrupt, since the qualification 'Dviruktau' does not apply to 'Rapara... spr̥hām'. The reading, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

21. GARHYA-KUSĪDA-DAŚAIKĀDAŚIKĀH// VIII. iii. 25//

Pāṇini gives the sūtras 'Prayacchati garhyam' (P. IV. iv. 30). and 'Kusīdadaśaikādaśāt śhaṅṣhacau' (P. IV. iv. 31). Bhojadeva has adopted these sūtras in his scheme as 'Garhyam' (B. IV. iv. 89) and 'Daśaikādaśa-kusīdābhyāṁ śhan' (B. IV. iv. 91). Bhojadeva has again adopted the usages about 'Garhya', 'Kusīda' and 'Daśaikādaśika' in this sūtra with reference to the Udatta accent, since the termination 'śhan' is Nit. But, Dr. Chintamani reads the sūtra as 'Varyadaśaikādaśikāh' (B. VIII. iii. 25). Evidently, the reading is corrupt; and the plural ending warrants the mention of the missing word 'Kusīda' in the sūtra. The reading, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

22. TRICATUṢṆAH SAMKHYĀYĀ HALĀDIH// VIII. iii. 53//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Śaṭtricaturbhyo halādiḥ' (P. VIII. iii. 53) where he prescribes the Udatta accent for the terminations beginning with with consonants, in the case of the words 'Śaṭ', 'Tri' and 'Catus'. Bhojadeva has formulated his sūtra on his basis of this sūtra, by changing the order of the words as 'Tri', 'Catus' and 'Śaṭ'. Dr. Chintamani reads Bhojadeva's sūtra as 'Titiṣṇuḥ (?) samkhyāyā halādiḥ' (B. VIII. iii. 53). Obviously, the reading is corrupt, and needs to be emended as shown above.

23. NA VINDINDHIKHIDIHNUṢṆIBHYAH// VIII. iii. 61//

On the Pāṇinian sūtra 'Anudāttasya ca yatrodāttalopaḥ' (P. VI. i. 161), Patanjali gives the Bhāṣya-vārtika 'Vindindhikhidibhyaśca lasārvadhātuk-anudāttapratishedhāṇi siddham'. And, again, Pāṇini gives another sūtra 'Tāsyānudāttennidad upadeśālasārvadhātukamanudāttamahnviṇoḥ' (P. VI. i. 180). Bhojadeva formulated his sūtra by combining the Bhāṣya-vārtika and the negational part 'Ahnviṇoḥ' of the latter Pāṇinian sūtra. Dr. Chintamani reads the sūtra as 'Vindindhividhasvibhyaḥ' (B. VIII. iii. 61), which is evidently corrupt, and needs to be emended as shown above.

24. GUHĀRĀDHĀRĀKĀRĀDHĀTIMANTRAKĀMAYĀMAKALPAPĀ-
DAVAHAMAHĀRĀJIKADĀNDĀJINIKĀNDĪRAPĀTRIYĀDINĀM//
VIII. iii. 84//
SAṆJNĀYĀM UPAMĀNAM// VIII. iii. 85//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Vṛṣādmām ca' (P. VI. i. 203), wherein he prescribes the Udatta accent on the initial syllable of the words included in the Vṛṣādi-gaṇa. Bhojadeva has formulated his sūtra on the basis of this Gaṇa

and has covered the words beginning with 'Guhā' and has changed their order to suit their easy pronunciation by due coalescence.

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Samjñāyām upamānam' (P. VI. i. 204). Dr. Chintamani's reading combines both these sūtras, which are quite independent, since the latter part, as shown to be separate sūtra above, has nothing to do with the words of Vṛṣādigana. The sūtra, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

25. MATOR ĀT STRISAMJÑĀYĀM// VIII. iii. 106//

Pāṇin has the sūtra 'Matoḥ pūrvam āt samjñāyām striyām' (P. VI. i. 219). Bhojadeva has formulated his sūtra on the basis of this Pāṇinian sūtra. But he seems to have intended 'Matoḥ' as locative indicating the previous place to the prescribed syllable. Dr. Chintamani reads Bhojadeva's sūtra as 'Mato vā' (B. VIII. iii. 105) and 'Stri samjñāyām' (B. VIII. iii. 106). Obviously it is corrupt and needs to be emended as one sūtra shown above.

26. NRAḤ SAMKHYĀYĀḤ // VIII. iii. 137//

Since Bhojadeva has adopted the *Phīṭ*-sūtras of Śāntanava serially in his text beginning with (B. VIII. iii. 109), and since he has included the previous sūtra 'Tṛṇadhānyānam ca dyaṣam' (Ph. S. II. 4) and the following sūtra 'Svāṅgaśiṭam adantam' (Ph. S. II. 6), he had no reason to drop the intervening *Phīṭ*sūtra 'Nraḥ samkhyāyāḥ' (Ph. S. II. 5) from his scheme. The text, therefore, needs the addition of the sūtra in the place shown above, since possibly the scribe has dropped it through oversight.

27. PATYĀV AIŚVARYE// VIII. iv. 20//
ABHŪVĀKCIDDIDHIṢU// VIII. iv. 21//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Patyav aiśvarye' (P. VI. ii. 18) and it is followed by another sūtra 'Na bhūvākciddiḥiṣu' (P. VI. ii. 19), in which the word 'pati' is expected by Anuvṛtti. Bhojadeva has based his sūtras on these Pāṇinian sūtras. However, Dr. Chintamani reads the sūtras of Bhojadeva as 'Abhūvākciddiḥiṣu' (B. VIII. iv. 20) and 'Patyāv aiśvarye' (B. VIII. iv. 21). In view of the expectancy of the word 'Pati' in the previous sūtra of Bhojadeva, the order needs to be reversed as shown above.

28. ĀCĀRYOPASARJANĀNTEVĀSINĀM CA// VIII. iv. 69//
MODAḤ PAIPALĀDER VĀ// VIII. iv. 70//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Ācāryopasarjanaś cāntevāsi' (P. VI. ii. 36) and 'Kārtakaujapādayaś ca' (P. VI. ii. 37). In this latter sūtra he refers to the words listed in the Kārtakaujapādi-gaṇa and enjoins the Prakṛti-svara in the

case of the Pūrva-pada of the Dvandva compounds included in the Gaṇa. Bhojadeva suitably breaks up the list into a number of parts, and formulates his sūtras B. VIII. iv. 66-70. In the last sūtra he intends to include the words 'Moda-paippalāḥ' and 'Moda-paippalāḍḥ' from the Gaṇa. But Dr. Chintamani reads the Bhojadeva's sūtras 'Ācāryopasarjanāntevāsinām cāmodaḥ' (B. VIII. iv. 69) and 'Paippalāder va'. Evidently the scribe has committed a lapse here by combining the initial word of the latter sūtra with the last one of the previous sūtra, and included it therein. The sūtras, therefore, need to be emended as shown above.

29. ANTAH// VIII. iv. 109//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Antah' (P. VI. ii. 92) which begins the Adhikāra of the accentuation of the last syllable of the previous member of a compound, and then he gives the sūtras 'Sarvaṁ guṇakārtsnye' (P. VI. ii. 93) and others, which expect the word 'Antodātta, in them by Anuvṛtti. Bhojadeva has evidently formulated his sūtra 'Guṇakārtsnye' (B. VIII. iv. 107) on this Pāṇinian sūtra. But in the scheme of Bhojadeva there is no previous sūtra to prescribe the Adhikāra of Antodātta. Thus, it is necessary to insert the new sūtra 'Antah' in Bhojadeva's scheme by adopting (P. VI. ii. 92) before (B. VIII. iv. 106) with the same serial number, to make good the deficiency, in keeping with his practice of laying down the Adhikāras, as in 'Ādyudattam' (B. VIII. iv. 72) and 'Antyāt pūrvaṁ bahvacah' (B. VIII. iv. 96).

30. GATYUPAPADAKĀRAKEBHYAḤ KṚT// VIII. iv. 156//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Gatikārapapadāt kṛt' (P. VI. ii. 139) which prescribes Prakṛti-svara to the Kṛdanta latter member of a Tatpuruṣa compound. Bhojadeva has formulated his sūtra on the basis of this Pāṇinian sūtra. In the scheme of Bhojadeva there is no provision for expecting the 'Kṛt' from any of the previous sūtras. Dr. Chintamani reads the sūtra of Bhojadeva as 'Pathyupapadakārakebhyaḥ' (B. VIII. iv. 155), which is rather corrupt, and hence needs to be emended as shown above.

31. DVITRIBHYĀM PĀDDANMŪRDHĀNAḤ// VII. iv. 192//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Dvitribhyām pāddanmūrdhasu bahuvrīḥ' (P. VI. ii. 197). Bhojadeva has based his sūtra on this Pāṇinian sūtra. Dr. Chintamani reads Bhojadeva's sūtra as 'Dvitribhyām pāddat' (B. VIII. iv. 191) and 'Mūrdhanaḥ' (B. VIII. iv. 192). Evidently, the scribe has here made a mistake in splitting one sūtra into two. The reading, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

32. NALOPAH SUPSVARASAMJNĀTUGVIDHIṢU KṚTI PURVATRĀSIDDHAH// VIII. iv. 224//

Pāṇini has the sūtras 'Pūrvatrāsiddham' (P. VIII. ii. 1) and 'Nalopaḥ supsvarasamjñātugvidhiṣu kṛti' (P. VIII. ii. 2). The latter sūtra expects the former by Anuvṛtti, since it falls into the Pūrvatrāsiddha Adhikara of the Tripāḍi. Bhojadeva too has the sūtras 'Pūrvatrāsiddham' and 'Nalopaḥ supi' (B. VII. iii. 38-39). But in view of the Pāṇinian sūtra the specific mention of the words 'Sup-svara-samjñā-tugvidhiṣu' and 'Kṛti' is expected in the Bhojadeva's sūtra, especially since it enjoins the Asiddhatva of Nalopa. The sūtra, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

33. VĀKYASYA TEḤ PLUTA UDĀTTAḤ// VIII. iv. 225//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Vākyaṣya Teḥ pluta udāttaḥ' (P. VIII. ii. 82). Bhojadeva has adopted this sūtra in two places, viz., 'Vākyaṣya teḥ' (B. VII. iii. 131) and 'Pluta udāttaḥ' (B. VIII. iv. 225). Evidently, Bhojadeva seems to refer to his previous sūtra prescribing the Udātta accent. The Kāśikā justifies the words 'Vākyaṣya teḥ' in the Pāṇinian sūtra as follows : Vākya-grahaṇam antyaṣya padasya pluta-nivṛttyartham/ Tīgrahaṇam vyanjanāntarasyāpi teḥ acaḥ pluto yathā syāt-'Agnici3d iti/. Dr. Chintamani reads Bhojadeva's sūtra as 'Pluta Udāttaḥ' (B. VIII. iv. 225). The sūtra is deficient and hence needs to be emended as shown above.

34. EKĀDEŚAH PADĀDAU VODĀTTAḤ// VIII. iv. 231//

Pāṇini has the sūtra 'Svarito vā'nudātte padādau' (P. VIII. ii. 6), wherein the Ekādeśa of the Udātta followed by initial Anudātta of a word is prescribed as Svarita optionally. Bhojadeva has preferred to prescribe the Udātta of the Anudātta optionally in the same position. Dr. Chintamani reads Bhojadeva's sūtra as 'Ekāde apadādau padāke vākye' (B. VIII. iv. 231). Evidently, the last word seems to be connected with the subsequent sūtra. The reading, therefore, needs to be emended as shown above.

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Dr. Parul K. Mankad

In his 'Alaṅkāracintāmaṇi' (i.e., Aci) Ajitasena has discussed almost all the aspects of Sanskṛta Kāvyaśāstra. Some of them are narrated in details and some in brief. Ajitasena was a Jain monk. He belonged to the XIIIth century A.D.

In the 5th chapter of Aci the theory of rasa or rasamīmāṃsā is briefly discussed. Ajitasena seems to rely on Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra, (i.e., N. S.). We shall, discuss and evaluate his rasanīṣpattivicāra as follows :-

In the 5th Chapter Ajitasena gives the definition of इन्द्रियज्ञान - the knowledge of senses. When the ज्ञानावरण is destroyed, दीर्घान्तराय is removed. The knowledge is dawned through mind and senses.¹

Then he gives the definition of Sthāyibhāva (See, 5/2)

Ajitasena accepts nine rasās and therefore nine Sthāyibhāvas are accepted accordingly. Then he proceeds to show the ālambana and uddīpana vibhāvas and Sāttvikabhāvas, and 33 Vyabhicāribhāvas.

In the Kārika 5/63 the adhiṣṭhāna of rasa is discussed. Ajitasena holds that rasa resides in the actor and not in the spectator.

First of all, he discusses bhāvas and then takes up rasas. In 5/64 he explains ten Varieties of Sṅgāra, following Bharata. Then he defines nine rasas and briefly discusses the Varieties of Nāyikas.

Śānta for him is the highest rasa.

Jiva is pariṇāmi and so he (Ajitasena) does not accept the colours and dieties of the rasas. So that according to Ajitasena the colours and dieties of rasas are not possible but the method of poetry is to be followed. So he describesthe colours and dieties in 5/133.

Now, we shall discuss the critical aspect of Ajitasena's theory of rasa in the light of Sanskṛta poetics.

Ajitasena says—

तेन संवेद्यमानो यो मोहनीयसमुद्भवः ।

रसामिव्यञ्जकः स्थायिभावश्चिद्वृत्तिपर्ययः ॥

(Aci. 5/2)

1. क्षयोपशमने ज्ञानावृत्तिवीर्यान्तराययोः ।

इन्द्रियमिन्द्रियेर्जीवे त्विन्द्रियज्ञानमुद्भववेत् ॥

(Aci. 5/2)

Sthāyī is experienced through knowledge of the senses, and is born of मोहनीय कर्म^८ and is of the form of चिद्वृत्ति— It is suggestive of rasa.

Ajitasena holds Sthāyī as a suggestor of rasa. So it seems that he accepts the tradition of 'स्थायिविलक्षणो रसः' ^१ because here he does not say that sthāyī itself is rasa, — 'स्थायी एव रसः' — OR उत्कर्षप्राप्तः उपचितः वा स्थायी रसः ^१

Abhinavagupta takes sthāyī as a Saṁskāra – Vasanā, While Ajitasena puts Sthāyī as a result of मोहनीय action. So he uses the term of Jain darśana. But he does not lay down clearly the form of Sthāyī and also does not discuss the explicit idea of the Jain terminology.

He mentions nine sthāyīs and he accepts Śama as a Sthāyī of Śāntarasa.

After that he has discussed the psychological basis of the sthāyibhāvas. In this discussion he follows Bharata and Abhinavagupta. (See, वृत्ति of 5/3).

He says :—

शृङ्गारादि रसत्वेन स्थायिनो भावयन्ति ये ।

ते विभावानुभावौ द्वौ सात्त्विकव्यभिचारिणौ ॥

(Aci. 5/4)

Thus vibhāvādi four bhāvas convert the sthāyī into sṛṅgārādi rasas.

What is vibhāva ? Ajitasena explains—

नाटकादिषु काव्यादौ पश्यतां शृण्वतां रसान् ।

विभावयेद् विभावश्चालम्बनेऽदीपनाद् द्विषा ॥

(Aci. 5/5)

For those who see drama and listen to kāvya vibhāvas make them experience rasas. Vibhāvas are two-fold, ālambana and uddīpana.

Bharata also Says विभावयन्ते etc. (See, N. S. 7/4) Ajitasena explains it in explicit manner.

Ajitasena defines the ālambana vibhāvas as follows :— (Aci. 5/6)

Factors resorting to which rasa is manifested are Called आलम्बनः and in case of couples, the lover and the beloved are ālambanas for each other.

He holds— रसस्योपादानं हेतुरालम्बनभावः । (Vṛtti of 5/6) i.e. आलम्बनभाव is the उपादान — material cause of rasa.

The factors that enhance the rasa are उद्दीपक's the instrumental causes such as moon light, garden etc.; in case of Sṛṅgāra: (5/8). Then he attempts the definition of अनुभावः.

Again in a sūtra he holds— रसस्य निमित्तहेतुहृदीपनभावः । The uddīpanavi-bhāvas are the instrumental causes of rasa. (Vṛtti of 5/8)

The Uddīpanas are four-fold viz, the गुणः— qualities, अलंकार— orna-ments वेष्टा— activities concerning the आलम्बन and also तटस्थ or neutral.

Then he describes the guṇas of ālambana and the alankāras of heroine (Nāyikā) according to N. S.

In 5/14 Ajitasena gives the definition of anābhāva.

रसोऽनुभूयते भावैर्देहं त्वन्मोऽनुभावकैः ।

तेऽनुभावा निगद्यन्ते कटाक्षादिस्तनुद्भावः ॥

Rasa is experienced by the भावः and is caused by अनुभावः, such as कटाक्षादि, produced from the body.

Bharata has observed in N. S. 7/6 that wordly actions have become अलौकिक अनुभाव in poetry and by them the Vācika, āṅgika and sāttvika abhinayas are performed.

Ajitasena describes sāttvikabhāva also following Bharata.

सत्त्वं हि चेतसो वृत्तिस्तत्र जातास्तु सात्त्विकाः ।

स्युस्ते च स्पर्शनालपनितश्चास्फालनादिषु ॥

(Aci. 5/16)

The sthva is the vṛtti-behaviour of चित्त— mind and sāttvika takes birth from it, i.e. सत्त्वं. Hence they are called sāttvika. They are horripilation etc. (Compare N. S. 7/374)

The sāttvikabhāvas are eight, only the change is made in the sequence, which Bharata has mentioned as स्वरभेद etc.

For Vyabhicāribhāvas Ajitasena says :-

उद्भवन्त्यः प्रणश्यन्त्यो वीचयोऽन्वयो तथात्मनि ।

बहुधा संचरन्तो ये भावाः संचारिणो मताः ॥

(Aci. 5/26)

Like the waves of ocean, rising and falling, the vyabhicāris move in the soul. Here, he seems to be under the influence of Daśarūpaka.

Ajitasena also mentions 33 bhāvas following Bharata but he puts first शीः (भय) in place of nirveda. In some place there is a change of name e.g. जडता for जाड्य.

He observes, following अभिनवगुप्त that the सात्त्विकऽ and व्यभिचारिन् are not fixed with this or that rasa only. Then he enlists particular सात्त्विकऽ and व्यभिचारिन् with reference to particular rasas.

The Adhishthāna of rasa

Though he believes rasa as suggested, he does not accept 'bhāvaka' as the location of rasa. He has mentioned that actor is the adhishthāna of rasa i.e. Ajitasena puts rasa in the actor-nāṭa-nartaka.

रसभावाभिनेतृत्वेऽधिकृते न तं रसाः ।

भावा न किंतु सम्भवे स्मृतपत्ररसादिषु ॥

(Aci. 5/63)

Bhāvas do not stay in सभ्य.

While, Abhinavagupta strongly believes that rasa does not reside in the actor, because the taste is not in the cup-pātra, but always in the drink. So the adhishthāna-location of rasa is in the heart of the connoisseur-सहृदय.

Ajitasena describes the ten avasthās-forms of Sṛṅgāra following Bharata and others. He changes some titles.

He accepts nine rasas and so with Śama sthāyī he has mentioned śāntarasa.

The rasas

Ajitasena follows the ancient ācāryas like Dandin and Lollāṭa, when he defines Sṛṅgāra and other rasas, e.g.:-

प्राप्यते या रतिमविः स शृङ्गाररसा मतः । (5/86)

हासारस्य स्थायिभावो यो विभावोऽयः प्रप्राप्यते । (5/96)

पुष्टः शोको विभावोऽयः स एव करुणो द्विधा । (5/101)

कोषः पुष्टो विभावोऽयः स रौद्ररसतां गतः ॥ (5/105)

nd see, again, 5/114 (भवानक) 5/118 (व्रीहत्स) 5/124 (अदभुत) and 5/125 (साम्त)

When he defines sthāyī he calls it "to be रसाभिद्रव्यजक."

In 5/83, 84 he gives rasalakṣaṇa

रसं जीवितभूतं तु प्रबन्धान्तं ब्रुवेऽद्युवा ।

विभावोऽयं चतुष्केण स्थायी भावः स्फुटो रसः ॥

नवनीतं यथाज्यत्वं प्राप्नोति परिपाकतः ।

स्थायी भावो विभावोऽयः प्राप्नोति रसतां तथा ॥

Rasa is the soul of a composition. Now by vibhāvas etc. sthāyibhāva attains to the position of rasa. As butter turn into ghee, sthāyibhāva turns into rasa. This has a reference to परिणामवाद or सुत्कायवाद. Viśvanātha also refers to this. (सं. द. 3/15, 16 and vṛti on 3/28)

But Ajitasena is not clear, because first he says that rasa is suggested and at other places; he observes that rasa is 'upacita-puṣṭa'.

He considers rasa as the life of composition but does not explain how rasa is suggested. So it is difficult to say, whether he follows the tradition of स्थायी एव रसः or स्थायिविलक्षणो रसः ।

When he narrates the form of Kāvya, he says that it is 'नवरसकलितम्' (See, Aci, 1/7) and unites it with vyaṅgyārth. But actually about the soul of poetry he is not clear.

In 5/130 he describes the opposite rasas such as Sṅgāra, Vira, Vira-Bhayanaka. In 5/131 he describes रस born of रस following Bharata. He says Hāsyā is born of Sṅgāra, raudra of Karuṇa adbhuta of vira and bhayanaka of bībhatsa.¹

With reference to Śāntarasa, while talking about the study of Śāstras, he follows the Jain faith.

He holds that as Śānta is the highest rasa it has neither रौद्री or correspondence nor opposition.

Then the colours and dieties of the rasas are described in some different manner from Bharata. According to Bharata the diety of hāsyā is gaṇa of Shiva, while according to Ajitasena the diety of hāsyā is Gaṇapati, himself. Bharata has Lord 'Buddha' as a diety of śānta, while, Ajitasena has 'Parabrahma.'

The varieties of hāsyā are described following Bharata.

Thus Ajitasena in brief, discusses the problem of rasa. He has left the discussion of रसप्रक्रिया, so his discussion does not seem to be perfect.

Following Ānandavardhana he also holds that three-fold रीतिस are रसव्यञ्जकः (See, 5/134). The रीतिस are 'गुणसंश्लिष्ट शब्दौषधं' शब्दा and वाक्य are described at 5/139-140 etc. These also suggest रस. He holds that अर्थ is threefold viz, वाक्य, लक्ष्य and व्यङ्ग्य. The vṛttis (5/158) also suggest the existence of रस.

1. धृङ्गारजनिता हास्या रौद्रीत्यः करुणा मृतः ।

अद्भुतो जायते वीराद बीभत्साच्च भयानकः ॥

(Aci, 5/131)

Thus, keeping aside some Jain impressions, Ajitasena seems to follow. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, on the whole; though at times he creates an impression that he follows Lollaṭa and others.

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Abbreviations

- (1) Alāṅkāracintāmaṇi- Aci.
- (2) Bharata Nāṭyaśāstra- N. S.
- (3) Sāhityadarpaṇa सा. द.

Hardly there is any other country in the world that has paid so much attention to language, its nature and function, its relation with the whole universe and with man. In this paper I want to highlight some of these aspects as reflected in Sanskrit Philosophical and Systematic literature.

1.0 Human Behaviour

A human being performs three types of behaviour either (i) he moves forward (*praytti*) or (ii) he moves backward (*nivrtti*) or (iii) he remains indifferent (*audāśnya*). To illustrate, when a person goes to collect silver, he is said to have behaved in the first category and when he runs after seeing a snake he is said to have behaved in the second category and when a *Sanyāsin* neither moves forward to collect silver nor runs away after seeing a surpent he is said to have behaved in the third category stated above.

Further, a human behaviour may be consistent and inconsistent. A consistent behaviour is that behaviour in which a person gets the same object which is shown by his knowledge. If the knowledge shows that there is silver and if he goes and gets the silver and can prepare ornaments, his behaviour will be said to be consistent. But when he sees a silver and goes to collect it and gets frustrated by not getting it, his behaviour will be said to be inconsistent. Here, the person does not get the object shown by the cognition.

Thus, whether it is a consistent behaviour or inconsistent behaviour, it is prompted by a cognition which can be verbalised. A true cognition prompts a consistent behaviour and a false cognition prompts an inconsistent behaviour.

2.0 The Universe

One behaves with the universe in which he lives. We have just stated above that it is the cognition that prompts a behaviour. That is, it is the cognition that prompts one to behave with its content. Thus, one behaves

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with the content of the cognition that prompts his behaviour. To be more precise, one behaves consistently with the object of the true cognition that prompts his consistent behaviour and one behaves inconsistently with the object of the false cognition that prompts his inconsistent behaviour. This object of cognition is the universe around him.

The next question that arises is whether this object of cognition i.e. the universe with which we behave has any ontological reality. Opinions of the philosophers are divided on this issue.

While the philosophers belonging to the realistic schools like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā hold that the world with which we behave is real, the idealists like the Buddhists and the Advaitins hold that it is mental projection and so the universe has no ontological reality.

This raises the next question : what is Reality ? In other words, how to decide whether *x* is real or unreal. The logicians attempted definitions of reality and falsity in terms of true and false cognitions respectively. If a cognition is true, its content is true and if it is false, the content is also false. Thus, an object of a cognition which is not contradicted by any subsequent cognition is said to be real, whereas an object of a cognition that is contradicted by a subsequent cognition is said to be false. (*abādhitajñāna-viśayaḥ satyaḥ* and *bādhitajñānaviśayaḥ asatyaḥ*).

For the Realists was the position stated above, but for the Idealists though the position about unreal remained the same, they suggested degrees of Realities for the sake of explaining human behaviour. For the Idealists like the Buddhists, however, *śūnyatā* may alone be the reality. For the Vedāntins, the ultimate reality is the Brahman, and really speaking there is no other reality in true sense of the term. But since human beings are behaving consistently with this world they had to posit a Reality called *vyāvahārika*-reality. Since human beings also behave inconsistently with the object of a false cognition they had to postulate a third type of reality called *prātibhāṣika* reality. Thus, for the Advaitin, there are three types of reality (1) *pāramārthika*, (2) *vyāvahārika* and (3) *prātibhāṣika*. The silver with which one makes or ornaments is a *vyāvahārika*-reality, the silver seen in the glittering conch-shell is a *prātibhāṣika*-reality and the Brahman is the *pāramārthika*-reality. The silver seen in the conch-shell has existence (*sattā*) only for the time till one discovers that it is not silver but only a conch-shell. This *sattā* is called the *prātibhāṣika-sattā*.

The relationship among these realities is quite interesting. If looked closely, one can see that the existence of the silver, seen in a conch-shell, has the duration of the cognition of the silver till it is known that it is not

silver. That is why, this silver is described as *jñānaikasattāka* 'of the duration of the cognition itself'. This, if the cognition exists for, say, one hour the mistaken silver exists for one hour. In other words, it has reality in some sense during that time and it disappears immediately after the knowledge of conch-shell. It is like the silver in the dream which disappears immediately after awakening.

Likewise, the Advaitins argue, the silver with which we behave consistently is going to disappear after one realises the ultimate Truth, the Brahman. From the point of view of ultimate Reality there is no difference between a *prātibhāsikasattā* and *vyāvahārika-sattā* and if at all there is difference it is only in terms of duration of time. The existence of silver seen in the conch-shell has shorter duration, while that of the silver which is used for ornaments has longer duration, but ultimately when the contradictory knowledge (*bādhakajñāna*) is going to arise, even the *vyāvahārika-rajata* is going to disappear. As the knowledge of conch-shell dispels *rajata*, in the same manner the knowledge of the Truth will dispel what we normally consider to be real i.e. the mundane world.

3.0 The Sources of a true cognition

We have seen above that the object of a true cognition is true and since the true cognition alone prompts our consistent behaviour with this world, the world is true.

Now, the question arises—how does a true cognition come into existence? In other words, what are the instruments or sources of a true cognition?

A cognition varies in types, depending upon the difference in its source. The process involved in generating a perceptual cognition is different from that involved in generating an Inferential cognition or verbal cognition or analogical cognition. Since the processes differ, the resultant cognitions also differ. This process or source of a cognition is also called *pramāṇa*.

Different philosophical systems conceived different number of the sources of cognitions. The number ranges from one to eight. The Cārvākas accepted only one *pramāṇa* i.e. perception or *pratyakṣa*. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists posited two, perception and Inference (*anumāna*), the Sāṃkhya-philosophers added *śabda* (verbal testimony) and accepted three *pramāṇas-pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* (verbal testimony).

The Naiyāyikas accepted four—*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *śabda* and *upamāna* (analogy). The Prābhākaras added *arthāpatti* to this list and made it five. The Bhāṭṭa school accepted six by accepting *anupalabdhi* or *abhavapramāṇa*.

The *paurāṇika* tradition accepted eight by adding two more to the above list, namely, *aitihya* and *sambhava*.

The Indian tradition has examined the above proposals thoroughly through centuries. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues that only first four *pramāṇas* are necessary to be accepted, and the remaining four could be included in these four only. Thus, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda* are required to be accepted as the valid source of valid cognitions, and *arthāpatti* can be included in *anumāna*; *anupalabdhi* can be accepted only as an auxiliary cause for generating the knowledge of absence, and *aitihya* and *sambhava* can be included in *śabda* and *anumāna* respectively.

It is clear from this that *śabda* or language is one source of cognition.

4.0 Language as source of a cognition :

On this issue again the Indian Philosophers did not see eye-to-eye. The Buddhist held that language does not speak the truth and it has nothing to do with reality. The Advaita Vedānta too took the same view that the Reality is beyond the reach of any language (*avāṇ-manaso gocaraḥ*). But there is difference between the views of the Buddhists and those of the Advaitins. While the Buddhists did not accept anything positive as real and all along advocated for *śūnyatā*, the Advaitins accepted the Brahman as the only Reality. Thus, the Advaitins had to accept temporary reality of this mundane world which is referred to by language. Thus, though the language may speak of this mundane world, it cannot speak of the ultimate Reality, the Brahman.

On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas took a stand that a language always speaks of reality. Thus, what language refers to is real. The entire world, therefore, became *padārtha* 'referent of a term' for the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school. The world is very much real for them as we have already observed above. Thus, language does speak of reality according to them.

Bharṭṭhari, the grammarian Philosopher took another stand. For him the entire world is a manifestation of *śabda*, the supreme reality. He was of the opinion that there can be no knowledge of this world without the interference of the *śabda*, the language. According to him any knowledge which is capable of being verbalised is a transformation of language itself. Therefore, there is no knowledge which is not associated with language. Both right and wrong knowledge are capable of being verbalised. Even the knowledge of a fictitious thing is capable of being verbalised. Thus, language speaks truth and also fiction. Language speaks of flower

in the garden and also flower in the sky which is fictitious; it speaks of the son of a person and also of son of a barren lady; it describes a person taking bath in the ganges and also in the mirage. Since the whole universe is the modification and transformation of *śabda*, language has reference to each and everything in this world, whether real or fictitious.

The Indian logicians (Naiyāyikas) and all those who believed in the reality of the world around us held a distinct view on the language and its association with the reality. They held the view that language speaks both, truth and untruth. Thus, language can be the source of a true cognition as well as of a false cognition. The language which is the source of a true cognition is called *Śabdapramāṇa*, and that of a false cognition is *pramāṇābhāsa*. According to this school a language encodes the knowledge which is to be verbalised. The speaker or writer expresses that language and the hearer or reader decodes that language and acquires the knowledge which was encoded by the speaker or the writer. Language is the medium through which the speaker or the writer transmits his or her knowledge to the hearer or reader. Thus, the speaker or writer wants to take the hearer or reader to the same world, the knowledge of which he encoded. If he succeeds in taking him there, there is said to be *saṁvāda* (agreement) between a speaker and a hearer or between a writer and a reader. It is in this background that one should understand why the Naiyāyikas call the Universe as *padārtha*, the referent of language.

This is an extreme view in the sense that it presupposes that language always speaks of the reality, and when it appears that language has expressed absurdity, the fact is this that it has simply verbalised a false cognition and thus if one understands 'sky-flower' as an entity having real existence, he is mistaken because there is no entity called sky-flower in this world. Thus, language always speaks the truth and it truly verbalises a false cognition also. Thus, the sentences likes, 'The circle is a square' etc. will generate only false cognitions since their contexts never correspond to the reality. This leads one think over the process by which a sentence generates understanding.

5.0 The Process of verbal understanding :

The following steps have been postulated in generating the verbal understanding :

- Step I : The hearer acquires the knowledge of morphemic constituents of a sentence (i.e. *padajñāna*)
- Step II : He will remember the referents from each of the respective constituents (*Padārtha-Smarana*)

Step III: He will come to know the relationships among the remembered referents.

The step III is the resultant verbal understanding. It may be noted that for going to Step No. II from Step No. I, the presupposition is that the hearer or reader already has the knowledge of relationship between a *pada* and its referent (*artha*).

Again, to reach the step III from Step II, it is necessary to know the intention of the speaker or writer. Unless that is known the hearer or the writer will fail to decide with what intension the speaker has uttered or the writer has written the sentence and without the knowledge it will remain doubtful whether the hearer or the reader has exactly understood what the speaker the writer wanted him to understand. Thus, *tatparyajñāna* or the knowledge of the intension of the speaker or writer plays an important role in generating verbal understanding.

To concrtise the entire process, let us assume that

$a + b + c + d$ is a sentence consisting of four morphemic units, and a^1 , b^1 , c^1 and d^1 are the respective referents of a , b , c , and d , the vertical line is the relation between a , b , c , and d and their respective referents, and the horizontal line represents the relationships among the referents. Thus, the entire process may be represented as follows :

$$\begin{array}{cccc} a & + & b & + & c & + & d \\ | & & | & & | & & | \\ a^1 & - & b^1 & - & c^1 & - & d^1 \end{array}$$

When one knows these horizontal lines, he is said to have understood the sentence-meaning. Thus, these horizontal lines i.e. the relations among the meanings are the sentence meaning.

6.0 Theories of Verbal understanding :

It may be observed above that the horizontal lines i.e. the sentence-meanings are not referents of any linguistic element of the sentence $a + b + c + d$, although they are the content of the verbal understanding. Thus, nothing is allowed to appear in the verbal understanding other than the relations among the referents. In other words, it is only the sentence-meaning that can appear in the verbal understanding even if it is not a referent of any linguistic unit of the sentence (*apadārthaḥ api vākyaārthaḥ śābdabodhe bhāṣate*). This is the stand of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System.

As a matter of fact, this issue has given rise to several theories of verbal understanding. The question that has been raised is if a *padārtha* is expressed by *pada*, what does express *vākyaārtha* ?

The answers to this question have resulted into various theories. We shall discuss here the following theories :

6.1 Abhihitānvaya-vāda :

This theory is the result of the answer to the above question given by the Bhāṭṭa School of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. According to this theory the *padas* express their *arthas* and by *lakṣaṇā* i.e. by the *śakti* of the *arthas* the sentence-meaning is understood. Thus, the relationships among the expressed senses are established after the meanings are expressed by the individual *padas* (*abhihitānām arthānām anvayaḥ*).

6.2 Anvitābhidhāna-vāda

This is the contribution of the Prābhākara School of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*. The school holds that the sentence-meaning is also expressed by the constituents of the sentence. According to the Prābhākaras, the *padas* not only express their own meanings but they also express the relationship with other meanings. (*anvitānām padārthānām abhidhānam*).

6.3 Tatparya-vāda

This theory says that the relationship among wordmeaning will be established by the force of the intension of the speaker. Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of *Nyāyamahājarī* has gone to elevate *tatparya* as a *vṛtti* that should account for the sentence-meaning.


6.4 Saṁsarga-māyā-vāda

This theory is the contribution of the Navya Nyāya. According to this system of Indian logic, the sentence-meaning is obtained because of the juxtaposition of meanings. The sentence-meaning appears in the verbal understanding in the capacity of a relation. The meanings presented to the mind get connected as per the capacity and compatibility. This theory is very close to the theory of the Bhāṭṭas in the sense that the meanings themselves have the capacity to connect themselves.

7.0 Structure of a Śabdabodha

There is another point that needs mention here. The content of a verbal understanding reflects a structure. The structure is of the type of qualificand qualified by a qualifier. Any acceptable sentence gives rise to an understanding which shows its content and the content always appears arranged in a particular form or structure, which can be divided in two parts—qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and qualificand (*viśeṣya*). If one wants to analyse

it one will find that the division observes the principles of immediate constituent analysis which can be transformed into a tree diagram. To illustrate, if the content has the element a^1 , b^1 , c^1 and d^1 , one may analyse it as follows :



This is very important to note.

8.0 Conclusions

Whatever we have discussed so far, it is clear that the ancient Indian Philosophers had paid great attention to the analysis of verbal behaviour. Their entire attempt to analyse the language has been from listener's or hearer's point of view. That is why we find meticulous analysis of the process of verbal understanding i.e. cognition that arises from a sentence i.e. the *śābdabodha*.

As philosophers of language, they took divergent stands—right from saying that language does not speak the truth to saying that it cannot speak but the truth through saying that it speaks both, truth and untruth.

To my mind, these divergent views paved the way for the evolution of an analytic philosophy, that is Indian Philosophy. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school contributed a lot to this development.

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Dr. Bhavana Trivedi

I

In all the four schools of Buddhism, the doctrine of *pratitya-samutpāda* plays the pivotal role representing the different Buddhist theories of change. The Buddhist theories of change differ according to the different interpretations of the doctrine of *pratitya-samutpāda* given by different Buddhist schools.

Accordingly in the *Vaibhāṣika* school, the doctrine of *pratitya-samutpāda* stands for its psychological significance. It is expressed here as the theory of *nairātmyavāda*. Let us therefore examine the *Vaibhāṣika*'s doctrine of *nairātmya*.

The aim of human life, believes Buddhism, is to be free from the bondage of *nāma-rūpa*. The question arises : what is *nāma* and what is *rūpa* ? Unlike the *Upanishadic* meaning of these two terms, here the word 'nāma' stands for the 'mental series' whereas 'rūpa' is a term used to signify the 'non-mental series'. The former, namely *nāma*, signifies four aggregates (1) *Vedana Skandha* (feeling), (2) *Sanjñā skandha* (ideas), (3) *Sanskāra skandha* (volition or disposition) and (4) *Vijñāna skandha* (pure consciousness). By 'nāma', the reference is to the combination of (mental states) *citta-caittasika dharmāḥ*. 'Rūpa' on the other hand, stands for what is known as non-mental series (*rupa skandha*). It is also called the *bhūta-bhautika dharmāḥ*, which in turn is believed to be constituted of the four *mahābhūtāḥ* (earth, water, fire and air).¹

Thus according to Buddhism, there is no entity called 'self' or 'thing'. Instead, in Buddhist's opinion, there exists an aggregate of mental and material (non-mental) series. There is no substance called 'self' over and above the aggregate of four *skandhāḥ*, nor is there any 'thing' called 'substance' (or *substratum*) over and above the qualities grasped by the senses. Since the so called 'thing' or 'substance' [can not be known by any of the senses, its supposed existence remains merely a matter of belief. This doctrine is known as the doctrine of *nairātmya*. It stands for bringing forth negatively, what an entity is not. The doctrine, if positively stated, stands for bringing out the *sanghāta* nature of the so called entities. In brief, there is neither the 'thing' or 'object' nor the 'self' or 'subject'. Whatever is, is instead, the aggregate of *bhūta-bhautika sanghāta* and *citta-caittasika sanghāta* respectively.

The doctrine of *nairātmya*, has been very cleverly brought out in the following dialogue between the king Milinda and the Sage Nāgasena.²

"Sir, are the hairs Nāgasena?"

"No, great king."

"Are nails or teeth, skin or flesh or bone Nāgasena?"

"No, great king."

"Is the bodily form Nāgasena, O Sir?"

"No, great king."

"Are the sensations Nāgasena?"

"No, great King."

"Are the perceptions, the conformations, the consciousness Nāgasena?"

"No, great King."

"Or, Sir, the combination of corporeal form, sensations, perceptions, conformations and consciousness, is this Nāgasena?"

"No, great King."

"Wherever I look then, Sir, I nowhere find a Nāgasena. A mere word, Sir, is Nāgasena. What is Nāgasena then? Though speakest False then Sir, and thou liest, there is no Nāgasena."

....."Hast thou come on foot or on a chariot?"

"I do not travel on foot, Sir: I have come on a chariot."

"If thou hast come on a chariot, great King, then define the chariot. Is the pole the chariot, great King?"

And now the saint turns the same course of reasoning against the king which the king himself had used against him. Neither the pole, nor the wheel, nor the body, nor the yoke is the chariot. The chariot, moreover, is not the combination of all these component parts, or anything else beyond them.

King Milinda said to the venerable Nāgasena: "I do not speak untruly, venerable Nāgasena. In reference to pole, axle, wheels, body and bar, the name, the appellation, the designation, the epithet, the word 'chariot' is used".

"Good indeed, great king, thou knowest the chariot. And in the same way, O King, in reference to my hair, my skin and bones, to corporeal form, sensations, perceptions, conformations and consciousness, the word Nāgasena is used: but here subject, in the strict sense of word, there is none. Thus also, great King, has the Buddhist nun Vājira explained in the presence of the Exalted One (Buddha):

"As in the case of the parts of a 'chariot' the name 'chariot' is used, so also where an aggregate of five groups is,³ a person is indicated, that is the common notion."

Thus consciousness, according to Buddhism is believed to be a series of discrete states not belonging to 'self' or 'subject'. The concept of a unitary self has been ruled out and the individual is considered to be a mere designation, used for a combination of groups for practical convenience. Just as 'chariot' is a conventional expression, given to the combination of the chariot-parts, similarly is 'I' just a conventional expression, used for the complex of groups. By rejecting the notion of a permanent soul or self, Buddhism "attempts to destroy not only a metaphysical and religious doctrine, but the ordinary man's feeling of states and things as belonging to himself."⁴

II

When we examine our experience of change, we find that our experience is neither of bare change, nor of pure permanence. Instead, our experience is of a 'changing thing'. In other words, what we experience is an object which remains identical in spite of its being in the midst of change. The expression 'changing thing' is paradoxical, yet it states the fact of our experience.

This being the case, the rejection of either of these aspects constituting the paradox of change, amounts to the avoidance of the very issue.

As the Parmenidian notion holds one thesis of the paradox of change, namely, permanence alone, the Hinayāna Schools of Buddhism on the other hand stick to the anti-thesis, namely, change alone. The latter thus disregards the notion of a permanent substance persisting through time by maintaining the *nairātmya* principle. Accordingly, the Hinayāna Buddhism disregards not only the permanent substance persisting through time, it also rejects the notion of a permanent substance persisting in the midst of change, as a logical construction from the changing sense-data.

In words of Oldenberg: Buddhism "condemns that fixity which we are prone to give to the current of incidents that come and go, by conceiving a substance, to or in which they might happen. A seeing, a hearing, a conceiving, above all a suffering takes place: but an existence, which may be regarded as the seer, the hearer, the sufferer is not recognised in Buddhist teaching".⁵

According to the Hinayāna Buddhism therefore, only change is real, not the thing undergoing change. This implies that the Hinayāna schools of Buddhism avoid the paradox by their one sided acceptance of the aspect of change only. It therefore avoids the issue by ignoring the remaining aspect, namely, the aspect of permanence, constituting the paradox of change. Their rejection of the permanent substance shows their incomplete analysis of the issue of change.

Buddhistic analysis of the psychophysical make-up of the individual into the categories of states or events (skandha) serves the double purpose : (a) It exhibits the structure of the person, which stands for the aggregate of the five skandhas, (b) It serves as a model, which can be the object of meditation for the adept, thereby enabling him to see that the unitary person does not exist, but is constituted by a complex of impersonal factors. Thereby the adept will learn to see himself not as 'I doing this', but as a complex of different elements operating in a certain manner. In words of Ninian Smart : "as with the concept of Nirvāṇa, the doctrine of groups has in Buddhism not only a theoretical interest, but also a practical aim."⁶

The five skandhas in combination are held to constitute a person. The sanghāta, when considered temporally, is held to be subject to the perpetual change which is technically known as *santāna* in Buddhist philosophy. Thus what is called 'self' or what is termed as 'thing', are labels used to signify the everchanging sanghāta, technically known as *santāna* or flux. The flame is a famous illustration often used in the Buddhistic literature to express the nature of flux. Accordingly whatever is, is only a succession of momentary series.⁷

The doctrine of skandhāḥ thus breaks down the common belief in a persistent self in two ways, "for not only is the individual analysed as a mere combination of states of different categories; but also the individual is fragmented in time into a succession of evanescent events. He is chopped up...both vertically and horizontally. The doctrine of groups (skandhāḥ)⁸ performs the first operation : the doctrine of impermanence performs the second."⁹

It should be noted here that this *santāna* doctrine is a kind of a middle way from the then existing extreme views : determinism and indeterminism.¹⁰

The doctrine of momentariness is unlike both the extremes of the doctrines of *śāśvatavāda* and *Ucchedavāda*. Unlike the former, according to the doctrine of momentariness an entity does not live forever; unlike the latter, the entity is neither held to disappear issueless. The doctrine is

therefore known as *santānavāda* according to which though an entity lives for a moment, it begets an issue. The doctrine is fully developed by the *Sautrāntika* school.

When the ethical import of this doctrine is examined, *nairātmyavāda* maintains, that karma is, but the agent is not. In a dialogue between a Buddhist nun and *Māra*, in answer to *Māra*'s question, the nun replies : "What meanest thou *Māra*, that there is person ? False is thy teaching. This is only a heap of changeful conformations (*sankhāra*): here there is not a person. As in the case where the parts of a chariot came together, the word 'chariot' is used, so also where the five groups are, there is a person; that is the common notion."

Change according to this system, is held to be governed by the law. It is this law, which is known as *pratityasamutpāda* (in Pali : *Paticcasamuppāda*).

By holding the doctrine of *Pratityasamutpāda*, they chock out a principle, which is different from both indeterminism as well as determinism. Regarding the question of the relation between the preceding and the succeeding moments of the series, the doctrine of indeterminism maintains, that their arrangement is a matter of sheer chance or accident. Besides regarding the causal link existing between the preceding and the succeeding moments of *santāna*, the principle of determinism accepts a supernatural governing deity or God according to whose wish or will, the succession of the series is held to be determined. Along with the prevailing differences, both these principles are in agreement in maintaining that man is not free to make alterations in the predetermined succession of the *santāna* series.

The *pratityasamutpāda* differs from the principle of indeterminism in so far as it accepts a universal law to be governing the *santāna* series. From the principle of determinism, it basically differs on the ground, that unlike determinism, it does not accept the supernatural force in the form of God to be governing the *santāna* series.

According to the principle of *Pratityasamutpāda*, cause by itself alone, unaccompanied by the accessories, can not result into the effect. The resulting of the cause into the effect, is therefore regarded as conditional. The series, for instance of a flame of the oil lamp does not come into being, if either the wick or the oil is missing. Similarly, the series of the light flame, when once started, it does not stop or cease to be unless and until any of its accessories (either wick or oil) is absent or removed. The doctrine therefore is known as, this being, that comes to be.¹¹

In Hinayāna Buddhism, the term *Patīccasamuppāda* has been literally translated as 'dependent origination'; wherein '*Patīcca*' stands for 'on account of', '*sama*' stands for 'together' and '*uppāda*' stands for origination.

Buddhaghosha gives the following synonyms for cause or *paccāya* :
*Paccāyo hetu kāraṇaṃ nidānaṃ sambhavo pabhavo ti ādi atthato ekaṃ.*¹²

A significant feature worth mentioning about the principle of *Pratītyasamutpāda* is, that it has kept on changing its meaning according to the various modifications in its interpretation by different Buddhist schools. Accordingly, the principle stands for its ethical significance in the *Vaiśiṣṭika* system, wherein it refers to the theory that all the elements (*nidānaḥ*) in the wheel of existence from *avidyā* to *Jarāmaraṇa*, are causally conditioned.

In the words of the Buddha : "O disciples, think not such thoughts as the world thinks : 'The world is ever-lasting, or the world is not ever-lasting. The world is finite or the world is not finite.'.....If ye think, O disciples, thus think ye : 'This is suffering'; thus think ye : 'This is the origin of suffering'; thus think ye : 'This is the extinction of suffering'; thus think ye : 'This is the path to the extinction of suffering'".¹³

The chain of causation consists of the following twelve links:¹⁴

- (1) Ignorance (*avidyā*)
- (2) Mental activity (*sankhāra* or *sanskāra*)
- (3) Rudimentary consciousness of the foetus (*vinñāṇa* or *vijñāna*)
- (4) Mental and non-mental series (*nāma-rūpa*)
- (5) Six sense organs (*ṣaḍāyatana*)
- (6) *Sparsa* (*phassa*)
- (7) Feeling (*vedanā*)
- (8) Desire (*tṛṣṇā* or *tanhā*)
- (9) *Upādāna*
- (10) *Bhāva*
- (11) *Jāti*
- (12) *Jarā-maraṇa*

In the chain, each preceding line is believed to be the cause of the succeeding line.¹⁵ This twelve-linked chain of causes extends over the three lives : the life of the present birth, past life of the previous birth and the future life of the next birth. Of these twelve, *avidyā* and *sankhāra* extend to the past or previous birth-and produce *vijñāna*, *nāma-rūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *sparsa*, *vedanā*, *tṛṣṇā*, *upādāna* and *bhāva*-leading to the present life. The *bhāva* produces the *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa* of the next life.¹⁶

Of these twelve, *avidyā* and *sankhāra* belong to the past, birth, decay and death belong to the future; and the intermediate eight belong to the present. It is also named *trikāṇḍaka* (having three branches) in *Abhidharma-kośa*.¹⁷

None of these twelve factors are real substances or beings. It is by ignorance that they are thought to be existents and hence attachment is generated towards them. Thus through ignorance comes *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *moha* (attachment, antipathy and thoughtlessness); and from these proceed *viñāṇa* and four *skandhāḥ*. These, along with the four elements (earth, water, fire and *ākāśa*) bring *nāma-rūpa*. From these proceed six senses (*ṣaḍāyatana*) and from that feelings, and from feelings, desires and so on. In words of *Nāgārjuna*: "The aggregates do not arise from desire, nor from time, nor from nature (*prakṛti*), nor from themselves (*svabhāvat*), nor from the Lord (*īśvara*), not yet are they without cause; know that they arise from ignorance (*avidyā*) and desire (*tṛṣṇā*)."¹⁸

Without birth, there cannot be decay and death. But why does birth occur? Because of attachment. The formula therefore runs: "From clinging (to existence) comes becoming (*bhava*); from becoming comes birth; from birth comes old age and death, pain and lamentation, sorrow, anxiety and despair."¹⁹

Attachment gives rise to craving, and feelings are precondition of craving. Feelings arise from sense-contacts. Sense-contacts originate from the sense-fields which include sense-objects, sensations and sense-organs.

The psychological complex cannot function without consciousness. Asks Buddha to Ananda: "Were cognition²⁰ not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form become constituted therein?"

'It would not, Lord'.

'Were cognition, after having descended into the mother's womb, to become extinct, would name-and-form come to birth in this state of being ?

'It would not, Lord'.

'Were cognition to be extirpated from one yet young, youth or maiden, would name-and-form attain to growth, development, expansion ?'

'It would not, Lord'.

'Wherefore, Ananda, just that is the ground, the basis, the genesis, the cause of name-and-form, to wit, cognition.'²¹

The determining cause of the arising of consciousness (i.e. in the foetus) is karma,²² or to be more accurate, the active tendencies²³ which express the operation of karma in the sequence of lives. These active tendencies are operative because of the individual's lack of spiritual insight (for otherwise nirvāṇa would have been the result). The lack of this insight is known as ignorance in Buddhism.

M. N. says about ignorance: "Not to know suffering, friend, not to know the origin of suffering, not to know the extinction of suffering: This, O friend, is called ignorance."²⁴

Buddhism, in agreement with the Brahminical texts, considers ignorance to be the ultimate root of all suffering.

III

The reality according to the Vaibhāṣika School is of the nature of momentary, unrelated, pure difference (svalakṣaṇa),²⁵ whereas the identity or universality are considered to be the mental construction superimposed upon the ontologically real svalakṣaṇa, by the creative imagination of the active mind. Says Ślokavārtika, *Kalpanā hi buddhivīṣeṣaḥ*.

In view of its definition of reality as svalakṣaṇa Vaibhāṣika maintains that there is no object, of which anything is predicated. The perceptual judgement, in so far as it consists of the distinction between subject and predicate, is held to be faulty. Accordingly when stated 'this is red'—on seeing a red thing, the statement is considered to be erroneous in the opinion of the Vaibhāṣika Buddhism except for its containing a core of truth—namely, svalakṣaṇa—which is 'red', in the present case.

The Svalakṣaṇa, according to Vaibhāṣika, can be known as svalakṣaṇa only when grasped by the nirvikālpaka state of mind, which it calls sensation.

It is a noteworthy characteristic of the early Buddhism, that it accepted the distinction of the two states of mind, known as vijñāna and saṃjñā. The former represents the completely passive state of mind, known as vijñāna and saṃjñā. The former represents the completely passive state of pure sensation. The latter, on the other hand, symbolises the active state of mind at the time of mental construction (Kalpanā), abstraction forming (udgrahaṇa) definite representation (parichinna) and judgement formation.

It is held that the mind, which is inactive at the level of sensation, becomes actively imaginative afterwards at the level of intellectual reflection when it is considered to be apprehending svalakṣaṇa as sāmānyalakṣaṇa.

Vaibhāṣika accepts the possibility of the direct knowledge of *svalakṣaṇa* inspite of the fact, that *svalakṣaṇa* is believed to be momentary by nature. Giving illustration of the fire which is produced by the rubbing of the two sticks, Vaibhāṣika maintains the theory of direct causation, according to which the moment of cause is held to be immediately followed by the moment of effect without any intervention of the psychic medium. Consistently with its doctrine of momentariness, Vaibhāṣika maintains that the act of coming into being is absolutely contemporaneous with the act of perceiving. Causality, therefore, does not mean here a determinate, temporal sequence. Instead it is maintained to be the simultaneously flashing together of the moment of origination and the moment of cognition. Though consistent with its principle of momentariness, Vaibhāṣika seems to be going against the evidence from experience, which shows, that the two moments must always be at least slightly separated in point of time. For instance, in the case of visual perception, light takes time to travel, in order to be effective, as also the transmission of a current along the optic nerve.

IV

While trying to explain the principle of causation by accepting the reality of past as well as future along with the present moment, the Vaibhāṣika contradicts its thesis of the doctrine of momentariness.

Moreover, Vaibhāṣika commits self-contradiction by maintaining on the one hand the reality of the dimension-less *svalakṣaṇa* and thereby abolishes time and space from subjective sphere. On the other hand, it accepts the reality of past and future in order to explain causation.

Its acceptance of the reality of past and future is contradictory to its belief in the principle of momentariness.

Besides, by calling only one aspect to be real of the two relative aspects forming the complex concept of change, and by ignoring the other aspect, the Vaibhāṣika altogether overlooks the problem of change instead of trying to solve it.

Vaibhāṣika claims that reality of *Santāna*—which it considers to be of the nature of *svalakṣaṇa*—when intellectually apprehended as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*; breaks itself into an antinomical concept of change: constituted of the contradictory aspects of permanence and change.

When Vaibhāṣika's notion of reality—which it calls *svalakṣaṇa*—is examined, it proves to be a mere intellectual abstraction, impossible to be grasped or realized as reality.

To accept the ultimate reality of svalakṣaṇa, is to hold pure difference to be the ultimate. As it is shown by the Mādhyamika school, the pure difference, like pure identity, is an intellectual abstraction and therefore not worth considering as ultimately real or absolute.

Now we shall proceed to study the other school of Hinayāna Buddhism, namely the Sautrāntika school.

(to be continued in Vol. 18)

FOOT-NOTES

1. V.M. II, p. 558. (Edi. by Rhys Davids, 1921. Published for P.T.S. by Humphrey Milford, Oxford Uni. Press).
2. Milindapaṇḥa : Translated by II. Oldenberg, pp. 25. Seg.
3. Material form, sensations, perceptions, conformations, consciousness.
4. Ninian Smart : Doctrine and argument in Indian philosophy. (1964, George Allen & Unwin), p. 45.
5. Oldenberg : Buddha-his life, his doctrine, his order, pp. 253-54.
6. Ninian Smart : Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964) p. 42.
7. Vaibhāṣika merely stated the doctrines. It was the Sautrāntika system which afterwards critically reflected upon the doctrines, presented by the Vaibhāṣika school. I shall therefore discuss fully the doctrine of momentariness in my account of the Sautrāntika School. It is sufficient to note that reality, according to the Hinayāna schools is of the nature of unique, unrelated, momentary Svalakṣaṇāḥ.
8. The word in bracket is mine.
9. Ninian Smart : Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, p. 43.
10. Oldenberg : Buddha, His Life, His Doctrine, His Order. p. 249.
Buddha tells Kaccāna : "The world, O Kaccāna, generally proceeds on a duality, on the 'it is' and the 'it is not'. But, O Kaccāna, whoever perceives in truth and wisdom how things originate in the world, in his eyes there is no 'it is not' in this world. Whoever, Kaccāna, perceives in truth and wisdom how things pass away in this world, in his eyes there is no 'it is' in this world...Sorrow alone arises where anything arises; sorrow passes away where anything passes away. 'Everything is', is the one extreme, O Kaccāna. 'Everything is not', is the other extreme. The Perfect One, O Kaccāna, remaining far from both these extremes, proclaims the truth in the middle."

11. *Idam Sati idam hoti, idam asati idam na hoti.*
12. V.M. p. 372 (Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavan Publication, Bombay, 1940).
13. S.N., Vol. III, fol. kyā.
14. Mah. S. of D.N.
15. Buddha says: "Man who are more in a worldly sphere, who have their lot cast and find their enjoyments in a worldly sphere, will find this matter hard to grasp, the law of causality, the chain of cause and effects." (Refer to M. V. I. page 120 of S.N.). Also see Mah. S. of D.N.: "Iti kho Ānanda nāmarupapañcayā vinnānaṃ, vinnānapañcayā nama-rupaṃ, nama-rupapañcayā phasso, phassapañcayā vedanā, vedanāpañcayā taṇhā taṇhāpañcayā upādānaṃ, upādānapañcayā bhavapañcayā jāti, jātipañcayā jarāmaraṇaṃ, jarāmaraṇapañcayā soka parideva-dukkhadomanassu pāyāsa sambhavanti—Mah. S. point 3
16. This explanation cannot be found in the early Pāli texts, but Buddhaghosa mentions it in the *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, Vol. II. on Mah. S.
17. A.K. III. 20: "Sa pratitya samutpādo dvādaśāṅgaḥ trikaṇḍakāḥ, pūrvāparāntayordvā dve madhyeṣṭau paripūraṇāḥ//
18. Verse No. 50. A quotation from Nāgārjuna's *Suhṛtlekhā* as translated by Wenzel (P.T.S. 1886), from the Tibetan translation, quoted by Dr. S. Dasgupta in his 'A history of Indian Philosophy'.
19. On p. 217 of 'Ananjasappāya Suttaṅta' of M.N., the Buddha says, "If three things were not in the world, my disciples, the Perfect One, the holy supreme Buddha, would not appear in the world, the Law and Doctrine, which the Perfect One propounds, would not shine in the world. What three things are they? Birth, Old age and Death."
20. On P.X of 'Dialogues of the Buddha' (Vol. III). R. Davids comments: "I have let *vinñāṇa* be rendered by 'cognition', or by 'consciousness'...."
21. R. C. to D. N. (Mahānidāna Suttaṅta). Translated by R. Davids, on pages 60–61 of 'Dialogues of the Buddha' Vol. III, Part II. (P. T. S. London, 1950).
22. "My action is my possession, my action is my inheritance, my action is my womb which bears me. My action is the race to which I am akin, my action is my refuge" (A.N., *Paccaka Nipāta*). What appears to man to be his body, is in truth "the action of his past state, which then assuming a form, realized through his endeavour, he has become endowed with a tangible existence" (S. N. Vol. I. Fol. jhe). No man can escape the effect of his actions. Says Dha. "Not in the midst of the sea, not if thou hidest thyself away in the clefts of the

mountains, wilt thou find a place on earth where thou canst escape the fruit of thy evil actions." (-Dha. Verse : 127).

23. From ignorance come conformations (Sankhāra). Sankhāra can be translated as "actions", if we understand by this word both the 'internal as well as the external actions' (e.g. internal actions in the form of wish and will). The old scholastic teachers divide actions into three classes as corresponding to the three categories of thought, word and deed. From the principle of moral division, the action can be categorized as either "pure" or "impure". And this brings us to the doctrine of Karma (karma in Sanskrit) or the law of retribution, which traces out for the wandering soul its path through the world of earthly being through heaven and hell.
 "Whatever he does, to a corresponding state he attains" (M. V., vi. P. 49). For the stream of Sankhāras, the figurative language of Buddhism employs both the stream and the flame as the symbols of the restless movement involved in every state of being. There are four great currents which break-in with the destructive force upon the human world; the stream of desire, of being, of error, of ignorance.
24. 'Sammādiṭṭhisuttānta in M. N.
25. Svam asadhāraṇam lakṣaṇam tattvaṁ svalakṣaṇam-N. B. T., Dharmotara. Edi. by Peterson, Page 15., I : 20,

जाणइ - पासइ^१

पञ्च. यु. पं. ५५

१. जैन आगमिक भूमिका में जहाँ जहाँ 'जाणः-पासइ' शब्दप्रयोग का उपयोग हुआ है, वहाँ सभी स्थानों पर 'जाणइ' शब्द प्रथम क्रम में पाया जाता है, और जहाँ नञ् का उपयोग हुआ है, वहाँ नञ् 'पासइ' के ही साथ जोड़ा गया है, 'जाणइ' के साथ नहीं, जैसे—'जाणइ ण पासइ ।'

नन्दिस्व में पाँचों ही ज्ञानों की द्रव्यादि विचारणा में 'जाणइ पासइ' का प्रयोग हुआ है । यद्यपि काल को नहीं देखा जा सकता है, फिर भी वहाँ 'जाणइ' के साथ 'पासइ' भी प्रयुक्त हुआ है । एक ओर श्रुत एवं मनःपर्याय को दर्शन नहीं है, फिर भी वहाँ 'जाणइ पासइ' का प्रयोग है, तो दूसरी ओर मतिज्ञान को दो दर्शन होते हुए भी वहाँ 'जाणइ, ण पासइ' का प्रयोग किया गया है । अवधि की विचारणा में 'दृश्' धातु का प्रयोग किया गया है—जैसे 'जोइ दृढाणं पासइ', 'अगत्थ गए ण पासइ ।' लोंगं पसित्ता, आगास पदेसं पासइजा आदि^२ । इसके आधार पर ऐसा अनुमान किया जा सकता है कि नन्दि के समय तक 'जाणइ पासइ' का संबंध अनुक्रम के ज्ञानदर्शन के साथ नहीं था ।

परवर्ती काल के जैनान्नायों ने 'जाणइ' का संबंध ज्ञानसे, एवं 'पासइ' का संबंध दर्शन से जोड़ा और इन दोनों का मूल क्रम बदल कर दर्शन का स्थान ज्ञानसे पूर्व में रखकर, दर्शन को अनाकार एवं ज्ञान को साकार बताया । परन्तु इस व्यवस्था की संगति के लिए बहुत प्रयत्न करने पड़े, जिनके फल स्वरूप [केवलज्ञान की विचारणा में] कमवाद, युगपत्वाद और अभेदवाद अस्तित्व में आए^३ । मतिज्ञान में विषयेन्द्रिय संयोगरूप व्यंजना विग्रह के पूर्व में दर्शन का स्थान युक्तिसंगत नहीं होने से, दर्शन ज्ञान की व्यवस्था के लिए जैनान्नायों को अधिक खींचतानी करनी पड़ी जैसे अभयदेवस्थिति अवग्रह-ईहा को दर्शनरूप बताया^४ । सिद्धसेन दिवाकर एवं यशोविजयजी ने ज्ञान-दर्शन का अभेद बता कर इस गड़बड़ी को ही समाप्त कर दिया^५ ।

'दर्शनानन्तरं ज्ञानम्' की व्यवस्था में जैनान्नायों को ही कुछ न कुछ त्रुटि अवश्य दिखाई दी है, अतः इस लघुनिबंध में यह प्रयास किया गया है कि, वैदिक एवं बौद्ध परंपरा के परिप्रेक्ष्य में "जाणइ-पासइ" का ज्ञान-दर्शन से संबंध, कक्षा, क्रम और अर्थ क्या हो सकता है ?

२. ऋग्वेद में उक्त ज्ञान के लिए विश्वदर्शतः^६, विश्वदृष्टकं, सर्वस्य दृष्टारकं, दूरेऽश्वः, विश्ववक्षागं, भूयक्षाः, सहस्रवक्षाः, सहस्राश्वाः, सहस्रचेताः^७ विचक्षेणिण आदि शब्द मिलते हैं । महाभारतगत विष्णुसहस्रस्तोत्र में विष्णु के सर्वदर्शनः सर्वविद्, सर्वदृक्, सहस्राक्षः, सर्वतश्चक्षुः आदि विशेषण मिलते हैं^८ । एक ही श्लोक में रामायण में राम के सहस्राक्षः, सर्वतश्चक्षुः आदि विशेषण मिलते हैं^९ । एक ही श्लोक में रामायण में राम के सहस्राक्षः, सर्वतश्चक्षुः आदि विशेषण मिलते हैं^{१०} । विष्णु के लिए सर्वज्ञः एवं सर्वदर्शी विशेषण दिए गये हैं^{११} ।

जैन परंपरा में भी श्री महावीर के लिए भी अणंत नाण अणंत दंसण^{१०}क, प्रभूयद^{११}सी^{१२}ल सन्वद^{१३}सी^{१४}ग, अणंतनाणद^{१५}सी^{१६}ग आदि विशेषण मिलते हैं। इस आधार से ऐसा कहा जा सकता है कि, प्राचीन काल से ही ज्ञान एवं दर्शन दोनों शक्ति होने पर भी अलग अलग माने जाते थे। अतः ये दोनों अभिन्न नहीं हैं।

ऋग्वेद में ज्ञान, विज्ञान और सर्वज्ञ शब्दों के प्रयोग नहीं मिलते हैं, परन्तु 'ज्ञा' और 'दृष्ट' धातु के विविध प्रयोग विविध अर्थों में अवश्य मिलते हैं, जैसे कि, (१) सामान्य शक्ति परक अर्थ में जानती^{१७}क, जानता^{१८}ल, जानत^{१९}ग, जानते^{२०}ष, विजानाति^{२१}ङ, आदि; (२) विशेष शक्ति परक अर्थ में विजानीहि^{२२}च, आजानीत^{२३}ल, आदि और (३) उच्च ज्ञान परक अर्थ में विजानाति^{२४}च आदि रूप मिलते हैं।

इसी तरह दृष्ट धातु के भी रूप प्राप्त होते हैं, जैसे कि, (१) सामान्य जानना अर्थ में पश्यथ^{२५}ल, पश्यन्ति^{२६}च, पश्यन्^{२७}ट, पश्यमानास^{२८}ल आदि; (२) सम्पृक्तज्ञान परक अर्थ में पश्यन्^{२९}ङ, संपश्यति^{३०}ल आदि; (३) साक्षीभावसे जानना अर्थ में पश्यन्^{३१} आदि; (४) प्रकाश में लाना अर्थ में पश्यसि^{३२}ल आदि; (५) चारों ओर से देखना अर्थ में अभिपश्यति^{३३}थ आदि; (६) विशेष देखना अर्थ में विपश्यति^{३४}ल, प्रपश्य^{३५}ष आदि; और (७) अतीन्द्रिय दर्शन परक अर्थ में पश्यन्^{३६}ल, पश्यति^{३७}ल दर्शम् अधिदर्श^{३८}म् आदि रूप मिलते हैं।

कहीं एक ही मंत्र में दृष्ट धातु का उपयोग जानना और देखना परक अर्थ में हुआ है, जैसे - यः [अग्निः] विश्व [सर्वभूतानि] अभि विपश्यति [विशेषण तेजसा प्रेक्षते], भुवन। [भूतजातानि] स पश्यति च [सम्पृक्त जानाति च] [ऋ 10-187-4]।

(१) कहीं दर्शन की सहाय से ज्ञानप्राप्ति की बात है, जैसे पश्यन् (प्रकाशयन्) चिक्के-तत् (जानाति) ऋ. 6-9-3, (२) कहीं ज्ञान की सहाय से सामान्य देखने की बात है, जैसे कि चिक्कित्वान् (जानन्) अपश्यति (अवाङ् मुखः सन् ईक्षते) ऋ. 8-6-29। (३) कहीं ज्ञान की सहाय से विशेष देखने की बात है, जैसे कि, तव क्रत्वा (प्रज्ञानेन) सूर्य पश्येम्। ऋ. 9-4-6, (४) कहीं ज्ञान की सहाय से चारों ओर देखने की बात है जैसे कि, क्रतुना (प्रज्ञानेन) परिपश्यते (परितः पश्यन्ति) ऋ. 9-71-9।

इस आधार से कहा जा सकता है कि, ऋग्वेद काल में 'ज्ञा' और 'दृष्ट' धातु सामान्य-शक्ति, विशेषशक्ति एवं उच्च शक्ति परक अर्थों में प्रयुक्त हुए हैं, फिर भी 'ज्ञा' धातु की अपेक्षा 'दृष्ट' धातु विशेष रूप से ज्ञानपरक अर्थ का वाचक रहा है।

3 उपनिषदों में ज्ञान^{३९}क, विज्ञान^{४०}ल, प्रज्ञान^{४१}ग, सर्वज्ञ^{४२}ल, दर्शन^{४३}ङ, आदि शब्द मिलते हैं। ऐतरेय उपनिषद् में आज्ञान, विज्ञान, प्रज्ञान, संज्ञान, मेधा, धृति, मति, स्मृति, दृष्टि आदि को प्रज्ञान ब्रह्म के पर्याय माने हैं।^{४४}

मुण्डकोपनिषद् में आत्मदर्शन के लिए तीन सोपान बताए हैं (1) आत्मा को जानना > (2) फिर उसका ध्यान करना (3) और > उसके बाद आत्म विज्ञान से आत्मा दर्शन करना।^{४५}

4. भगवद्गीता में शास्त्रं द्रष्टुं च तत्त्वेन (11-54), ज्ञानिनस्तत्त्वं दर्शिनः (4-34); रमनात्मानं पश्यन् (6-20); ददामि दिव्यं ते चक्षुः (11-8); अहं नृलोके द्रष्टुम् (11-5); तत्त्वज्ञानार्थदर्शनम् (13-12); ध्यानेनारम्भेन पश्यन्ति (13-25); पश्यन्ति ज्ञानचक्षुषः (5-10); योगिनश्चैनं पश्यन्ति (15-11); आदि वाक्य ज्ञान से, दर्शन की उच्च कक्षा चेत करते हैं। मनु स्मृति एषं भागवत में प्रयुक्त 'मन्त्र' और 'मन्त्रदर्शिन' शब्द इसी कक्षा में समर्थन करते हैं।¹⁴ रघुवंश और बुद्धचरित में ध्यान स्थिति में देखने की बात है, ज्ञान की नहीं, जैसे:-सोऽपश्यन्निधानेन संततेः स्तम्भकारणम् । (रघुवंशम् 1-74), तत-
नेन स दिव्येन परिशुद्धेन चक्षुषा । ददशं निखिलं लोकमादर्शं श्व निर्मले ॥ (बुद्ध चरितम् 4-8) । ये प्रयोग भी दर्शन की कक्षा (ज्ञानसे) ऊँची बताते हैं ।

बौद्ध परंपरा में भी "ज्ञानाति-पस्सति" शब्द युग्म का प्रयोग मिलता है, जिसका अर्थ 'जिन्होंने पहचाना' में Recognize, Realize, know बताया है। यही अर्थ जैन आगमिक रूढ़िप्रयोग "जाणइ-पासइ" का है, ऐसा अनुमान किया जा सकता है। गुजराती भाषा का रूढ़िप्रयोग 'जाणी-जोईने' इसी बात का समर्थक है।

इन समस्त तथ्यों के आधार पर यह स्वीकार करना होगा कि भारत में जैन आगमिक जाल में 'ज्ञानाति' और 'पश्यति' शब्द एक ओर सामान्य अर्थ में प्रयुक्त होते थे तथा दूसरी ओर वे एक दूसरे से भिन्न अर्थ के वाचक भी थे।

जैन आगमिक 'जाणइ-पासइ' शब्दयुग्म सामान्य अर्थ में प्रयुक्त हुआ है। अतः वहाँ 'जाणइ' का संबंध ज्ञान से एवं 'पासइ' का संबंध दर्शन से जोड़ना युक्तिसंगत नहीं है। अतः मति एवं श्रुत की विचारणा में प्राप्त दो पाठान्तरों '(क) जाणइ-पासइ, (ख) जाणइ, ण पासइ'—में से 'जाणइ-पासइ' पाठान्तर युक्ति संगत है। यशोविजयीने जैन तर्क-भाषा में ज्ञानविचारणा में दर्शन को छोड़ दिया है, यह सवैया योग्य किया है।

जहाँ ये दोनों शब्द भिन्न अर्थ के वाचक हैं, वहाँ दर्शन की कक्षा ज्ञान से ऊँची रही है। फलतः ज्ञान के पश्चात् ही दर्शन का क्रम रखा जा सकता है। अतः जैन परंपरा में ऐसी व्यवस्था का स्वीकार करना उचित होगा कि जिस तरह केवली के लिए ज्ञानोत्तर दर्शन की व्यवस्था है, ऐसी ही व्यवस्था छद्मस्थ के लिए मति एवं अवधि में भी स्वीकारना उचित है। फल स्वरूप दर्शन अनाकार नहीं हो सकता। अस्तु।

पादटीप

- (1) यह लघु निबंध ओल इन्डिया ओरिएण्टल कॉन्फरन्स (35 वाँ सेशन) में पढ़ा गया। (इ.स. 1990, नवम्बर) इस निबंध के मार्गदर्शक पं. मालवणियाजी हैं।
- (2) नंदि = नन्दिसूत्रम्. स. मुनि पुण्यविजयः, प्राकृत ग्रन्थ परिषद् प्रकाशन, इ.स. 2023, सूत्र 22, 23, 29, 32, 41, 59, 119 दश्व ओ णं ओहिणाणी जहण्णेणं अणं ताणि रविदव्वाइ जाणइ पासइ...न दिसुज 28.
- (3) ज्ञा-चि = ज्ञानचिन्तु प्रकरण, यशोविजयीजी, स. पं. सुखलालजी, सिंधी जैन ग्रंथमाला प्रकाशन, अहमदाबाद, इ.स. 1942, पृ. 42-62, प्रस्तावना।

- (4) नच् = नन्दिचर्णि मुनि पुण्यविजयजी, प्राकृत ग्रंथ परिषद्, वाराणसी, इ.स. 1966
पृ. 42 की पादटीप, विशेषावश्यक भाष्य गाथा 533 (इन्डोलोजी प्रकाशन, अहमदाबाद)
- (5) शा. वि पृ 33-47
- (6) ऋ. = ऋग्वेदसंहिता भाग १-4, सायण भाष्य समेता, प्रकाशन वैदिक संशोधन मण्डल पूना-6, द्वितीय आवृत्ति: शके 1894 । ऋ. 1-146-5; (क) 1-191-9; 5; 6; (ख) 7-1-1; (ग) 7-63-1; (घ) 2-27-3 (ङ) 7 34 10; (च) 1-23-3; 1-79-12; 10-90-1; 10-161-3; (छ) 1-100 12; (ज) 1-35-9; 1-79-12; 1-64-12; 1-78-1; 2-41-10; 5 63-3
- (7) विष्णुसहस्रनाम, मकरन्द दवे, महर्षि वेद विज्ञान अकादमी, अहमदाबाद
श्लोक 10, 14, 22, 24, 67
- (8) रामायण 2-106-6, विष्णु सहस्र श्लोक 48
- (9क) सू. कृ. सूत्रकृतांग स. पुष्पमिह्लु गुडगौव छावनी, इ.स. 1953। सू. कृ. 1-9 24 (460); (9ख) आचारांग स. पुष्पमिह्लु 1-5-4-5 (309); (9ग) सू. कृ. 1-6-5 (356); (9घ) सू. कृ. 1-9-24 (460)
- (10) (क) ऋ. 3-31-4; 6; 5-45-2; (ख) 5-51-15; (ग) 3-29-10; (घ) 3-57-3; (ङ) 5-61-7; (च) 1-51-8; (छ) 1-94-8; (ज) 6-9-3; (झ) 1-105-16; (ञ) 2-27-3; (ट) 4-1-17, 7-60-2; (ठ) 7-83-1; (ड) 1-88-5; (ढ) 3-62-9, (ण) 6-51-2; (त) 7-94-6; (थ) 1-25-11; (द) 3-62-9; (ध) 6-47-7; (न) 9-96-7; (प) 9-10-9; (फ) 1-25-18
- (11) क पञ्चज्ञानानि (पञ्चेन्द्रिय ज्ञानानि) कठ-कठोपनिषद्-उपनिषद्भाष्य खण्ड-1, 2, प्रकाशन गीताप्रेस गोरखपुर, स. 1992 कठ, 2-3-10, उच्चज्ञान कठ, 2-3-8, (ख) लौकिक ज्ञान परक अर्थ में सुं. मुण्डकोपनिषद् 2-2-1, विशेषज्ञान परक अर्थ में सुं. 1-2-12; उच्चज्ञान (विज्ञान ब्रह्म) तैत्तिरीय 2-5-1, (ग) कठ 1-2-24 ऐतरेय 3-1-3 (घ) मुण्डक 1-1-9, 2-2-7, प्रश्नोपनिषद् 4-10, 4-11 (ङ) दृश्यते त्वग्रथा बुद्ध्या सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः कठ 1-3-12 (ये सभी उपनिषद् उपयुक्त उपनिषद् भास्य खण्ड १-२ में हैं ।)
- (12) 3-1-2 ऐतरेय
- (13) मुण्डक 2-2-5 से 8
- (14) आप्टे की डिकशनरी
- (15) नच् पृ. 42 की पादटीप
- (16) विशेषावश्यक भाष्य गाथा 550

प्राकृत भाषा में उद्धृत स्वरके स्थान पर 'य' श्रुति की यथार्थता

—के. आर. चन्द्र

आचार्य श्री हेमचन्द्राचार्य ने अपने प्राकृत व्याकरण में ऐसा नियम दिया है कि मध्यवर्ती अव्ययप्राण व्यंजनों का लोप होने पर 'अ' और 'आ' शेष रहने पर यदि वे 'अ' और 'आ' के बाद में आये हो तो और कभी कभी अन्य स्वरों के बाद आये हो तो भी उन 'अ' और 'आ' की लघु प्रत्यय के कारण 'य' श्रुति होती है।

उनका सूत्र और वृत्ति इस प्रकार है—

अवर्णो य श्रुतिः 8.1.180

कणचजेत्यादिना लुकि सति शेषः अवर्णः अवर्णात्परो लघुप्रत्ययनतरयश्रुतिर्भवति ॥ नवरं, रसायलो, पयावई पायालं । वरचिद् भवति (अर्थात् शेष 'अ', 'आ' के पहले 'अ', 'आ' नहीं होने पर भी) पियई (पिबति) और सरिया (सरिता 8.1.15)

व्याकरणकार चण्ड के प्राकृत-लक्षण में भी 'य' श्रुति का सूत्र दिया गया है परन्तु हेमचन्द्र की तरह इतना स्पष्ट नहीं है—

यत्वमवणे 3.37

ककारवर्गं तृतीयोरवणे परे यत्वं भवति । काकाः = काया; नागाः = नाश ॥

वरचिद् इस प्रवृत्ति के बारे में मौन है । तो क्या ऐसा माना जाय कि यह 'य' श्रुति की प्रवृत्ति वरचिद् के बाद में प्रारम्भ हुई या वरचिद् ने जिस प्राकृत भाषा का व्याकरण लिखा है उसमें या उनके समय में 'य' श्रुति का प्रचलन ही नहीं होगा और यह प्रवृत्ति बाद में प्रचलित हुई होगी।

आदर्य की बात तो यह है कि इस मन्तव्य के विरुद्ध भरत-नाट्यशास्त्र में भी 'य' श्रुति का आंशिक रूप से अपत्यक्ष रूप में अनुमोदन मिलता है। उसमें निम्न प्रकार का निर्देश है—

प्रवळाचिराचडादिषु भवति चकारोपि तु यकारः 17.16

अर्थात् मध्यवर्ती 'च' का 'य' भी होता है।

अब लोक प्रवृत्ति को भी देख लें कि उसमें 'य' श्रुति का प्रचलन या या नहीं और 'य' श्रुति के नियम को मान जैन परम्परा में ही अपनाया गया है वह कहाँ तक उचित है।

पालि साहित्य में तो मध्यवर्ती अव्ययप्राण व्यंजनों के लोप की प्रवृत्ति है ही नहीं फिर भी उसमें भी कहीं कहीं पर 'य' श्रुति मिलती है जो लोक-प्रवृत्ति के प्रभाव के नष्ट होने के बाद हो ऐसा मान्य होता है। गाङ्गार महोदय¹ (36) ने कुछ उदाहरण इस प्रकार दिये हैं जो प्राचीनतम पालि साहित्य में भी मिलते हैं—

निय (निज) सुचत्तिपात, आवेणिय (आवेणिक) विनयपिटक; अपस्सोयान (अपमोदान) बोधिवंश; लायित (लादित; जातक)।

इस 'य' श्रुति का प्रचलन प्राचीनकाल से ही था यह शिलालेखों से भी सिद्ध होता है। डॉ. एम. ए. मेहेण्डले का इसके बारे में निम्न प्रकार का निष्कर्ष है—

सम्राट अशोक के पूर्वी क्षेत्र के शिलालेखों में मध्यवर्ती 'क' और 'ग' का कभी कभी लोप होने पर शेष रहे उस 'अ' का जो 'अ' और 'इ' के पश्चात् आता है कभी कभी 'य' में बदलने के कुछ उदाहरण प्राप्त हो रहे हैं।

यह निष्कर्ष हेमचन्द्र के नियम के साथ बिल्कुल साम्य रखता है।

वे भागे कहते हैं कि इसी प्रकार उत्तर-पश्चिम के शिलालेखों में 'आ' और 'ओ' के पश्चात् आनेवाले 'ज' का लोप होने पर शेष रहे 'अ' के 'य' में बदलने के कुछ उदाहरण मिलते हैं।

अशोक से परवर्ती ई. स. की चौथी शताब्दी तक के भारत के सभी क्षेत्रों में प्राप्त हो रहे शिलालेखों में मध्यवर्ती अल्पप्राण के लोप के बाद उद्भूत स्वर की 'य' श्रुति होने के कितने ही उदाहरण मिलते हैं और यथावत् उद्भूत स्वर भी मिलते हैं।

शिलालेखों में प्राप्त हो रहे 'य' श्रुति के उदाहरण इस प्रकार दिये जा सकते हैं—

(i) अशोक के शिलालेख

अनाहुतिय (अनायुक्ति) धौली पृथक्, जोगड पृथक्। -उपय (-उपय) धौली, कालसी, शाह, मान, गिर। अथातिय (अर्धत्रिक) लघु शिलालेख।

कम्बोज (कम्बोज), रय (राजन्), समय (समाज) शाहजाजगड।

(ii) खरोष्ठी शिलालेख

सहयर् (सहचर) K14², महरय (महाराज) K13¹ प्रथम शताब्दी ई. स. पूर्व
संवत्सरय (संवत्सरक) K13¹ प्रथम शताब्दी ई. स.
अभ्यय 'च' का भी 'य' K86³, द्वितीय शताब्दी ई. स. (K86 काडुल के पास वर्दक के
कलशलेख (Vase Inscp. से)

महरय (महाराज) K13¹, पूय (पूजा) K², K80⁴, K88 (प्रथम शताब्दी ई. स.
पूर्व से तृतीय शताब्दी ई. स. तक)

श्री मेहेण्डले द्वारा दिये गये उदाहरणों में (पृ. 298-299) य श्रुति के उदाहरणों के साथ साथ उद्भूत स्वरों के उदाहरणों की मात्रा अधिक है।

व्याकरणकार वररुचि ने प्राकृत भाषा के जो लक्षण दिये हैं उनके आधार से वे दक्षिण प्रदेश (वह्निर्ध्वा, त्रिन्ध्वगिरि के दक्षिण का प्रदेश) के निवासी थे ऐसी संभावना हो सकती है—यह एक अनुमान मात्र है। वे दक्षिण प्रदेश के हो और दक्षिण में 'य' श्रुति की यह प्रवृत्ति विद्यमान न हो ऐसी शंका की जा सकती है। परन्तु दक्षिण के शिलालेखों में प्रथम शताब्दी ई. स. पूर्व से ही इस प्रवृत्ति के उदाहरण मिलते हैं।

(i) अय—लोपारय (छूर्पारक) L 11.19 नानावाट II

आय—नाय (नाग) L 1078 भाजा

- इय—सामिय (स्वामिक) L 1106³ नासिक IV
 उय—पुयय (पूजार्थ) L 1000³ कण्हेरी
 ओय—महाभोय (महाभोज) L 1073 कुडा
 (ii) आया—राया (राजा) L 1113 नानाघाट I
 उया—वेण्डुया (विष्णुका) L 1060 कुडा
 (iii) अयि—पवयितिका (प्रव्रजितिका) L 1041 कुडा
 पवयित (प्रव्रजित) L 1125 नासिक IV, कण्हेरी
 आयि—भायिला (भाजिला) L 1050 काले^{*} I
 इयि—वाणियिय (वाणजिय-वाणिज्य) L 1055 कुडा
 एयि—वेयिका (वेदिका) L 1089 काले^{*} I
 (iv) आयू—पायून (पादोन) L 1133 नासिक III

यही नहीं परन्तु चतुर्थ शताब्दी के मैसूर राज्य के बेलारी जिल्ले के शिवस्कंदवर्मा के हीरहृदयगणिल के ताम्रपत्र में भी य श्रुति का प्रयोग मिलता है।

भारद्वायो (भारद्वाजः), भारदाय (भारद्वाज), अकूर-योल्लक (अकूर-चल्लक)

अर्थात् ऐसा अनुमान नहीं लगाया जा सकता कि दक्षिण में यह प्रवृत्ति नहीं थी। इस परिधिष्य में वररुचि द्वारा 'य' श्रुति का उल्लेख नहीं किया जाना उनके व्याकरण का एक आश्चर्य ही है।

शिलालेखों में जो उदाहरण मिलते हैं उनमें सभी स्वरों के पश्चात् आने वाले उद्धृत स्वरों के स्थान पर य श्रुति मिलती है। विशल महोदय का भी मत है कि जैनो द्वारा लिखी गयी हस्तप्रतों में भी यही स्थिति है परन्तु जैनेतर रचनाओं की हस्तप्रतों में यह य श्रुति नहीं अरनायी गयी है। उनका कहना है कि लेखन का सही तरीका यह है कि सभी स्वरों के बाद उद्धृत स्वर अ और आ के स्थान पर य श्रुति का उपयोग होना चाहिए (विशाल 187)।

आधुनिक भाषाओं में भी यह य श्रुति कितने ही शब्दों में पायी जाती है।

हिन्दी : गया, किया, दिया, पिया, अंधियारा, बहिनिया, जीयदान, अभिय, पियर।

गुजराती : पियर, मायर, दियर, गयो, शीयालो, होय छे. वेण (वयण-वचन).

अन्य शब्द : वनपतराय, रायबहादुर, कायर.

वास्तव में उच्चारण की सरलता और लघु प्रयत्न का ही सिद्धान्त इस य श्रुति में लागू होता है जो एक स्वाभाविक नियम है जिसके लिए व्याकरणकारों का अनुमोदन हो या न हो। परन्तु सभी जैनेतर प्राकृत रचनाओं में य श्रुति का नहीं मिलना वास्तविकता के अनुरूप नहीं है और इसे भाषाकीय-कृत्रिमता ही कहा जायगा। यह कृत्रिमता वररुचि के प्रभाव से आयी हो या अन्य कोई परम्परा के कारण, जो हो सो हो परन्तु है एक प्रकार से अस्वाभाविकता का दोष।

अंग सूत्र 'आचार'—सापेक्ष जीवसिद्धि

गुरु विचक्षण पदरज — साध्वी सुरेखा श्री

जैन वाङ्मय की धारा सदैव 'जीव' सापेक्ष ही प्रवाहित रही है। सात तत्त्व, पंचास्ति-काय, षड्द्रव्य, नवपदार्थ सभी में जीव तत्त्व को ही प्राथमिकता दी गई है। जैन दर्शन की आधारशिला ही जीव तत्त्व है। बंधनयुक्त जीव ही संसार और बंधनमुक्त जीव ही लिद्ध है। जीव और अजीव ये दो ही तत्त्व जैन दर्शन मान्य करता है।¹ इसमें भी प्राधान्य जीव-तत्त्व का ही है। क्योंकि दृश्यमान अजीव तत्त्व जीव तत्त्व का ही कलेवर है, ऐसा स्पष्ट मन्तव्य है। यथपि इन दो तत्त्वों को प्रमुखता दी है, तदपि जीव-तत्त्व ही इस दर्शन का केन्द्र बिंदु रहा है। जीव और अजीव तत्त्व की मिश्रवस्था ही, इस संसार का हेतु है। अजीव संलग्न जीव ही संसरण करता है, भ्रमण करता है।

वस्तुतः जीव तत्त्व है भी या नहीं? जीव है तो कैसा है? उसका स्वरूप क्या है? उसका लक्षण क्या है? इत्यादि अनेक प्रश्न दार्शनिक चिन्तन के विषय सदैव से रहे हैं। चिन्तक—धरा पर प्रस्तुति होते रहे हैं। द्वादशाङ्गी के प्रथम अंग सूत्र 'आचार' में जीव-अस्तित्व, जीव सिद्धि पर पर्याप्त प्रकाश डाला है। जीव को आत्मा, चैतन्य आदि अभिधानों से भी उल्लिखित किया गया है। 'जीव-सिद्धि' इस तथ्य की प्रामाणिकता इसमें 'अस्तिवाद' के चार अंगों की स्वीकृति द्वारा होती है, आत्मवाद, लोकवाद, कर्मवाद और क्रियावाद।² इसी तथ्य की पुष्टि 'मूककृताङ्ग' द्वितीय अंग सूत्र में भी है, 'लोक-अलोक, जीव-अजीव, धर्म-अधर्म' बंध-मोक्ष, पुण्य-पाप, क्रिया-अक्रिया नहीं है ऐसी संज्ञा मत रखो, किन्तु ये सब हैं। ऐसा संज्ञारखो।³

आत्मवादी, लोकवादी, कर्मवादी और क्रियावादी किसे कहा जाय? जो आत्म स्वरूप को समझ लेता है वही सच्चा आत्मवादी है। जो आत्मवादी है वही सच्चा लोकवादी है। जो आत्मा के और लोक के स्वरूप को जानता है वही कर्मवादी और जो कर्मवादी है वही क्रिया करने से क्रियावादी होता है।

आचाराङ्ग के इस उल्लेख से यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि आत्मा या जीव का अस्तित्व है या नहीं? जिसने आत्म स्वरूप को जाना है, वही लोक को भी जान पाता है। वही कर्म और क्रिया में भी पूर्ण निष्ठा के साथ तत्पर होता है। आत्मज्ञान मात्र यहाँ पर्याप्त नहीं है, तदनुसार लोक में कर्म और कर्मानुसारी क्रिया भी यहाँ महत्त्वपूर्ण है। यह सूत्र जैन दर्शन पर 'अकर्मण्यता' के आरोप का भी निराकरण करता है। साथ ही जो दर्शन आत्मा को सर्वव्यापी, नित्य, क्षणिक, अकर्ता मानते हैं, उसका भी निरसन करता है।

अन्य दर्शनों ने किसी ने आत्मवाद को, तो किसीने लोकवाद को महत्त्वपूर्ण बताया। किसी ने कर्म को तो किसी ने क्रिया को प्राथमिकता दी। वहाँ जैन विचारणा अनेकान्तवाद पर आधारित होने से आत्मवाद के साथ लोकवाद, कर्मवाद और क्रियावाद को भी ग्रहण करती

है। जो आत्मा के अस्तित्व में विश्वास करता है, वह लोक कर्म और क्रिया से उपरत नहीं हो सकता। एकान्त आत्मवाद, एकान्त लोकवाद, एकान्त कर्मवाद एवं एकान्त क्रियावाद का यहाँ निषेध किया गया है। लोकस्थित जीवात्मा कर्म हेतु क्रिया करता ही है। कर्म समारम्भ हेतु क्रिया अनिवार्य है! इसीलिए 'मैंने किया, मैंने करवाया और करते हुए अन्य को अनुमोदन दूँगा, लोक में इतनी ही कर्मबन्ध की हेतुरूप क्रियाएँ समझनी चाहिए।' ऐसा उल्लिखित है। जीव का कर्म हेतु क्रिया का इससे निश्चय होता है। वस्तुतः एकान्त पक्ष मिथ्या है, समन्वित अनेकान्तवाद वस्तु-स्वरूप का सच्चा ज्ञान कराने में सहायक है।

स्पष्ट है कि जैन दर्शन की भित्ति आत्मवाद पर अधिष्ठित है। इस आत्मवाद के प्रश्न का दर्शन की उत्पत्ति की पृष्ठभूमि कहा जाय तो अनुचित न होगा। क्योंकि आत्म सापेक्ष दृष्टि भारतीय चिन्तकों की रही है। इसी विश्वासा की झलक आचारार्ङ्ग में स्थल स्थल पर दृष्टिगत होती है। इसमें उल्लेख है, 'इस संसार में एक-एक जीव को यह ज्ञान नहीं होता कि दिशा-विदिशाओं में संचरणशील कौन है? आत्मा का पुनर्जन्म होता है या नहीं? मैं कौन था और यहाँ से चलकर परलोक में कहाँ जाऊँगा? क्या होऊँगा?'^{१५} फिर भी कोई जीव अपनी विशिष्ट जातिस्मरणदि ज्ञानयुक्त बुद्धि से अथवा तीर्थङ्कर के कहने से या अन्य उपदेशकों से सुनकर यह ज्ञान लेता है कि दिशा विदिशाओं में गमन करनेवाला, भवान्तर में संचरण करनेवाला मैं हूँ।^{१६}

जो दर्शन आत्मा को सर्वव्यापी, नित्य, क्षणिक, और अकर्ता मानते हैं, उनके मत में आत्मा का भवान्तर में संक्रमण सिद्ध नहीं हो पाता। म्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन आत्मा को सर्वव्यापी मानते हैं।^{१७} सर्वव्यापकत्व मानने पर जीव का भवान्तर में संक्रमण असिद्ध हो जाता है। उसमें कोई क्रिया भी घटित नहीं हो सकती। जब क्रिया का ही अभाव है, तो इहलोक और परलोक की व्यवस्था की संगति नहीं हो सकेगी। शुभा-शुभ कर्मों का फलानुभाव नहीं हो सकेगा।

सार्वभ्य दर्शन आत्मा को कूटस्थ नित्य के रूप में स्वीकार करता है।^{१८} कूटस्थनित्यता मानने पर अनित्य पक्ष को हानि पहुँचती है। इससे भी भवान्तर संक्रान्ति, लोक व्यवस्था, कर्म एवं क्रिया की निष्ठा नहीं हो सकेगी। क्योंकि नित्य उसे कहा है जो 'अप्रच्युतानुत्पन्न स्थिरैक स्वभाव नित्यम्' जो कभी नष्ट न हो, उत्पन्न न हो, एक स्वभाव में स्थिर रहे वह नित्य है। इस प्रकार आत्म-नित्यत्व स्वीकार करने पर नवीन शरीर का धारण करना पूर्व शरीर का त्याग नहीं हो सकेगा। जब जन्म मरण घटित नहीं होगा तो कर्म और क्रिया की व्यवस्था भी नहीं हो सकेगी। इस प्रकार यहाँ आत्मा की कूटस्थ नित्यता का निराकृत करके बौद्ध-दर्शन सम्मत क्षणमगवाद पर आत्मस्थिति का स्थापन भी अमान्य किया है। बौद्ध मतानुसार प्रत्येक पदार्थ क्षणमात्र अवस्थित रहता है और दूसरे क्षण में निरन्वय नष्ट हो जाता है। यदि आत्मा की क्षणमात्र स्थिति व निरन्वयनाश माना जाय तो इहलोक परलोक, पुनर्जन्म तथा उसका अनुसन्धात्मक ज्ञान 'सोऽहं' भी नहीं हो पावेगा।^{१९} क्षणिक स्थिति में क्रिया भी संभवित नहीं है क्योंकि दूसरे क्षण में तो नाश हो जायेगा। अतः क्रियाकाल का

अवकाश भी नहीं है। किया कारिता के पश्चात् फल प्राप्ति भी उसे नहीं हो सकेगी, क्योंकि प्रथम क्षण में वह किया करेगा, उसका फल अवान्तर क्षण में मिल सकेगा। जब कि दूसरा क्षण भी नष्ट हो जाने से उसका भोक्ता भी कीन होगा। इस संगति से कृतनाश और अहाकृत के दोष की संभावना रहेगी। क्योंकि कर्ता कोई और भोक्ता कोई और होगा। अतः आत्मा को सर्वथा क्षणिक न मानकर परिणामी निरर्थ मान्य किया है।

सांख्य दर्शन आत्मा को कर्त्ता न मानकर भोक्ता मान्य करता है।¹⁰ जब स्वयं वह कर्त्ता नहीं तो भोक्ता भी कैसे हो सकता है? अकर्ता मानने पर भोक्ता मानना योग्य नहीं है और जब भोक्ता नहीं तो जन्ममरण स्वर्ग-नरक, पुण्य-पाप, इहलोक परलोक गमन भी संभव नहीं हो पावेगा। इसी से यहाँ कर्मवाद और क्रियावाद भी पुष्ट होता है। क्योंकि शुभाशुभ क्रिया की ओर कर्मवादी प्रेरित होता है। शुभ कार्यों में प्रवृत्ति और अशुभ कार्यों से निवृत्ति कर्मवादी करता है। यहाँ इस सूत्र से आत्मा के अस्तित्व के साथ कर्मबंध का भी विचार किया गया है।

आत्म अनेकत्व की विचारणा का इसमें कथन है कि 'सति पाणा पुडो सिया'¹¹ अर्थात् सभी प्राणी पृथक् पृथक् रूप से रहे हुए हैं। जबकि अद्वैत वेदान्त की मान्यता है कि एक एव हि भूतारत्ना, भूने भूने व्यवस्थित।¹² अर्थात् स्वभावतः जीव एक है, परन्तु देहादि उपाधियों के कारण नाना प्रतीत होता है। आचाराङ्ग में यहाँ इस मत का खंडन करते हुए उल्लेख है कि प्रत्येक प्राणी में पृथक् पृथक् आत्म अस्तित्व है। जबकि वेदान्त दर्शनानुसार तो ब्रह्म अर्थात् जीव एक ही है वही अंश सर्व भूतों में विद्यमान है।

पृथ्वीकाय, जलकाय, अग्निकाय, वायुकाय और वनस्पतिकाय इनको एकेन्द्रिय प्राणी मानकर जीव सत्ता का निवेश करते हुए कथन है कि पृथ्वीकाय¹³, अपकाय¹⁴, तेजकाय¹⁵, वायुकाय¹⁶ और वनस्पतिकायादि¹⁷ जीवों का अपलाप नहीं करना चाहिये तथैव आत्मा का भी अपलाप नहीं करना चाहिये। जो इनकी सजीवता में शंकाशील होकर अपलाप करता है, वह आत्मा के अस्तित्व का अपलाप करता है। जो आत्मा के अस्तित्व का निषेध करता है वह इनकी सचेतनता का अपलाप करता है।

स्पष्ट है जिस प्रकार हमें अपने आत्म-अस्तित्व का बोध होता है, उसी प्रकार इन पञ्च निकाय के जीवों के अस्तित्व व उनकी सचेतनता का बोध होता है।

इन पृथ्वीकाय के जीवों को वेदना का अनुभव कैसे होता है? ऐसा पृष्ठने पर समाधान किया गया है कि, 'जैसे जन्म से अन्धे, बहरे, छूले, लँगड़े तथा अवयवहीन किसी व्यक्ति के कोई भालादि द्वारा पाँव, टखने, पिण्डी, घुटने, जंघा, कमर, नाभि, पेट, पाँसली, पीठ, छाती, हृदय, स्तन, कंधा, भुजा, हाथ, अंगुली, नख, गर्दन, दाढ़ी, होठ, दाँत, जीभ, तालु, गाल, कान, नाक, आँख, मोँह, ललाट, मस्तक इत्यादि अवयव छेदे तो उस अन्ध-बधिर को वेदना होने पर भी वह व्यक्त नहीं कर सकता। इसी प्रकार एकेन्द्रिय पृथ्वीकाय के जीवों को अश्वयत वेदना होती है। जैसे कोई मनुष्य पर सहसा प्रहार कर उसे मूर्च्छित करके फिर मार डाले तो मूर्च्छावस्था में उसे पीड़ा होती है, वैसे ही पृथ्वीकाय की वेदना समझनी चाहिये'¹⁸।

कर्ण, नासिका आदि इन्द्रियों से रहित ये जीव वेदना का अनुभव मूर्च्छितावस्था की भाँति करते हैं। यद्यपि इन्द्रियाभाव के कारण उसकी अभिव्यक्ति नहीं कर पाते, फिर भी उनका अनुभव तो होता ही है। इसी भाँति अपृक्काय, तेजस् कायादि जीवों की अनुभूति अव्यक्त रूप से होती है।

अपृक्काय के जीव को सजीव मानना यह जैन दर्शन की मौलिकता है। भगवान् महावीर के काल में अन्य दार्शनिक जल को सजीव नहीं मानते थे, किन्तु तदाश्रित अन्य जीवों की सत्ता स्वीकार करते थे। तैत्तिरीय, आरण्यक में 'वर्षा' को जल का गर्भ माना है और जल को 'प्रजननशक्ति' के रूप में स्वीकार किया गया है। 'प्रजनन क्षमता' सचेतन में ही होती है अतः सचेतन होने कि धारणा का प्रभाव वैदिक चिन्तन पर पड़ा है, ऐसा माना जा सकता है।^{1७} किन्तु मूलतः अणुगार दर्शन को छोड़कर अन्य सभी दार्शनिक जल को सचेतन नहीं मानते थे। इसी कारण यहाँ आचारान्न सूत्र में दोनों तथ्यों को स्पष्ट किया है। 1. जल सचेतन है 2. तदाश्रित अनेक छोटे बड़े जीव रहते हैं।^{2०} इस प्रकार जल को सचेतन मानकर उसमें जीव अस्तित्व सिद्ध किया है।

जिस प्रकार पृथ्वी, पानी में जीव-सत्ता को मान्य किया है, उसी प्रकार तेजकाय-तेजस् काय में भी चेतना मानकर जैन दर्शन में अतिन को जीव माना है। भगवान् महावीर कालीन धर्मपरम्पराओं में जल तथा अग्नि दोनों को देवता मानकर पूजा जाता था, किन्तु उसकी हिंसा का विचार नहीं किया गया था। जल से शुद्धि और पंचाग्नितर से सिद्धि मानकर इनका खुल्लमखुल्ला प्रयोग किया जाता था। भगवान् महावीर ने इन दोनों को ही सजीव माना है। टीकाकार शीलकाचार्य के अनुसार, 'अग्नि की सजीवता तो स्वयं ही सिद्ध है। उसमें प्रकाश व उष्णता का गुण है। जो कि सचेतन में होते हैं। साथ ही अग्नि वायु के अभाव में जीवित भी नहीं रह सकती है।²¹ स्नेह, काष्ठ आदि का आहार लेकर बढ़ती है, आहार के अभाव में घटती है। यह सब उसकी सजीवता के स्पष्ट लक्षण है। भगवती सूत्र में भी इसकी पुष्टि की गई है।²²

वनस्पतिकाय की सचेतनता बताने के लिए मनुष्य शरीर के साथ तुलना करते हुए कहा है कि 'जैसे अपना शरीर उत्पन्न होता है, वैसे यह वनस्पति भी उत्पन्न होती है। अपना शरीर बढ़ता है तो वनस्पति में भी वृद्धि होती है। अपने शरीर में चैतन्य है तो यह भी चैतन्यवान् है। अपने शरीर को छेदने से यह कुम्हला जाता है, उसी प्रकार यह भी छेदने से कुम्हला जाती है। जिस प्रकार अपने शरीर का आहार चाहिये, उसी प्रकार वनस्पति को भी आहार की आवश्यकता होती है। अपना शरीर अनित्य, अशाश्वत है, तो वनस्पति भी अनित्य-अशाश्वत है। अपना शरीर घटता बढ़ता है तो यह भी घटती बढ़ती है। अपना शरीर अनेक विकारों को प्राप्त करता है, वैसे यह भी विकारों से ग्रस्त होती है।²³ यहाँ वनस्पति की सचेतनता का उल्लेख स्पष्ट रीति से किया गया है। ज्ञानयुक्त मनुष्य की भाँति इसमें भी ज्ञान होता है क्योंकि धात्री, प्रपुन्नाट (लाजवन्ती) आदि वृक्षों में सेना जागना पाया जाता है।²⁴ अपने नीचे जमीन में गाँठे हुए धन की रक्षा के लिए ये अपनी शाखा फैलाते हैं।²⁵

वर्षाकाल के मेघस्वर से तथा शिशिर ऋतु की वायु से इनमें अंकुर उत्पन्न होते हैं। अशोक वृक्ष के पत्तल और फूल की उत्पत्ति कामदेव के संसर्ग से स्खलित गतिवाली, चपलनेत्रवाली सोलह शृंगार सजी हुई युवती अपने नूपुर से शब्दायमान सुकौमल चरण से स्पर्श करती है, तब होती है। बकुल वृक्ष का विकास सुगंधित मद के कुल्ले के मिचन से होता है। लाजवती वृक्ष हाथ के स्पर्शमात्र से संकुचित हो जाता है।^{१०} क्या ये सब क्रियाएँ ज्ञान के अभाव में संभव हो सकती हैं? सुप्रसिद्ध वैज्ञानिक सर जगदीशचंद्र बसु वैज्ञानिकों भी संसार में वनस्पति में चेतनता मानने के लिए बाध्य कर दिया है। उन्होंने अपने वैज्ञानिक साधनों के द्वारा यह प्रत्यक्ष कर दिया है कि वनस्पति में भी क्रोध, प्रसन्नता, राग, मोह, आदि भाव निहित हैं। उनकी तारीफ करने पर वह हास्य प्रकट करती है और गाली देने पर तथा निंदा करने पर क्रोधित होती दृष्टिगत हुई है। इस प्रकार वैज्ञानिक युग में वनस्पति की चेतनता के अनेक प्रमाण प्राप्त होते हैं।

त्रस कायिक जीवों में अंडज, पोतज, जरायुज, रसज, संस्वेदज संमूर्च्छिम उद्भिज औपपातिक प्राणियों के समूह को संसार कहा है।^{१२} आचाराङ्ग में षड्जीविकायों में वायुकाय की सजीवता का अंत में उल्लेख किया है।^{१३} वायु को सचेतन मानना यह भी जैन दर्शन की मौलिकता है। सामान्य क्रम में पृथ्वी अप, तेजस, वायु, वनस्पति और त्रस इस प्रकार आता है किन्तु यहाँ इस क्रम का उल्लंघन करके वायुकाय का वर्णन अंत में लिया है। इसका क्या कारण है? इस शांका का समाधान शालांकार्य टीका में इस प्रकार करते हैं, षड्काय में वायुकाय का शरीर चर्मचक्षु (आँख) से दिखाई नहीं देता है। जबकि अन्य पाँचों का शरीर चक्षुगोचर है। इसी कारण वायुकाय का विषय अन्य पाँचों की अपेक्षा दुर्बोध है। अतः यहाँ पर पहले उन पाँचों का वर्णन करके अंत में वायु का विवेचन किया है।^{१४} इस प्रकार अंग सूत्र आचाराङ्ग में षड्जीविकाय का पृथक् पृथक् वर्णन करके जीव के अस्तित्व की सिद्धि की गई है। जैन दर्शन में जीव की सत्ता का विचार जिस सूक्ष्मता और गहनता से किया है, अन्यत्र कहीं दृष्टिगोचर नहीं होता। जीव का लक्षण स्वरूप तथा वर्गीकरण यहाँ अहिंसा धर्म के पालन के परिप्रेक्ष्य में करके सूक्ष्मातिसूक्ष्म हिंसा का निषेध किया गया है।

आत्म स्वरूप की अनिर्वचनीयता, स्वयंसिद्धता व शुद्धता का निर्देश सुन्दर रीति से किया है कि, “शुद्धात्मा का स्वरूप बताने के लिए कोई भी शब्द समर्थ नहीं है। तर्क की वहाँ गति नहीं है। बुद्धि वहाँ तक नहीं जाती, कल्पना भी नहीं हो सकती। वह कमल-रहित प्रकासरूप समग्र लोक का ज्ञाता है। वह न दीर्घ है न छोटा है, न बड़ा है, न गोल है, न त्रिकोण है न चौरस है, न मंडलाकार है न काला है, न नीला है न पीला है, न लाल है, न सफेद है, न सुगन्धवाला है, न दुर्गन्धवाला है न तीखा है न कड़वा है न कसेला है, न खट्टा है, न मीठा है, न कठोर है, न सुकुमार है, न भारी है, न हल्का है, न ठंडा है, न गर्म है, न स्निग्ध है, न रुक्ष है, न शरीरधारी है, न पुनर्जन्मा है, न आसक्त है, न स्त्री है, न पुरुष है, न नपुंसक है। वह ज्ञाता है, परिज्ञाता है। उसके लिए कोई उपमा नहीं, वह अरुपिणी सत्ता वाला है। अवस्था रहित है, अतएव उसका वर्णन करने में कोई शब्द

समर्थ नहीं है । वह शब्दरूप गंधरूप, रसरूप, और स्पर्शरूप नहीं है । स्पष्ट है कि आत्मा का स्वरूप इन्द्रियागोचर होने से इन्द्रियागम्य है । उपनिषदों में जिस प्रकार 'नेति नेति' कहकर सवोधित किया है, उसी प्रकार शुद्धात्म स्वरूप का विवेचन भी नहीं किया जा सकता । नित्यानित्य आत्मा का स्वरूप जैन दर्शन का मौलिक चिन्तन है ।

जो आत्मा है, वही विज्ञाता है । जो विज्ञाता है, वही आत्मा है । जिसके द्वारा वस्तु स्वरूप जाना जाता है, वही ज्ञान आत्मा का गुण है । उस ज्ञान के आश्रित ही आत्मा की प्रतीति होती है । जो आत्मा और ज्ञान के इस संबंध को जानता है, वहीं आत्मवादी है और उसका संयमानुष्ठान सम्यक् कहा गया है ।¹

शुद्धात्म स्वरूप की प्रतीति, अनुभव हो सकता है । जो आत्मवादी है वहां ज्ञाता है ऐसा यहाँ स्पष्ट निर्देश है ।

'आत्मवत् सर्वभूतेषु' की भावना का साङ्गोपाङ्ग वर्णन यहाँ मिलता है—जिसे तू मारने का विचार कर रहा है, वह तो तू स्वयं है, जिस पर तू हुकूमत चलाने का विचार करता है, वह भी तू स्वयं है । जिसे तू दुःखी करना चाहता है, वह तू स्वयं है । जिसे तू पकड़ना चाहता है, वह तू स्वयं है । जिसे तू मार खालना चाहता है, वह भी तू स्वयं ही है । यह विचार कर । सन्मुख इस समझ से ही सत्पुरुष सभी जीवों के साथ मैत्री भाव कर सकते हैं ।²

यहाँ कई व्यक्ति शंका करते हैं कि आत्मा तो नित्य है अच्छेय है, अमेय है, अचल है, सनातन है । इसे शूल नहीं छेद सकते, अग्नि जला नहीं सकती, पानी गला नहीं सकती, हवा सुखा नहीं सकती । जब यह शाश्वत है तो उसकी हिंसा कैसे हो सकती है ? इसका समाधान यह है कि यहाँ हिंसा का अर्थ आत्मा का व्यापादन नहीं बल्कि आत्म संलग्न शरीर का व्यापादन है । आत्मा का आधारभूत शरीर है । आत्मा का शरीर से विशेषीकरण हो जाता कहा परा है जो प्राणवत्ता के नियमितरूप पर आधारित होने से आत्मसिद्धि विवादास्पद नहीं हो पाती ।

इस प्रकार जैन चिन्तन आत्मा की स्वयंसिद्धता, अनिवर्चनीयता पर प्रमुख रूप से निर्धारित है । जीव आत्मा या चेतना की सत्ता का प्रश्न महत्वपूर्ण होने पर भी यहाँ विवादास्पद नहीं है ।

1. ठाण : 2.1.1.
2. आचाराङ्ग : 1.5, 'से आशावाई, लोयावाई, कम्मावाई, किरियावाई.
3. सङ्कताङ्ग : 2.5
4. आचा., 1.1.6
5. आचा : 1.3
6. वही, 1.4

7. केशव मिश्र : तर्क भाषा पृ 148.
8. सांख्य कारिका : 19-20
9. स्याद्वाद मंजरी बलोक 18
10. सांख्य कारिका : 17, 11; सांख्य प्रवचन सूत्र : 1.66; योग सूत्र 4.24
11. आचा० : 1.2.12
12. ब्रह्म सूत्र : शार्ङ्ग भाष्य : 3.2.18, ब्रह्म त्रिदुः 72
13. आचा : 1.2.13
14. वही : 1.3.21
15. वही : 1.4.29
16. वही : 1.7.60-61
17. वही : 1.5.42-44
18. आचा : 1.2.16
19. संदर्भ : श्री पुष्कर सुनि अभिनन्दन ग्रंथ, पृ. 346, डॉ. जे. आर जोशी (पूता)
20. आचा : 1.3.25
21. आचा : शीलां. वृत्ति, 1.1.14 पत्रांक, 50
22. भगवती : शतक 6 उद्दे. " न विणा वा डयाएतं अगणिकाए उश्जलति "
23. आचा० : 1.5.45
25. षड्दर्शन समुच्चय बलोक 47-48 गुणरत्न सूरि कृत टीका
25. समराड्कच कहा, तद्बोधो भव, पत्रांक 171
26. षड्दर्शन समुच्चय : बलो 47-48 गुणरत्न सूरि कृत टीका
27. आचा० : 1.6.49
28. वही : 1.7.60-61
29. वही : शीलांका० टीका; पत्रांक 56
30. आचा० : 1.5.6
32. आचा० 1.5.5

પણિડતરાજ જગન્નાથકૃત 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકુચમર્દિની' દીકાનો અભ્યાસ *

વસન્તકુમાર મ. ભટ્ટ x

૦.૦ ભૂમિકા :

૦.૧ પાણિનિએ પોતાના 'અષ્ટાધ્યાયી' વ્યાકરણમાં જે ક્રમે સૂત્રોની રચના કરી છે, તે જ ક્રમને વળગી રહીને 'કાશિકાટ્ટિતિ'(ઈ.સ. ૬૦૦-૭૦૦)માં પાણિનિનાં સૂત્રોની સમજૂતી રજૂ કરવામાં આવી છે. પાણિનિનાં સૂત્રોની મઠઠથી ન્યારે કોઈ વાક્ય કે વાક્યના એક એકમરૂપ નામપદ કે ક્રિયાપદની રૂપસિદ્ધિ વર્ણવી હોય ત્યારે પાણિનિનાં સૂત્રોના ઉપસ્થિતિ ક્રમ બદલાય છે. આવી રૂપસિદ્ધિમાં જે ક્રમે સૂત્રોની ઉપસ્થિતિ થાય છે, તેને 'પ્રક્રિયાક્રમ' પણ કહે છે. કાલક્રમે 'કાશિકાટ્ટિતિ', કે જેમાં 'અષ્ટાધ્યાયી'નાં સૂત્રોની પાણિન્યુચ્ચરિતક્રમે વ્યાખ્યા કરવામાં આવી છે, તેવા ટૂંકાવોને બદલે પ્રક્રિયાઅન્યોની, (કે જેમાં રૂપસિદ્ધિમાં જે ક્રમે સૂત્રો ઉપસ્થિત કરવામાં આવતાં હોય છે તે પ્રક્રિયા ક્રમાનુસાર સૂત્રોની વ્યાખ્યા કરવામાં આવતી હોય તેવા અન્યોની) રચના થવી શરૂ થઈ છે. આમાં 'રૂપમાલા' જેવા અન્યો પછી, ઈ.સ. ૧૫૦૦ માં રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યકૃત 'પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી' અસાધારણ મહત્વનું સ્થાન ધરાવે છે. (કારણ કે આ પ્રક્રિયા અન્યોની પરંપરામાં જ, અને 'પ્રક્રિયા કૌમુદી'માંથી જ વિપુલ પ્રેરણા મેળવીને કાલક્રમે ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે (ઈ.સ. ૧૬૫૦) 'વૈયાકરણ-સિદ્ધાન્ત-કૌમુદી' અન્યની રચના કરી છે.)


૦.૨ રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યકૃત 'પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી' ઉપર 'પ્રકાશ' અને 'પ્રસાદ' નામની એ નોંધપાત્ર દીકાઓ મળે છે. આમાંથી પહેલી 'પ્રકાશ' (અથવા 'પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદીટ્ટિતિ') નામની દીકા શેષવંશમાં જન્મેલા શ્રીકૃષ્ણ પંડિતે રચી છે, અને બીજી 'પ્રસાદ' નામની દીકા પ્રક્રિયા-કૌમુદીકાર રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યના જ પૌત્ર વિક્રમે રચી છે.

૦.૩ પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદીકાર રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યનું દ્વિવિધ વંશવૃક્ષ નીચે પ્રમાણે હોય એમ જણાય છે :-

* તા. ૧૭-૧૯ ડિસેમ્બર, ૧૯૯૧ ના દિવસોએ સંસ્કૃતવિભાગ, ભાપાસાહિત્યભવન, ગુજરાત યુનિવર્સિટી, અમદાવાદ દ્વારા આયોજિત "પણિડતરાજ જગન્નાથ વિષયક રાજ્યકક્ષાના પરિસંવાદ" માં રજૂ કરેલ શોધપત્ર


x રીડર, સંસ્કૃત વિભાગ, ભાપાસાહિત્યભવન, ગુજરાત યુનિવર્સિટી, અમદાવાદ-૯.

(૧) ગ્રન્થ વંશવૃક્ષ :




પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદીકાર રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યનું વંશ 'શેષવંશ' એવા નામથી પણ પ્રખ્યાત ન્યું છે; આ વંશમાં ઘણા વૈયાકરણો પાક્યા છે અને તેમણે પાણિનીય વ્યાકરણશાસ્ત્ર પ્રચારમાં ખૂબ મહત્વનો ફાળો આપ્યો છે.

(૨) વિદ્યાવંશવૃક્ષ :



૧. 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાખંડન'ના કર્તા ચક્રપાણિદત્તે પોતાના ચુડ તરીકે શેષવંશના 'વટેશ્વર'નું નામ આપ્યું છે (જુઓ : ૧.૫ માં ઉદ્ધૃત કરેલા શ્લોક). આ વટેશ્વર તે જ 'વીરેશ્વર શેષ' છે.

પ્રોફિટ શ્રી યુધિષ્ઠિર મીમાંસકૃષ્ણે આ યુરુશિષ્ય પરંપરાનું એક ચિત્ર નીચે પ્રકારે આપ્યું છે :



આ ચિત્રમાં જગન્નાથ અને ભટ્ટોજિદીક્ષિતને સતીથ્થ (સમાન યુરુના શિષ્ય) બતાવ્યા છે; તે ચિન્ત્ય છે.

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પ્રોફે. શ્રી આર. બી. આઠવળે સાહેબે લખ્યું છે કે—“ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે પોતાના ‘પ્રૌઢમંતરમા’ અન્થમાં વ્યાકરણશાસ્ત્રના પોતાના યુરુ શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શૈષના પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી (= પ્રક્રિયા-કૌમુદી પ્રકાર) નામના વ્યાકરણ અન્થમાંના કેટલાક મુદ્દાનું ખંડા કરેલું છે. વીરેશ્વર શાસ્ત્રી શૈષ જગન્નાથરાયના પિતાના વ્યાકરણશાસ્ત્રના યુરુ હતા, એટલે જગન્નાથરાયને ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિત ઉપર બે રીતે શૈષ હતા, એ ઉઘાડું છે. એક તો પોતાના યુરુના(પિતાના) [ખરેખર યુરુના (પિતાના) યુરુના] એમ પ્રોફે. આઠવળે એ લખ્યું નોંધવું હતું]. અર્થનું ખંડન કર્યું, એ પોતાના પિતાનું જ અપમાન થયું, એવી લાગણીથી થનારો શૈષ, અને બીજો, ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે પ્રત્યક્ષ પોતાના યુરુના અર્થનું ખંડન કરી ગયેલા યુરુદ્રોહ કર્યો એવો શૈષ.”^૩—અહીં પ્રોફે. આઠવળેએ વીરેશ્વર શૈષને જગન્નાથના સાક્ષાત્ યુરુ નહીં કહેતાં, જગન્નાથના પિતા(પરમ ભટ્ટ/પિરુ ભટ્ટ)ના યુરુ કહ્યા છે તે અવગધાન-પ્રચુકત પ્રમાદ હશે ?

૦.૪ ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે ‘વૈયાકરણસિદ્ધાન્ત કૌમુદી’ની રચના કર્યા પછી, તેની ઉપર ‘પ્રૌઢમંતરમા’ નામનો એક દીકાઅર્થ પાળ્યો છે. આ અર્થમાં તેમણે પોતાના પરમ યુરુ (પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદીકાર) રામચંદ્રાચાર્યના મતાનું તથા પોતાના સાક્ષાત્ યુરુ (પ્રક્રિયા

૨. જુઓ : સંસ્કૃત વ્યાકરણશાસ્ત્રના ઇતિહાસ (ભાગ-૧); પં. યુધિષ્ઠિર મીમાંસક, પ્રકા. રામલાલ કપૂર ટ્રસ્ટ, હોનીપત (હરયાણા), તૃતીય સંસ્કરણ, મં. ૨૦૩૦, પૃષ્ઠ : ૪૦૮.

૩. જુઓ : ‘રસગંગાધરની ભૂમિકા’, લેખક : રા. બ. આઠવળે, અનુવાદક : નગીનદાસ પારેખ, યુનિવર્સિટી અર્થ નિર્માણ પ્રોહ, અમદાવાદ, ૧૯૭૨; પ. ૧૧૨.

કૌમુદીપ્રકાશ - ટીકાકાર) શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષના અનેક મતોનું 'પ્રૌઢવાદપૂર્વક' સ્પષ્ટીકૃતક 'ખ'ંડન કયું' છે. બહોળિ દીક્ષિતના આ 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા' ગ્રંથે વૈયાકરણ સમૂહમાં ભારે ઊઠાપોઠા જગાડયો છે, અને તેનું પ્રકટપણે 'ખ'ંડન કરવા માટે ત્રણેક વૈયાકરણોએ પ્રયત્નો પણ કર્યા છે. જેમ કે,

(૧) પ્રક્રિયા કૌમુદી-પ્રકાશકાર શેષકૃષ્ણના પૌત્ર અને વીરશ્વરના પુત્રે (કે જેનું નામ અજ્ઞાત છે, તેમણે) 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'નું 'ખ'ંડન કરતો કોઈ અન્ય લખ્યો હતો. ૪ પણ સમ્પ્રતિ આ ગ્રંથ અપ્રાપ્ય છે.

(૨) ચક્રપાણિકૃત નામના બીજા એક વૈયાકરણે 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા' 'ખ'ંડન' નામનો અન્ય લખ્યો છે એમાંથી કેટલોક અંશ 'લાઝરસ ક'પની, બનારસ દ્વારા પ્રકાશિત થયો છે. ૫

(૩) પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથે 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા કુચમર્દિની' નામની ટીકા રચીને બહોળિ દીક્ષિતની 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'નું 'ખ'ંડન કયું' છે.

૦.૫ પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથે 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'નું 'ખ'ંડન કરવા માટે જે 'કુચમર્દિની' ટીકા લખી છે, તેનાં બે પ્રેરક પરિચયો નીચે પ્રમાણે છે :

(ક) બહોળિ દીક્ષિતે પોતાના પરમચુરુ શ્રીરામચન્દ્રાચાર્યની 'પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી'માંથી જ ઘણી બધી પ્રેરણા લઈને 'વૈયાકરણ સિદ્ધાન્તકૌમુદી'ની રચના કરી છે. તથાપિ બહોળિ દીક્ષિતે 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'માં પોતાના પરમચુરુની જ 'પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી'ના મતોનું 'ખ'ંડન કયું' છે, અને સાથે સાથે પોતાના સાક્ષાત્ ચુરુ શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષની 'પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી પ્રકાશ' ટીકામાં ચર્ચેલા અનેક મતોનું પણ 'ખ'ંડન કયું' છે ! આથી પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથની દૃષ્ટિએ બહોળિ દીક્ષિતે 'પ્રૌઢ મનોરમા' લખીને ચુરુદ્રોહ જ કર્યો છે. વળી, પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથને માટે આ ચુરુદ્રોહ અક્ષમ્ય બની રહ્યાનું એક કારણ એ પણ છે કે બહોળિ દીક્ષિતના જે સાક્ષાત્ ચુરુ — પ્રક્રિયાપ્રકાશકાર શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષ — છે તે જગન્નાથના સાક્ષાત્ ચુરુ શેષ વીરશ્વરના પિતા છે. આથી પોતાના ચુરુના પિતાની કોઈ માનહાનિ કરી બધાં તે પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથથી કેવી રીતે સહન થઈ શકે ? આમ જગન્નાથે ચુરુદ્રોહી બહોળિ દીક્ષિતની 'પ્રૌઢ મનોરમા'નું 'ખ'ંડન કરવા એક ટીકાની રચના કરી, અને તેને 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકુચમર્દિની' એવું અસભ્ય શીર્ષક આપીને, બહોળિ દીક્ષિતની ટીપ્પણી ઉઠાવી છે.

(લ) 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકુચમર્દિની'ની રચના પાછળ બીજો પણ એક પ્રસંગ બન્યો હોય એમ લાગે છે, આ પ્રસંગની વિગત તરફ ધ્યાન દોરતાં પંડિત સુચિષ્ઠિર મીમાંસકે

૪. સા ચ પ્રક્રિયાપ્રકાશકૃતાં વૈચૈરલિલશાસ્ત્રમહાઈવમન્યાચલાયમાનમાનસામાસ્મદ્ગુરુત્તરીશ્વર-
પણ્ડિતાનાં તત્ત્વવૈદ્યિતા અપિ સ્વમતિપરીધાર્યં પુનર્રમાભિરપિ નિરીક્ષ્યતે ॥ પ્રૌઢમનોરમા, સં.
સદાશિષ જોશી, ચૌહાવા સંસ્કૃત સીરિજ આર્કિસ, બનારસ, ૧૯૩૮, પરિશિષ્ટ-૧, પૃ. ૧.

૫. ચક્રપાણિકૃત 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા' 'ખ'ંડન'નો ઉદ્ધાર બહોળિ દીક્ષિતના પૌત્ર હરિ દીક્ષિતે 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા' ઉપરની ટીકા 'શુબ્દરત્ન'માં કર્યો છે.

નીચે પ્રમાણે લખ્યું છે : 'પ'હિતરાજ જગન્નાથને ભદ્રોજિ દીક્ષિત સાથે જે અહિનકુલ-વૈર જેવું સહજ વૈર બહુ' થઈ ગયું હતું એ વિષે એક કવિએ લખ્યું છે કે—ગવિંધ દ્રાવિડ(અપ્પયદીક્ષિત)ના દુરાગ્રહરૂપી ભૂતાવેશથી (પ્રેરાયેલા) ગુરુદ્રોહી ભદ્રોજિ દીક્ષિતે ભરી સભામાં, વગર વિચારે 'પ'હિતરાજને 'મ્લેચ્છ' કહી દીધા. ધૈર્યનિધિ 'પ'હિતરાજે આ (વચન)ને તેમની 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'નું કુચમર્દન કરીને સાચું કરી દેખાડ્યું અને અપ્પય દીક્ષિતાદિ (ભદ્રોજિના સમર્થકો) જોતાં જ રહી ગયા.

'પ'હિત યુધિષ્ઠિર મીમાંસકે કાશીમાં પ્રકાશિત થયેલી 'રસ ગંગાધર'ની કોઈ હિન્દી દીકામાંથી એક ઉદ્ધરણ આપ્યું છે, જેમાં ઉપયુક્ત પ્રસંગ નોંધ્યો છે :

दृप्यद् द्राविडदुर्गहृदयद्वयान्मिष्टं गुरुद्रोहिण्य यन्मलेच्छेति वचोऽविचिन्त्य सदसि प्रौढेऽपि
भद्रोजिना । तत्कृतपापितमेव धैर्येतिचिन्ता यत्त व्यनुदनात् कुचम्, निर्बध्नाऽरुच मनोरमामवशयन्-
नवाद्यान् स्थितान् ॥^१

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આપણે જાણીએ છીએ કે 'પ'હિતરાજ જગન્નાથે યવનકન્યા સાથે લગ્ન કર્યા હતા. આ હકીકતથી ખીળાયેલા કાશીના તત્કાલિક સમાજમાં, જગન્નાથને 'મ્લેચ્છ' જાહેર કરનારો કોઈ પ્રસંગ બન્યો હોવાની પૂરી સંભાવના છે. અવશ્યતઃ, જગન્નાથે પોતે આવા કોઈ પ્રસંગની વાત 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકુચમર્દિની'ની પ્રસ્તાવનામાં લખી નથી.

૧.૦ 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકુચમર્દિની' દીકા અન્થનો પરિચય :

૧.૧ 'પ'. જગન્નાથકૃત મનોરમાખંડનરૂપ-કુચમર્દિની નામની દીકા સમ્પ્રતિ પૂર્ણ રૂપે મળતી નથી. પણ શ્રી સદાશિવ જ્ઞેશી શાસ્ત્રીએ સમ્પાદિત કરેલી 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'માં પૃ. ૫૬૬ પછી, પરિશિષ્ટ રૂપે (પૃ. ૧ થી ૨૬) આ દીકા જોડવામાં આવી છે.^૭

આ દીકામાં કુલ છ પ્રકરણો આવેલાં છે :

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|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| ૧. સંગ્રા પ્રકરણ, | ૪. હલસાન્ધિ પ્રકરણ |
| ૨. પરિભાષા પ્રકરણ, | ૫. વિસર્ગ સન્ધિ પ્રકરણ અને |
| ૩. અચ્ચ સન્ધિ પ્રકરણ, | ૬. સ્વાદિ સન્ધિ પ્રકરણ. |

આની આગળનો અન્થ મળતો નથી. પરંતુ છઠ્ઠા 'સ્વાદિ સન્ધિ પ્રકરણ' ને અન્તે નીચે મુજબની પુષ્પિકા વાંચવા મળે છે :

૧. શુઓ : સંસ્કૃત વ્યાકરણશાસ્ત્ર કા ઇતિહાસ, ભાગ-૧, તૃતીયસંસ્કરણ, વિ. સં. ૨૦૩૦, પૃ. ૪૮૧-૪૮૨. વળી, આ શ્લોક "હિન્દી-રસગંગાધર", લેખક-પુરુષોત્તમ શર્મા ચતુર્થેદી (પ્રકા: ઇન્ડિયન પ્રેસ લિમિટેડ, પ્રયાગ, સંવત (૧૯૮૬)ની પ્રસ્તાવનામાં પૃ. ૨૧ ઉપર આવેલો છે.

૭. પ્રમા-ધિમા-ચોરુના-કુચમર્દિની-સંવલિત લશચ્ચરણ પ્રૌઢમનોરમા; સંગ્રહ-સદાશિવ જોશી શાસ્ત્રી, પ્રકાશક-ચૌહાન સંસ્કૃત લેરીફ આફિસ, બનારસ સીટી, 1934 A.D.

શ્રીમત્પદ્મરાજવ્રજગણપદ્મરાજગણનાથકૃતૌ મનોરમાલબ્ધનકુચમર્દિન્યાં વચ્ચસન્ધિ-
પ્રકરણં સમાપ્તિમ્ અગમત્ ॥

“પદ્મ(વ્યાકરણશાસ્ત્ર), વાક્ય(ભીમાસાસાસ્ત્ર) અને પ્રમાણ(ન્યાયશાસ્ત્ર)ના બંને છેડાઓને
રૂપથી જનાર શ્રીમાન પદ્મિતરાજ જગન્નાથની રચેલી ‘મનોરમા’ખંડનકુચમર્દિનીમાં
આવેલું ‘પદ્મસન્ધિ પ્રકરણ’ સમાપ્તિને પામ્યું.”

આવી પુષ્પિકા વચ્ચેનાં બીજાં કેટલાં પ્રકરણોને અન્તે જોવા મળતી નથી, તેથી
સંભવ છે કે જગન્નાથે સ્થાલીપુલાકન્યાયે જ મનોરમાની પરીક્ષા કરીને, આટલા પ્રકરણ
પૂરતી જ પોતાની ટીકા રચી હોય. આના સમર્થનમાં જગન્નાથની જ એક પ્રાસ્તાવિક
નોંધ અહીં ઉલ્લેખનીય છે :

...સાવઃ પ્રવૃત્તિં સમર્થયમાનાનાં મુદ્દેષદ્વિપિતમતીનાં વલ્લપિ પુરુષાયુષેણાપિ ન શક્યન્તે ગણયિતું
પ્રમાદાસ્તથાપિ દિઙ્માત્રેણાપિ કાનપિ કુશાગ્રધિવર્ણેણુ નિરૂપયામઃ । (પૃ. ૨)

‘...સાપૂર્ણ પ્રવૃત્તિનું સમર્થન કરનારા એવા, અને યુરુ(શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષ)નો દ્રેષ કરવાથી
દ્વિપિત થયેલી મતિવાળા(ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિત)ના પ્રમાદો જે કે સમગ્ર પુરુષાયુષને ખરચવાથી
પણ ગણી શકવા શક્ય નથી; તેા પણ દિશામાત્રનું સ્વરૂપ કરવા પૂરતું તેમાંના કેટલાક
દોષોને અમે કુશાગ્ર બુદ્ધિવાળાઓને વિષેની સમક્ષ-રજૂ કરીએ છીએ.”

આમાંથી એવું સ્પષ્ટ સ્વરૂપ છે કે પં. જગન્નાથે સમગ્ર પ્રૌઢમનોરમા ઉપર તેા
‘કુચમર્દિની’ ટીકા નહીં લખી હોય. અલબત્ત આ ‘કુચમર્દિની’ જે પ્રકરણો ઉપર મળે છે
તેટલી જ સ્વાર્થ હશે કે હજી બીજા થોડાંક પ્રકરણો ઉપર પણ સ્વાર્થ હશે ? એ વિષે
કથું નિશ્ચિત કહી શકાય એમ નથી.

૧.૨ ‘કુચમર્દિની’ ટીકાના આરંભે પં. જગન્નાથે એક મંગલશ્લોક મૂક્યો છે :

લક્ષ્મીકાન્તરદામ્ભાંજં પ્રણમ્ય શ્રેયસાં વદમ્ ।

પણ્ડિતેન્દ્રો જાગ્નનાથઃ સ્વતિ ગર્વં ગુરુદ્ગ્રહામ્ ॥

અર્થાત્—“કૃત્યાણેનું જે ધામ છે તેવા લક્ષ્મીકાન્ત(વિપ્લુ)ના ચરણકમળને પ્રણામ
કરીને પદ્મિતેન્દ્ર જગન્નાથ (શેષકૃષ્ણ)યુરુનો દ્રોહ કરનારાઓના ગર્વના અન્ત આણું છે.”

આ મંગલશ્લોકના અન્તિમ ચરણ સ્વતિ ગર્વં ગુરુદ્ગ્રહમ્ । માં નહો અન્તકર્મેણ
ધાતુનું લઢ લકાર—વત્માનકાળ—માં ‘પ્રથમ’ પુરુષ એકવચનનું સ્વતિ । એવું રૂપ
વપરાયું છે. એનો અર્થ છે : અન્તકર્મે પ્રાપવતિ । વૃત્તી કરોતિ । આથી અન્યકર્તાના આશય
તરત જ સ્પષ્ટ થઈ જાય છે કે યુરુનો દ્રોહ કરનાર ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતના ગર્વનું ખંડન કરવા
માટે જ આ અન્યની રચના કરવામાં આવી છે.

આ મંગલશ્લોક પછી જગન્નાથે પોતાના આ અન્યની પ્રસ્તાવના કરતાં કહ્યું છે કે—

“અહીં અખિલ વિદ્વાનોના મુકુટમણિના કિરણોની હારમાળાથી જેમનાં ચરણકમળ
લાક્ષિત કરાયાં છે તેવા, દેવયુરુના ગૌરવનો પણ ગ્રાસ કરી જનારા સુહૃદ મહિમા વડે
જેમણે સઘળા પૃથિવીમંડળને સુરોક્ષિત કર્યું છે તેવા ‘શેષ’ વંશના આશુપણ રૂપ ‘શ્રીકૃષ્ણ’

નામના પંડિતશ્રીની લાંબા સમય સુધી પૂજેલી પાદુકાઓના પ્રસાદથી જ જેમને શબ્દાનુ-
શાસન જાણવા મળ્યું છે તેવા કેટલાક વૈયાકરણો, કે જેઓ કલિકાવતી આત્મામાં રહીને
બોધતા થયા છે તેમણે, તેમના—શૈષ કૃષ્ણ યુરુના—સ્વર્ગે સીધાના પછી તેમણે (શૈષકૃષ્ણે)
ઉદ્ઘાસિત કરેલા ‘પ્રક્રિયા પ્રકાશ’ ને, તે(પ્રક્રિયાપ્રકાશ)ના આશયોના અજ્ઞાનમાંથી જાણ
કરેલા દોષો વડે પોતે રચેલી ‘(પ્રોઠ્ઠ)મનોરમા’માં આકુળ આકુળ કરી નાખ્યો છે—
અર્થાત્ ઉદ્ઘોળી નાખ્યો છે. આવી આ(પ્રોઠ્ઠમનોરમા)ને પ્રક્રિયાપ્રકાશકાર(= શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શૈષ)ના
પૌત્રે, કે જે બધાં જ શાસ્ત્રો રૂપી મહાસમુદ્રનું આલોહન કરનાર (મેરુ) પર્વત જેવા
મનવાળા અમારા યુરુ વીરેશ્વર પંડિતના પુત્ર છે તેમણે દુષિત તો કરી જ કાઢી છે;
તથાપિ અમારી(= પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથની) છુદ્ધિની પરીક્ષા કરવા માટે ફરી એકવાર
અમારા વડે પણ તપાસવામાં આવે છે.”^૮ આ વિસ્તૃત પ્રસ્તાવનામાંથી નીચેના મુદ્દાઓ
સનિશ્ચય આન ઉપર ચઢે છે :

૧. (‘પ્રક્રિયાકોમુદી’ ઉપર ‘પ્રકાશ’ ટીકા લખનારા) શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શૈષ આસાધારણ પાંડિત્ય
ધરાવનારા હતા.
૨. ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે તેમના અન્તેવાસી બનીને જ પાણિનીય શબ્દાનુશાસનનું
જ્ઞાન મેળવ્યું હતું.
૩. શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શૈષના અવસાન પછી, ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે પોતાની ‘પ્રોઠ્ઠમનોરમા’માં તે
‘પ્રક્રિયાપ્રકાશ’ના ધણા મતોનું, આશયો નહીં સમજી શકવાને કારણે, તેમાં
દોષોદ્ઘોષાવન કરીને ખંડન કર્યું છે. આ રીતે તેમણે યુરુદ્રોહ કર્યો છે.
૪. આવી ‘પ્રોઠ્ઠમનોરમા’નું ખંડન તો શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શૈષના પૌત્ર અને જગન્નાથના
યુરુ શ્રી વીરેશ્વર પંડિતના પુત્રે, (કે જેનું નામ અજ્ઞાત છે, તેમણે)
કર્યું જ છે.
૫. તથાપિ જગન્નાથે પોતાની મતિની પરીક્ષા કરવા માટે ફરી એકવાર
‘પ્રોઠ્ઠમનોરમા’ની નિરીક્ષા શરૂ કરી છે.
૬. ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે કરેલા યુરુદ્રોહનો અન્ત લાવવા માટે જ આ ‘કૃત્યમર્દિની’ની
રચના કરવામાં આવી છે. પણ તેમાં ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે જગન્નાથનું ‘સ્યેચ્છાદિ
શબ્દથી અપમાન કર્યાનો કયાંય નિર્દેશ મળતો નથી.

૮. ૩૬ લઘુ કેચિન્નિલિલવિદ્વન્મુર્ઠમણિમયૂલમાલા - લાલિતચરણકમલાનાં શીર્ષાંગુરુરૌચ-
ગ્રાસમાંસલમદ્દિમમણિહતાલખંડમહીમમણ્ડલાનાં શોષાબંધાવતંસાનાં શ્રીકૃષ્ણાશ્વપણ્ડિતાનાં
ચિરાચારિતયોઃ પાદુકયોઃ પ્રવાદાદાસાદિતશબ્દાનુશાસનાસ્તેષુ ચ પારેશ્વરં પદ પ્રયાતેષુ
કલિકાલવંશવંદીભવન્તસ્તત્રમવદિમસ્ત્યસિત પ્રક્રિયાપ્રકાશમાધ્યાનવશોષિતવચ્ચર્ચકૃષ્ણૈઃ
સ્વયં નિર્મિતાયો મનોરમાયામ્ આકુસ્પકાર્ણે, સા ચ પ્રક્રિયાપ્રકાશકૃત્તાં પૌત્રૈર્ગલિલચાત્રમહાર્ણ-
વમન્થાન્નલાવણાનમાનલાનામ્ અસંપદગુરુચીરેશ્વરપણ્ડિતાનાં તત્યૈર્દુષિતા અગિ રામતિપરેશ્વાયે
પુનરસ્માધિરવિ નિરીક્યતે ॥ (પ્રોઠ્ઠમનોરમા - કુચમર્દિની ટીકા - પૃ. ૧)

૧.૩. આગ્રહિ (૧.૧ માં) ઇચ્છાન્તુ' છે તેમ જગન્નાથના મતે ભટ્ટોજિ દી પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'માં જે દોષો આ છે તેને આખા આયુષ્ય દરમ્યાન શોધ્યા કરીએ અને જે કરીએ તે વાત આપે એમ નથી. તથાપિ જગન્નાથે इति दिक्-ન્યાયે જે કેટલાકે દેખી ખતાવ્યા છે તેની સંખ્યા લગભગ પચ્ચાસ જેટલી થવા વળ્ય છે. જગન્નાથે જે નવો (કે વાતિકો) ઉપરની 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'ના મતોની સમીક્ષા કરી, તેનું ખૂબ કયું જે પચ્ચાસ મતો નીચે મુજબ છે :—

૧. હચ્ચમ્ । પા. સુ. ૧ - ૩ - ૩
૨. ડગદેસોડજનુનાસિક્ક હત્ । ૧-૩-૨
૩. જ્ઞાતોડચ્ચસ્વદીર્ઘપ્લુતઃ । ૧-૨-૨૭
૪. તસ્પાદિત્ત ઉદાત્તમર્ષહસ્વમ્ । ૧-૨-૩૨
૫. અઘ્ઠવર્ણયોમિથઃ સાવર્ણ્યમ્ વાચ્યમ્ । (વાતિકમ્)
૬. અણુદિસ્તવર્ણસ્ય ચાપ્રત્યયઃ । ૧ - ૧ - ૬૧
૭. તપસ્તકાલસ્ય । ૧ - ૧ - ૭૦
૮. સ્વં રૂપં શબ્દરૂપાશન્દસંજ્ઞા । ૧ - ૧ - ૬૮
૯. મિદ્ધોડસ્પાત્વઃ । ૧ - ૧ - ૪૭
૧૦. તસ્મિન્નિતિ નિર્દિષ્ટે પૂર્વસ્ય । ૧ - ૧ - ૬૬
૧૧. અનેકાલ્પિતવર્ણસ્ય । ૧ - ૧ - ૫૫
૧૨. દ્વિતીયગણિઃ । ૬ - ૧ - ૭૭
૧૩. ન પદાન્તેદિર્વચનવરેયલ્પોઽ । ૧ - ૧ - ૫૮
૧૪. ઇત્યેષત્યુ દ્વિત્વમ્ । ૬ - ૧ - ૮૯
૧૫. સ્વાદીરેત્તિગોઃ । (વાતિકમ્)
૧૬. પ્રાદુહોદોદયેષ્યેષ્યે । (વાતિકમ્)
૧૭. ઉપન્યાદિતિ ધાતૌ । ૬ - ૧ - ૯૧
૧૮. નિપાત્ત એકાજનાહ્ । ૧ - ૧ - ૧૩
૧૯. હેતુનો ચ સપ્તમ્યર્થે । ૧ - ૧ - ૧૯
૨૦. સમુદૌ શાક્ત્યસ્યોતાવનાર્થે । ૧ - ૧ - ૧૬
૨૧. સ્તોઃ રચુનાઃ રચુઃ । ૮ - ૪ - ૪૦
૨૨. શ્વના શ્વઃ । ૮ - ૪ - ૪૧
૨૩. શિ ઉક્તઃ । ૮ - ૩ - ૩૧
૨૪. હ્રમો હસ્વાદિચિ હમુળ્ નિત્યમ્ । ૮-૩-૩૨
૨૫. શપરે વિવર્જનીયઃ । ૮-૩-૩૫

૧.૪ જગન્નાથની આ 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાક્રમવર્દિ'ની' ટીકામાંથી કેટલાકે સન્દર્ભોમાં એવું પણ પાંચવા મળે છે કે જેમ ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતની 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'માં અચુક મતો તેપમુક્ત છે તેમ ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતના 'શબ્દકીરતુભ'માં ૨૪૫ થયેલા અચુક મતો પણ ભૂલભરેલા છે. જેમકે, નેમજે 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાક્રમવર્દિ'નીમાં કેટલાકે સ્થળે લખ્યું છે કે—

૧...ગ્રાહકતાપ્રસંગ એવ નાસ્તીતિ નિર્ણયઃ इति कौस्तुभेन निर्णीतम् । तदुक्तम् ॥ (પ્ર. ૧૧)

૨. एतेन छन्दोऽनुवृत्त्ययाचनास्य छन्दोविषयत्वमिति कौस्तुभोक्तमशुद्धमेव ॥ (પ્ર. ૨૩)

આથી જગન્નાથે ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતના 'શબ્દકૌસ્તુભ'નું પાણુ ખ'ડન કરતો એક અન્ય રચ્યો હોય એમ જણાય છે. તેમણે આ પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકૃત્યમર્દિની' દીકામાં જ લખ્યું છે કે—

(૧) अमुं चार्यम् — 'अणुदित्' सूत्रगतकौस्तुभलण्डनावसरे व्यक्तवृत्तादधिष्ठातः ॥ (પ્ર. ૨)

(૨) इत्थं चोत्सृगतकौस्तुभग्रन्थः सर्वोऽप्य संगत इति ध्येयम् । अधिकं कौस्तुभरचण्ड नादवसेयम् ॥ (પ્ર. ૨૧)

આ સન્દર્ભો એવું સૂચવે છે કે પં. જગન્નાથે ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિત જેવા યુરોહીનું ગર્વખ'ડન કરવા તેમના રચેલા 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા' અને 'શબ્દકૌસ્તુભ' જેવા અન્યોનો પહેલાં પૂણ સહમતાથી અભ્યાસ કરી લીધો છે, અને એક આરૂઢ વૈયાકરણ જેટલી જ સજ્જતા કેળવીને પદ્ધી, પોતાના 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકૃત્યમર્દિની' કે 'શબ્દકૌસ્તુભખ'ડન' (છર્ફે 'શબ્દ-કૌસ્તુભશાષ્ટોતેજન') જેવા દીકાઅન્યોની રચના કરી છે. જગન્નાથે રચેલા વ્યાકરણવિષયક આ બે અન્યોમાંથી દુર્ભાગ્યે 'શબ્દકૌસ્તુભખ'ડન' અન્ય આજે ઉપલબ્ધ થતો નથી.

૧.૫ પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકૃત્યમર્દિની' શીર્ષક : અગાઉ (૦.૫માં) આપણે જોયું છે કે જગન્નાથે ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતની 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'નું ખ'ડન કરવા માટે જે દીકા અન્ય રચ્યો, તેની પાછળ બે પ્રેરક પરિણામો હોઈ શકે : જેમકે, એક તો ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે કરેલો યુરોહો અને બીજું જગન્નાથનું 'મ્લેચ્છ' એવા શબ્દથી કરવામાં આવેલું અપમાન.

પરંતુ આ બે પ્રેરક પરિણામો ઉપરાંત, એક ત્રીજો પ્રેરક સન્દર્ભ પણુ અમને હાથ લાગ્યો છે, જે આહી ઉદ્દેખનીય છે : ચક્રપાણિદત્તે પોતાના 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાખ'ડન' અર્થનું મંગલાચરણ કરતી વખતે લખ્યું છે કે—

विरोचिनां तिरोभावमग्नौ यदमारसीभरः ।

वटेश्वरं गुरुं क्षेपवृंशोत्तनं भजामि तम् ॥૧॥

દારિત - વિપુ - વક્ષોજ સત્ત્વક્ષયાગિનરહરિં નત્વા ।

વિદ્વન્મણ્ડલદ્વય તપરમતલણ્ડનં તનુતે ॥૨॥

“વિરોધીઓના તિરસ્કારથી વધી પડેલા એવા, વાણીના ભારવાળા હું” (ચક્રપાણિ) શેખવંશના આજ્ઞાણુ રૂપ યુરુ વટેશ્વર (= વીરેશ્વર ?) ને બહુ છું. જેમણે શત્રુઓની છાતીને ચીરી કાઢી છે એવા નરહરિને પ્રણામ કરીને આ ચક્રપાણિ વિદ્વાનોની મંડલીને ગમી નય એવા પારશ્વઓના મતના ખ'ડનને વિસ્તારે છે.”

આ શ્લોકમાં 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમાખ'ડન'ના કતાં ચક્રપાણિએ તૃસિંહનું રૂપ લેનાર વિષ્ણુને માટે - દારિતરિપુવક્ષોજમ્—એવું જે વિશેષણ વાપર્યું છે તેમાં શત્રુઓની છાતીનું ઉત્પાટન/વિદારણ કરવાની વાત ઉલ્લેખાઈ છે. કદાચ આમાંથી સ્પષ્ટ લઈને પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથે ત્યારે પોતે 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'નું ખ'ડન કરતી દીકા રચી ત્યારે તેનું શીર્ષક 'મનોરમાકૃત્યમર્દિની' આપવાનું સમજ્યું હોય તો નવાઈ નહીં.

૨.૦ પા. સુ. 6-1-77 સૂત્રોક્ત યગદેશના પ્રવૃત્તિનિયામક બાબતે વિવાદ :

અગાઉ (૧.૩માં) નોંધ્યું છે તેમ જગન્નાથે ‘પ્રૌઢમનોસ્મા’માંથી પચ્ચીસેક સૂત્રો લઈને તેની ઉપર ‘કૃત્યમદિ’ની દીકા પ્રસ્તુત કરી છે. તેમાંથી આપણે ફક્ત યગચિ | 6-1-77 સૂત્ર ઉપરના પ્રૌઢમનોસ્માકાર ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતના વિધાનોનો પરિહાર કરતો પ’. જગન્નાથનો સાન્નાયક ઉદાહરણ રૂપે તપાસીશું :

૨.૧ ‘પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી’માં રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યની રજૂઆત :

પાણિનિની ‘અષ્ટાધ્યાયી’નાં સૂત્રોને આધારે પ્રક્રિયાગ્રન્થો રચવાની શરૂઆત થઈ તેમાં રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યના પ્રયાસ અત્યંત નોંધપાત્ર પૂરવાર થયો છે; (કેમકે કાલાન્તરે એમાંથી જ વિપુલ પ્રેરણા મેળવીને ભટ્ટોજિ દીક્ષિતે ‘વૈયાકરણસિદ્ધાન્તકૌમુદી’ની રચના કરી છે). રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યે ‘પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી’માં જે આરંભે માહેશ્વરસૂત્રો ચૂક્યાં પછી પહેલું ‘સંજ્ઞાપ્રકરણ’ રજૂ કર્યું છે; અને તેની તરત જ પાછળ ‘અચૂ સન્ધિ પ્રકરણ’ની શરૂઆત કરી છે. અહીં સુષુપ્તાસ્યઃ એવા ઉદાહરણની સિદ્ધિ કરવા માટે નીચેના ક્રમે સૂત્રો રજૂ કર્યાં છે :-

(૧) ફકો યગચિ | ૬ - ૧ - ૭૭

(યકિપાકૌમુદી વૃત્તિઃ)—ફકઃ સ્થાને યજ્ઞ સ્યાદચિ સંહિતાવાં વિષયે ||

(૨) યથાસંલ્પમનુદેશઃ સમાનામ્ | ૧ - ૩ - ૧૦

(પ્ર. કૌ. વૃત્તિઃ)—સમેષ્ઠેશિષુ સમાનાં વિધાનં યથાક્રમં સ્થાન્ || મુષ્યુ ડગાસ્ય ઇતિ સ્થિતે—

(૩) અનચિ ચ | ૮ - ૪ - ૪૭

(પ્ર. કૌ. વૃત્તિઃ) અચઃ પરસ્ય યગેડનચિ વરે દ્વે સ્તઃ || વગેરે.

મુષિષા ડગાસ્યઃ (વિણુઃ) એ પદોનો તૃતીયા તત્પુરુષ સમાસ કરીએ તો મુષી+ડગાસ્ય ની સન્ધિ કરવાનો પ્રસંગ પ્રાપ્ત થાય છે. આ સ્થિતિમાં, ઉપર જોયું તે મુજબ રામચન્દ્રાચાર્ય તેમની ‘પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી’માં સૌથી પ્રથમ ફકો યગચિ ; ૬ - ૧ - ૭૭ સૂત્રને ઉપસ્થિત કરીને, ફક્ત સ્થાનમાં યગદેશતુ વિધાન કરે છે. પ્રકૃત ઉદાહરણમાં ફક્ત વર્ણુ તરીકે મુષીનો ફ છે. એના સ્થાનમાં યજ્ઞ પ્રત્યાહારના આર વર્ણો આદેશ તરીકે પ્રવૃત થવા આવે છે એમ જોઈને તેમણે યથાસંલ્પમનુદેશઃ સમાનામ્ ૧-૩-૧૦ | સૂત્રને ઉપસ્થિત કર્યું છે. આ સૂત્ર જણાવે છે કે—“ઉદેશ્ય અને અનુદેશ (અર્થાત્ વિધાન=આદેશ)ની સંખ્યા એક સમાન હોય તો ત્યાં વિધાનની=આદેશની પ્રવૃત્તિ યથાક્રમે=અનુક્રમે કરવી.” આ સૂત્રની આવી સૂચના મળતાં પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદીકાર કહે છે કે મુષીના ફના સ્થાનમાં યજ્ઞ પ્રત્યાહારનો પહેલો વૂ વર્ણુ જ આદેશ તરીકે પ્રવૃત થશે. પરિણામે મુષ્યુ+ડગાસ્ય | એવું બની જશે.

આમ પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદીકારે ‘અચૂ પરમાં રહેતાં સ્થાનિભૂત ફક્ત સ્થાને યજ્ઞ આદેશની પ્રવૃત્તિ કરવા માટે ૧-૩-૧૦ સૂત્રોક્ત યથાસંલ્પન્યાયને નિયામક દર્શાવ્યો છે’ એટલું નોંધીને અટકીશું.

૨.૨ શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષે 'પ્રકાશ' ટીકામાં રજૂ કરેલું વિવરણ :

સુષી + ડગસ્ય । એ સ્થિતિમાં ફકો યળચિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ થી યણદેશનું વિધાન થયા પછી, ફેના સ્થાનમાં યણદેશની પ્રવૃત્તિ કરવા માટે, રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યે યથાસંસ્થમનુદેશ: સમાનામ્ । ૧-૩-૧૦ સૂત્રને પુરસ્કાયું છે. એ વિષે સ્વર્ણ કરતાં શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષે પોતાની 'પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદીપ્રકાશ' ટીકામાં નીચે મુજબની રજૂઆત કરી છે:

શંકા (૧) : અહીં સ્થાનેડન્તરતમ: । ૧-૧-૫૦ એ સૂત્રથી જ (ફક્ત) સ્થાનમાં ઘટ્ટ યણદેશની) સિદ્ધિ થઈ શકવાની હતી. જેમકે, સ્થાનિભૂત તાલવ્ય કે કારના સ્થાને સ્થાનસામ્ય ધરાવતો તાલવ્ય યુ કાર આદેશ રૂપે પ્રવૃત્ત થશે; ઔષ્ઠ્ય જ કારના સ્થાનમાં તેવો જ એટલે કે ઔષ્ઠ્ય જ કાર, મૂર્ધન્ય જ કારના સ્થાનમાં મૂર્ધન્ય રૂપે અને દન્ત્ય જ કારના સ્થાનમાં એવો જ સ્થાનસામ્ય ધરાવતો જ કાર આદેશ રૂપે પ્રવૃત્ત થઈ જશે. તો પછી, એ કાર્ય કરવા આ યથાસંસ્થમનુદેશ: સમાનામ્ । ૧-૩-૧૦ સૂત્રને શા માટે પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદીકારે આગળ ધસ્યું છે ?

સમાધાન :- આ શંકા સાચી છે. પણ તસ્યસ્થનિર્વા તાન્ત્રતામ: । ૩-૪-૧૦૧ જેવાં સ્થાન્યાદેશનું વિધાન કરનારાં સૂત્રોમાં, (કે જેમાં તત્ત્વ આદિ અલયના સ્થાનમાં તામ વગેરે આદેશ કલા છે તેમાં) સ્થાનકૃતાદિ સામ્ય મળવાનો સંભવ નહીં હોવાથી, તેવાં સ્થળોને માટે આ યથાસંસ્થમનુદેશ: સમાનામ્ । ૧-૩-૧૦ સૂત્રને પુરસ્કાયું છે. વળી, અહીં ફકો યળચિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ સૂત્રમાં પણ આ (પરિભાષા) સૂત્રનો અનવરુદ્ધ વિપય હોવાથી, અને આ સૂત્રથી (સ્થાન્યાદેશનો) નિર્ણય કરવા રૂપી કાર્ય સરળ બની રહેતું હોવાથી આચાર્યે અર્થાત્ રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યે તે(૧-૩-૧૦)ને અહીં પણ રજૂ કર્યું છે.

શંકા (૨) : સુષી + ડગસ્ય । જેવા ઉદાહરણમાં ફકો યળચિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ ની પ્રવૃત્તિ કરવા માટે જો યથાસંસ્થમનુદેશ: સમાનામ્ । ૧-૩-૧૦ સૂત્રની મદદ લેવાનું નિયમરેશો તો પણ અહીં યથાસંસ્થત્વ મળવાનું નથી. કારણ કે (અણદિત્ત સર્વોણ્ય નાપ્રત્યય: । ૧-૧-૬૯ સૂત્રોક્ત ન્યવસ્થાનુસાર) સવર્ણ વર્ણોનું પણ ગ્રહણ કરવાનું હોવાથી ફક્

૯. પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી (રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યવ્રણીતા), ભાગ-૧, શ્રીકૃષ્ણવિચિત્રિયા 'પ્રકાશ' વ્યાખ્યાના સંવલિતા, સં. શ્રીમુરલીધર મિશ્ર: , સરસ્વતીભવન ગ્રંથમાલા-૧૧૧, પ્રકા. સમ્પૂર્ણાનંદ સંસ્કૃત વિશ્વવિદ્યાલય, વારાણસી, 1977 A.D.

૧૦. નન્વજ 'સ્થાનેડન્તરતમ' (૧-૧-૫૦) ફલેવ સિદ્ધમ્ । તથા હિ સ્થાનસામ્યાદિકારસ્ય તાલવ્યસ્ય તાલવ્યો યકાર: । ઉકારસ્યૌષ્ઠ્યસ્ય તાદૃશ ઇવ વ: ! જ્ઞકારસ્ય મૂર્ધન્યસ્ય તાદૃશ ઇવ ર: । લૂકારસ્ય દન્તસ્ય તાદૃશ ઇવ લ: , તત્ક્રિમર્થમિદમ્ ॥ (પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી પ્રકાશ ટીકા પૃ. ૭૫)

૧૧. સત્યમ્ । 'તસ્યસ્થનિર્વા તાન્ત્રતામ:' (૩-૪-૧૦૧) ફલ્યાદાવાન્તર્વાસમ્ભવાત્ તદર્થમિદ-મારસ્થમ્ । ઇવજ્ઞેદ્દાવ્ય-પ્રતિહૃતયિષ્યતશ્ચ સૌકર્યવશાન્નાર્ચકાન્યસ્તમ્ ॥ (પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી પ્રકાશ ટીકા, પૃ. ૭૫-૭૬)

પ્રત્યાહારથી કુલ ૬૬ વર્ણો (સ્થાનિભૂત વર્ણો તરીકે) લેવાના છે, અને ચળ પ્રત્યાહાર કુલ ૭ વર્ણો (આદેશભૂત વર્ણો તરીકે) લેવાના છે. ૧૨ આમ સ્થાનિભૂત વર્ણોની અને આદેશભૂત વર્ણોની સંખ્યા એક સરખી નહીં હોવાથી, તેમની વચ્ચેના સ્થાન્યાદેશ લાવવાથી સંખ્યાત્વ = આનુક્રમિકતા નહીં ગોઠવી શકાય. ૧૩

સમાધાન : ઉપર્યુક્ત બીજી શંકા પણ નિર્મૂળ કરી શકાય એમ છે. કારણ કે શબ્દમૂલક સામ્યની મેળવણી કરવાનો માર્ગ સ્વીકારીએ તો અહીં ડોઈ હોય આવશે નહીં 'શબ્દસામ્ય અને એકની સાથે એકનો યોગ કરવો' એવા પક્ષતુ' આશ્રયથી કરવું એ કૈયટ પણ કહ્યું છે. ૧૪ અને આવું માનવાથી જ સ્વતાસી લહુટો: । ૩-૧-૩૩ સૂત્રો: વિકરણ પ્રત્યયોની છટ ગોઠવણી કરી શકાય છે. (જેમ કે, લૂવાળા લકાર પરમાં રહેત ધાતુને સ્પ પ્રત્યય, અને લૂદ લકાર પરમાં રહેતાં, ધાતુને તામ પ્રત્યય લાગે છે. અહીં લૂવા લકાર લૂદ અને લૂદ્ -એમ કુલ બે છે. પણ શબ્દસામ્યને ધ્યાનમાં લઈને, પાણિનિ કુલ ત્રણ લકારો પરમાં રહેતાં, બે પ્રત્યયો કળ્યા છે.) એ જ પ્રમાણે, પરસ્મૈવદા ગળતુસ્યચ્ચુસુગજ્જવા: । ૩-૪-૮૨ સૂત્રમાં; અને ઇચોડયવાવા: ૬-૧-૭૮ સૂત્ર અનુક્રમે 'પરસ્મૈપદ' એવા સંજ્ઞાશબ્દો તિવ્વત્સિદ્ધિ: । ૩-૪-૭૮ સૂત્રોક્ત તિવ્ વગે નવ પ્રત્યયો; અને ઇચ્ એવા સંજ્ઞાશબ્દો અક્ષરસમાનાય(દમોદ્. । દેમોદ્) સૂત્રો: ૫, ઓ, ઇ ઓ વર્ણોની જ પ્રતીતિ થાય છે; અને તે તે [= તિવ્વત્સિદ્ધિ: (૩-૪-૭૮ દમોદ્-દેમોદ્) સૂત્રોમાં આવેલા ક્રમતુ' જ આશ્રયથી થાય છે. આમ (પરસ્મૈ કે ઇચ્ એવા) સંજ્ઞાશબ્દોથી ચોક્કસ વર્ણોની જ અનુક્રમે ઉપરિચિત થાય છે. ૧૫



આ અર્થા દ્વારા પ્રક્રિયાકોમુદીપ્રકાશકાર શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષે પણ ફકો યજ્ઞિ । ૬-૧-૭ સૂત્રોક્ત સ્થાન્યાદેશમાં શબ્દસામ્ય મૂલક ફક્ સંજ્ઞાવાચ્ય દ, ઝ, જ, લ, એવા ચ

૧૨. ફના ૧૮ સવર્ણુભેદો + ઝના ૧૮ સવર્ણુભેદો + જના ૧૮ સવર્ણુ ભેદો + લના ૧ સવર્ણુ ભેદો = એમ કુલ ૬૬ વર્ણો. તથા રેફ સિવાયના ધ્, ઘ્, અને જના સાનુનાસિક અને નિરનુનાસિક ભેદો ૨ + ૨ + ૨ અને ૧ નિરનુનાસિક રેફ = ૭ વર્ણો.

૧૩. અથ વદ્યમાનેડ્વસ્મિન્ યથાસંલ્લયેન ન લભ્યં તવર્ણપ્રજ્ઞાત્ વદ્યવિટિકિઃ. યજ્ઞ સર્વો વૈવમ્વાદિતિ ચેન્ન । (પ્રક્રિયા કૌમુદી પ્રકાશ ટીકા, પૃ. ૭૬)

૧૪. નૈતદસ્તિ । સંખ્યાતાનુદેશેનાવ્યેતસ્તિદ્વમ્ હતિ । ૧-૧-૪૯ હત્યજ માધ્યમ્ ॥ અજ પ્રદીપ —“પ્રજ્ઞાહારસાદે શબ્દતઃ સામ્યમસ્તીતિ માવઃ ॥ —ઝવાકરણમહામાળ્યમ્ માગ-૧ પૃ. ૨૬૬ પ્રકા. મોતીલાલ બનારસીદાસ, દિલ્લી, ૧૯૬૭

૧૫. શબ્દતઃ સામ્યરુપ તત્ત્વાનુપગમાન્ત દોષઃ । શબ્દસામ્યમ્ એકયોગશ્ચેત્વેષ પક્ષ આશ્રયિતમ્ ઈ કૈયટોક્તેઃ । અત એવ 'સ્વતાસી લહુટો:' (૩-૧-૩૩) હત્યવાપીલસિદ્ધિઃ । પરસ્મૈવદાન ગલાદયઃ, 'ઇચોડયવાવા:' (૬-૧-૭૮) હત્વાદો ચ તિવાદિ સૂત્રેડક્ષરસમાનાયેઃ । તિવાદય એચશ્ચ ક્રમેણ પ્રતીતા હતિ તદગત એવ ક્રમ આશ્રયતે સંજ્ઞાશબ્દેન તાદશાનામેવો પરિચિતેઃ ॥ (પ્રક્રિયા કૌમુદીપ્રકાશ ટીકા, પૃ ૭૬.)

સ્થાનિભૂત વર્ણો; અને યજ્ઞ સંગ્રાવાન્ય આદેશભૂત ન યૂ વૂ રૂ લ્ એવા ચાર ન ઉપસ્થિત થશે; અને તેમાં યથાસંખ્યન્યાયથી ન સ્થાન્યાદેશભાવ નક્કી કરવાનો રહેશે એમ કહીને પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદીમાંના રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યેકિત કમલુ ન અનુમોદન કયું છે.

૨૩ બટોનિ દીક્ષિતલુ સત્તાન્તર અને 'પ્રક્રિયા પ્રકાશ'લુ ખંડન :

'પ્રક્રિયા કૌમુદી'માંથી ન પ્રેરણા લઈને કાલાન્તરમાં ન્યારે બટોનિ દીક્ષિતે 'વૈયાકરણ-સિદ્ધાન્તકૌમુદી'ની રચના કરી ત્યારે તેમણે સુષી + હવાસ્ય ની સ્થિતિમાં ફકો યળ્ચિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ સૂત્રોક્ત યજ્ઞાદેશને પ્રવૃત્ત કરવા માટે લખ્યું કે સ્થાનત આન્તર્યદ્દુર્દ્દેશસ્ત વકારઃ । ૧૬ અર્થાત્ સુષી + હવાસ્ય । એ સ્થિતિમાં, તાલવ્ય રૂના સ્થાનમાં, સ્થાનકૃત સામ્યને આધારે યજ્ઞ = યૂ વૂ રૂ લ્ વર્ણોમાંથી તાલવ્ય યૂ કાર ન આદેશ રૂપે પ્રવૃત્ત કરીશું. આ રીતે બટોનિ દીક્ષિતે 'પ્રક્રિયાકૌમુદી'થી જુદા પડીને સુષી + હવાસ્ય । માં ફકો યળ્ચિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ સૂત્રની પ્રવૃત્તિ કરવા માટે યથાસંજ્ઞમનુદેશઃ સમાનામ્ । ૧-૨-૧૦ સૂત્રને બદલે સ્થાનેડન્તરમઃ ૧-૧-૫૦ સૂત્રની મદદ લેવી એમ જાહેર કયું.

હવે, બટોનિ દીક્ષિતે વૈયાકરણસિદ્ધાન્તકૌમુદી ઉપર પોતે 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા' દીકાની રચના હાથ ધરી ત્યારે, પ્રકૃત સંદર્ભમાં યજ્ઞાદેશને પ્રવૃત્ત કરવા માટે સ્થાનકૃત સાદરચની ન મદદ કેમ લેવી; અને યથાસંખ્યન્યાયને કામે કેમ ન લગાડવો એની ચર્ચા હાથ ધરી છે. જેમકે, તેમણે 'પ્રૌઢમનોરમા'માં કહ્યું છે કે—

દીર્ઘાન્તેષાં ચ । ૬-૧-૧૦૫ સૂત્રમાંથી નીકળતા જાપકને આધારે, અને ત્વાદિચ્ચઃ । ૮-૨-૪૪ સૂત્રમાં કરેલા નિર્દેશને આધારે એવું સૂચવાય છે કે ફકો યળ્ચિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ જેવાં સૂત્રમાં જે ફક્, યજ્ઞ, અન્ વગેરે પ્રત્યાહારોનું અણ્ય કયું છે તેમાં તદ્વાન્યવાચ્યમાં નિષ્ઠા લક્ષણા માતવાની છે. (અર્થાત્ જેમ 'દ્વિરેક' પદથી 'ભ્રમર' શબ્દનો બોધ થાય છે; અને પછી 'ભ્રમર' શબ્દથી અહિ = ભ્રમરા એવા જાતુનો બોધ થાય છે તેમ ફકો યળ્ચિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ સૂત્રથી અહરજ્ઞ । આદિ માહેશ્વર સૂત્રસ્થ ફક્ વર્ણોના બોધ થાય છે, અને તે પછી ફક્ પ્રત્યાહારસ્થ ફ, હ, ળ અને લ્ એવા ચાર વર્ણોથી હવાદિ જ્ઞતિ જેમાં રહેલી છે તેવા ૧૮ પ્રકારના (સવર્ણ) ફ કારોનો બોધ થાય છે.) ૧૭ આથી કરીને ૬-૧-૭૭ સૂત્રસ્થ ફક્ પ્રત્યાહારથી ૬૬ સવર્ણ વર્ણોનું અણ્ય કરવાનું છે, એ ન રીતે યજ્ઞ શબ્દથી = પ્રત્યાહારથી સાત સવર્ણ વર્ણોના બોધ કરવાનો છે. આ દષ્ટિએ, અહીં સ્થાનિભૂત ૬૬ ફક્ વર્ણો અને આદેશભૂત સાત યજ્ઞ વર્ણોમાં યથાસંખ્ય ન્યાયથી (= ૧-૩-૧૦ સૂત્રથી) સ્થાન્યાદેશભાવની ગોઠવણી ઘર્ષ શકશે નહીં. આથી ન (અમે = બટોનિ દીક્ષિતે 'વૈયાકરણ-સિદ્ધાન્તકૌમુદી'માં કહ્યું છે કે) સ્થાનેડન્તરમઃ । ૧-૧-૫૦ સૂત્રથી ન ઇષ્ટસિદ્ધિ કરતી.

૧૬. જુઓ : વૈયાકરણસિદ્ધાન્તકૌમુદી, પૃ. ૧૨ (સંપા. વાસુદેવ પળશીકર, નિર્ણયતાગર પ્રેસ, મુમ્બયી, ૧૯૨૯)

૧૭. પ્રકૃત સૂત્રમાં નિષ્ઠાલક્ષણા કેવી રીતે સિદ્ધ થાય છે એ સમજાવતાં 'વિભા' દીકામાં લખ્યું છે કે—ગજ્ઞાયાં બોષઃ હર્યજ્ઞ બોષાદિવદપ્રયોગાનન્તરમેવ લક્ષ્યાયોગસ્થિતિઃ રહ તુ પદાન્તરાપ્રયોગેડપિ સર્વોક્તાં વ્યક્તીનામુપસ્થિતિઃ । રૂઢમેવ નિરુદ્ધત્વમ્ ॥ પ્રૌઢમનોરમા-પૃ. ૬૧.

એટલે કે સ્થાનકૃત સાદર્યની દૃષ્ટિએ જ સુષી ના હ ના સ્થાનમાં તાલન્ય વ્ કારને આ રીતે પ્રગત કરવો.^{૧૮}

આમ ભદ્રોગિ દીક્ષિતે સુષી + જગસ્ય । માં યજ્ઞાદેશની પ્રવૃત્તિ કરવા માટે સ્થાન સાદર્યને નિયામક જાહેર કહ્યું^{૧૯}; અને એમના પૂર્વસરિઓએ, અર્થાત્ એમના જ પરમ : રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યે ‘પ્રક્રિયાકીમુદી’માં અને એમના સાક્ષાત્ ગુરુ શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષે ‘પ્રક્રિયાપ્રકાશ’ પ્રકૃત ઉદાહરણમાં કહેલી યથાસંખ્યન્યાયની પ્રવૃત્તિને પરિહાર કરી દીધો.

૨.૪ પ. જગન્નાથે કહેલું ‘પ્રૌઢમનોરમા’નું ખંડન :

આમ ફક્ત યજ્ઞિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ સૂત્રોક્ત યજ્ઞાદેશની પ્રવૃત્તિ કરતી વખતે-(ક) (પ્ર) કીમુદીકાર અને તેમના દીકાકાર મુજબ) યથાસંખ્યમનુદેશ : સમાનામ્ । ૧-૩-૧૦ સૂત્રો યથાસંખ્યન્યાયની મદદ લેવી; અથવા (લ) (ભદ્રોગિ દીક્ષિતના કહેલા મુજબ) સ્થાનેડન્તરતમ : ૧-૧-૫૦ સૂત્રની મદદ લેવી-એવા બે વિચિન્ન મતો ઉપસ્થિત થયા. જગારે ૫. જગન્ન મુદુદોદી ભદ્રોગિ દીક્ષિતના પ્રયોગનું આલોકન કરીને એના દોષોની પરીક્ષા કરવાની રૂ કરી ત્યારે ઉપયુક્ત મુદ્દા પરત્વે પણ એમનું ધ્યાન ગમ્યું અને તેમણે એ વિષે પોતા ‘પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકુચમદ્વિતી’ દીકામાં લખ્યું કે—

“ફક્ત યજ્ઞિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ સૂત્રોક્ત ફક્ શબ્દથી ૬૬ સ્વવર્ણ વર્ણો લેવાના છે, આ વળ શબ્દથી સાત સ્વવર્ણ વર્ણો લેવાના છે. તથા એ સંજોગોમાં યથાસંખ્યન્યાયે સ્થાન્યાદેશ વાચની વ્યવસ્થા કરવાની નથી.” એવું જ (પ્રૌઢમનોરમામાં ભદ્રોગિ દીક્ષિતે) કહ્યું છે ઉચિત નથી.^{૨૦} આથી, જગન્નાથે પાંચ-૭ કારણો આપીને ભદ્રોગિ દીક્ષિતની વાત સ્વીકાર : લકાવ એમ નથી એમ જાહેર કહ્યું છે. જેમ કે—

(૧) ભદ્રોગિ દીક્ષિતનું કહેલું જો સ્વીકારીએ તો સ્થાનેડન્તરતમ : । ૧-૧-૫૦ સૂ ઉપરનો ભાષ્ય ગ્રન્થ ડહોળાઈ જવાની પરિસ્થિતિ ઊભી થાય છે. જેમ કે, ત્યાં કહ્યું છે કે—

સ્થાનેડન્તરતમ : । પા. સૂ. ૧-૧-૫૦

—વિમુદાહરણમ્ ।

—“ફક્ત યજ્ઞિ” દર્શન મધ્યજ । તાલુસ્થાનસ્ય તાલુ સ્થાનઃ, ઓષ્ટસ્થાનસ્ય ઓષ્ટસ્થાનઃ યથા સ્વાદિતિ ॥

—નૈવસ્તિ । સંસ્થાતાનુદેશોનાપ્યેતિસિદ્ધમ્ ॥^{૨૦}

૧૮. ફક્ત યજ્ઞિ । ૬-૧-૭૭ પ્રત્યાહારમંથણેનુ તદ્વાચ્યવાચ્યે નિરુદ્ધા લક્ષણા, દીર્ઘાઙ્ગતિ ન (૧-૧-૧૦૫) इति ज्ञापकात् ‘स्वादिभ्यः’ (८-४-४४) इति निर्देशाच्च । तेनेकशब्देन पदपठित्वात्, यणशब्देन सप्त ।...अतो नास्ति...यथासंख्यम् ॥...तस्मादिह ‘स्थाने-’-न्तरतमः । १-१-५० इति सूत्रेणैवैष्टविद्धिरित्यभिप्रेत्याह-स्थानत आन्यार्थोदिति । (प्रौढमनोरमा, संपा. यथाशेष शाल्मी जोशी, चौलम्बा संस्कृत सीरर आर्षिक, बनारस : १९३४, पृ. ५९-६३)

૧૯. “ફક્ત યજ્ઞિ” (૬-૧-૭૭) । યતુઃ ફક્શબ્દેન ધદષ્ટિર્વર્ગી યજ્ઞાન્તે યજ્ઞશબ્દેન સપ્તેતિ નાસ્તિ યથાસંખ્યમ્^{૨૦} इति, तन्न ॥ (प्रौढमनोरमा, परिशिष्ट कुचमर्दिनी पृ. १४)

૨૦. યજ્ઞાહરણમહાભાષ્યમ્ (પ્રૌઢમનોરમાવહિન્મ્) ભાગ ૧, પૃ. ૨૬૬ પ્રકા. મૌલિચાલ વનારસીદામ, દિલ્હી, ૧૯૬૭.

અહીં 'સ્વયં' બાળ્યકારે દર્શિત થયેલ છે. જેવાં ઉદાહરણમાં ફક્ત યજ્ઞચિ । ૬ - ૧ - ૭૭ સંલોકિત યજ્ઞદેવની પ્રવૃત્તિમાં યથાસંખ્યન્યાયથી પણ કામ ચાલી શકશે, (અર્થાત્ આવાં ઉદાહરણમાં સ્થાનેડાન્ટરતમઃ । ૧ - ૧ - ૫૦ સૂત્રની જરૂર નથી) એમ કહ્યું છે. હવે જે બદોગિ દીક્ષિતની વાત સ્વીકારીએ તો ઉપયુક્ત બાળ્યયથાં વિસંગત થઈ જશે. ૨૧

(૨) એમ પણ કહી શકાય એમ નથી કે 'ફક્ત શબ્દથી બોધ્ય એવી ને જ, કે વગેરે ચાર સંજ્ઞાઓ અને તેનાથી બોધ્ય એવા ૬૬ સવર્ણ વર્ણો (તેમના સ્થાનમાં) અનુક્રમે ઘણા શબ્દથી બોધ્ય એવી યૂ વૂ રૂ અને લૂ એવી ચાર સંજ્ઞાઓ, અને તેનાથી બોધ્ય એવા સાત સવર્ણ વર્ણો (આદેશ રૂપે) થાય છે—એવું કહેનારો બાળ્યગ્રંથ છે. કારણ કે એવું કહેશે તો પણ 'પ્રકૃતસૂત્રમાં (૬ - ૧ - ૭૭માં) યથાસંખ્યનુદેશઃ સમાનામ્ । ૧ - ૧ - ૧૦ સૂત્રની પ્રવૃત્તિ ના કરવી' એવું કહેનારી તમારી (= બદોગિ દીક્ષિતની) "નાસ્તિ—યથાસંખ્યમ્"—નાળા ઉકિત તો બાળ્યવિરુદ્ધ જ બની રહેવાની છે. એમાં કશો ફેર પડવાનો નથી. ૨૨

(૩) વળી, તમારા (બદોગિ દીક્ષિતના) કહેવા મુજબ જે ફક્ત વગેરે પ્રત્યાહારોમાં તદ્વાચ્યવાચ્યને વિષે લક્ષણ કરવામાં આવશે તો નકારથી જેમ તેના ૧૮ સવર્ણોનેહોનો પણ બોધ થશે, તેમ (ઋગ્વર્ણયોઃ મિથઃ સાવર્ણ્યમ્ વાચ્યમ્ । એ વાર્તિક અનુસાર) નકારથી લૂ કારનો પણ બોધ થશે, અને પછી સ્થાનિભૂત લૂ કારના સ્થાને આદેશ રૂપે રેકની પ્રસક્તિ થશે—તો એ રીતે પણ તમારા કહેલા અર્થમાં (= વિવરણમાં) દૃષ્ય બાધીને બીજું જ રહેશે. ૨૩

(૪) પહેલી દૃષ્ટિએ જોઈને જ, ઉપયુક્ત બાળ્યસંદર્ભ પૂર્વપક્ષીની ઉકિત છે એમ કહેવું પણ તમારે માટે (= બદોગિ દીક્ષિતને માટે) યોગ્ય નથી. કારણ કે જ્યારે બાળ્યવિવરણની કોઈક રીતે સંગતિ કરી શકાતી હોય એ સ્થિતિમાં 'પ્રથમ દૃષ્ટિએ જ' (આ બાળ્યોક્તિ પૂર્વપક્ષીની છે) એવી (આક્ષેપાત્મક) વાણી મહર્ષિના વચનને વિષે—ને માટે—વાપરવી તે અત્યંત અસંગત છે.

(પ્રસ્તુત સંદર્ભમાં યથાસંખ્યન્યાયને પુરસ્કારનારા) બાળ્યવિવરણની સંગતિ અહીં કેવી રીતે કરી શકશે એને સમજાવતાં પં. જગન્નાથ ઉમેરે છે કે—“ફક્ત શબ્દથી બોધ્ય ફલ્ય વગેરે જાતિયગુણથી યુક્ત એવા સ્થાનિઓના સ્થાનમાં અનુક્રમે ઘણા શબ્દથી બોધ્ય થવાદિ જાતિયગુણથી વ્યાપ્ત એવા વર્ણો આદેશ રૂપે પ્રવૃત્ત થાય છે.”—એમ જાતિગત સંખ્યાને

૨૧. 'સ્થાનેડાન્ટરતમ' (૧ - ૧ - ૫૦) इति सूत्रगतस्य भाष्यग्रन्थस्याकुलीभावप्रसङ्गात् । तथा च तत्रोक्तं "स्मिन्दाहरणम् १ इको यणचि (६ - १ ७७) दध्यम्, संख्यातानुदेशेनाप्येतत् सिद्धमिति ॥ प्रौढमनोरमा; परिशिष्टे कुचमर्दिनी, पृ. १४.

૨૨. न चेकृतादयोऽप्यसंज्ञाचतुष्टयबोध्यानां क्रमेण यणशब्दबोधसंज्ञाचतुष्टयबोध्यः भवन्तीत्येवंवरो भाष्यग्रन्थ इति वाच्यम् । एकमपि प्रकृतसूत्रे यथासंख्यपरिभाषाप्रवृत्तिनिर्गसपरया 'नास्ति यथ संख्यम्' इति भवदुस्तेमोष्यविक्रदताया अपरिहारात् ॥ तत्रैव पृ. १४.

૨૩. नकारबोध्यस्य लकारस्य रेफप्रसक्त्या प्राप्तात्स्वार्थस्य दुष्टत्वाच्च ॥ तत्रैव पृ. १४.

લઈને યથાસંખ્યન્યાયને પ્રવૃત્ત કરવો એવું બાબ્યકારને અભિપ્રેત છે ! ૨૪ (આથી બાબ્ય-કારના મતે પણ પ્રકૃત સંદર્ભમાં સ્થાનેડન્તરતમઃ । ૧ - ૧ - ૫૦ થી કામ લેવાની જરૂર નથી.)

(૫) ઉપયુક્ત દૃષ્ટિએ બાબ્યવિવરણને સમન્વયા પછી તમે = બદોગિ દીક્ષિતે કહેલી નિરૂદ્ધ લક્ષણા પણ માનવાની જરૂર રહેશે નહીં, અને એ રીતે પરમ લાઘવ શિક્ષ થઈ રહેશે. એ પણ એક મોટો ફાયદો જ છે ! ૨૫

(૬) વળી, બાબ્યોક્ત વ્યવસ્થાને (= યથાસંખ્યન્યાયને ઉપયુક્ત રીતે જો સમજીશું) તો અણુદિત્ત ૦ । ૧ - ૧ - ૬૯ સૂત્ર ઉપરનું * “તવર્ગેડળ્ ગ્રહણમવરિમાષ્વમ્ ; આકૃતિગ્રહણાત્” ॥ * [= સવર્ણ વર્ણોત્ત્વં ગ્રહણ થાય છે એમ જાહેર કરતી વખતે અળ્ ગ્રહણ કરવાની જરૂર નથી. કેમકે ત્યાં તો આકૃતિત્વં = જાતિત્વં (= મ કારથી અત્વ જાતિત્વં) ગ્રહણ થતું હોવાથી જ ખજ સિદ્ધિ થઈ રહેશે.] એવું વાર્તિક પણ અનુગૃહીત થશે. અને એ રીતે બાબ્યગ્રન્થની પૂર્વાપરની અર્થવ્યઙ્ગ્યા સાથે પ્રસ્તુત અર્થધટનનો અન્વય પણ પરિપુષ્ટ થશે. ૨૬ આમ યથાસંખ્યન્યાયની જાતિપક્ષમાં વ્યવસ્થા જાણવી.

* * *

પરિતરાજ જગન્નાથ કહે છે કે વ્યક્તિપક્ષમાં પણ શક્યતાવચ્છેદક (જે કાર ‘શક્ય’ છે, તેમાં રહેલ ફત શક્યતાવચ્છેદક કહેવાશે, તેની) સંખ્યાને આગળ કરીને ત્યાં (પણ) યથા-સંખ્યન્યાયની પ્રવૃત્તિ અવ્યાહત = નિર્ણય રીતે કરી લેવી. (અર્થાત્ ઇક્ષમાં ચાર હવ, હવદિ શક્યતાવચ્છેદકો છે, તેમના સ્થાનનાં અનુક્રમે વ્યક્તિશઃ એક એક શક્યતાવચ્છેદક યથાદિ વિશિષ્ટ આદેશોની પ્રવૃત્તિ કરી લેવી.) અને અહીં નિરૂદ્ધ લક્ષણા વર્ગોરેની પ્રવૃત્તિ કરવી—(એટલે કે ઇક્ષ = ૪, ૪, ૪, ૪ થી વાચ્ય જે હવદિ ચાર શક્યતાવચ્છેદકો, અને તે ચાર શક્યતાવચ્છેદકોથી વાચ્ય એવા જે ૧૮ સવર્ણબેદો—એમ નિરૂદ્ધ લક્ષણાથી પ્રાપ્ત એવો અર્થ લેવો) તો જરૂરી જ બની રહેશે. ૨૭

અહીં—(ક) ઇક્ષ પ્રત્યાહારાન્તર્ગત સ્થાનિભૂત ચાર હવદિના સ્થાનમાં યજ્ઞ પ્રત્યાહારાન્તર્ગત ચાર યથાદિ રૂપ આદેશોત્ત્વં સંખ્યાસામ્ય આગળ ધરીને, તથા (લ) સ્થાનેડન્તરતમઃ । ૧ - ૧ - ૫૦ ની અપેક્ષાએ યથાસંખ્યમ્ અનુદેશઃ સમાનામ્ । ૧ - ૩ - ૧૦ સૂત્ર પરચત્ર

૨૪. નાવ્યાવાતત્ત્વવાં પૂર્વવપ્રકાશનો માધ્યમગ્રન્થ હિતિ યુક્તં વક્તુમ્, શક્યક્રિયાયાં ગનાવાનાતત્ત્વમ્ હિતિ મિર મહર્ષિચન્દ્રનેડવ્યન્તમગજ્જતેઃ ॥ મતિદષ્ટેત્થં ઇક્ષશબ્દોપ્યેત્યાદિ જાતિચતુષ્ટયાવચ્છિન્નાન્નાં ક્રમેણ યજ્ઞશબ્દોપ્યયથાદિજાતિચતુષ્ટયાવચ્છિન્ના માધ્યમતેઃ હિતિ જાતિસંસ્થામાદાય સંસ્થતાનુદેશો માધ્યમકૃતામભિપ્રેતઃ । (તત્રૈવ - પૃ. ૧૫)

૨૫. નિરૂદ્ધલક્ષણાપ્યેવં સતિ મવતુક્તા નાજ્ઞીકર્તૈર્યેનિ પરં લાઘવમ્ । (તત્રૈવ, પૃ. ૧૫)

૨૬. ‘તવર્ગેડળ્ ગ્રહણમવરિમાષ્વમાકૃતિગ્રહણાત્’ હિતિ ‘અણુદિત્ત.’ (૧ - ૧ - ૬૯) સૂત્રગતં વાર્તિક-કમપ્યનુગૃહીતં મવતીતિ ગ્રન્થવ્યઙ્ગ્યાન્વયશરિપુષ્ટા મેવતિ । એવં જાતિરક્ષે વ્યવસ્થા । (તત્રૈવ, પૃ. ૧૫)

૨૭. વ્યક્તિપક્ષેડનિ શક્યતાવચ્છેદકસંસ્થામાદાય યથાસંસ્થવપ્રચિરવ્યાહતા । નિરૂદ્ધલક્ષણાદિકં તુ ન વાર્યતે । (તત્રૈવ, પૃ. ૧૫)

હોવાથી તે ૧-૧-૫૦ને બાધ કરી દેશે—એ બે દૃષ્ટિએ વિચારીએ તો પ્રકૃત ઉલ્લહરણમાં, તે (સ્થાનેડનતમઃ । ૧-૧-૫૦) પરિભાષાસૂત્રથી વ્યવસ્થા થઈ શકતી હોવા છતાંય, ૧-૩-૧૦ સૂત્રોક્ત યથાસંખ્યન્યાયને પ્રવૃત્ત થતો કોઈ રીતે શકી શકાશે નહીં. ૨૮

આથી સુષી + ઉપાસ્ય । માં ફકો યજ્ઞચિ ૬-૧-૭૭ ની પ્રવૃત્તિ કરવા માટે વથાસંખ્ય-મતુદેશઃ સમાનામ્ । ૧-૩-૧૦ સૂત્રની જ મદદ લેવી એમ પ્રાચીન પ્રક્રિયા કહેનારા = પ્રક્રિયાક્રીમુદાકાર રામચન્દ્રાચાર્યના; અને તેમના વ્યાખ્યાતા = પ્રક્રિયા પ્રકાશકાર શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષનો કહેવાનો આશય હતો એમ સમજવું જોઈએ. ૨૯

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સુષી + ઉપાસ્ય । ની પ્રક્રિયા બાળતે જ વિશેષ મર્યા કરતાં કરતાં પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથે એમ પશુ કશું છે કે તસ્માત્ માણ્યમ્નય इव गुह्यम્થોડયિ રમણીય एव । (પ્રૌઢમનોરમા કુચ-મર્દિની, પૃ. ૧૭) અર્થાત્ “ભાષ્યઅન્યના જેવો જ શ્રીકૃષ્ણ શેષ યુરુનો ‘પ્રક્રિયા પ્રકાશ’ નામક દીકાઅન્ય પશુ રમણીય જ છે.” આ રીતે પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથે સ્થાલીપુલાકન્યાયે બહોળિ દીક્ષિતની ‘પ્રૌઢમનોરમા’ના અમુક મતોનું સચુકિતક અને વિસ્તરથી ખંડન કયું છે.

૩૦ ઉપસંહાર : બહોળિ દીક્ષિતે ‘પ્રૌઢમનોરમા’ લખીને ‘યુરુદ્રોહ’ કર્યો છે અને અથવા પોતાને બહોળિ દીક્ષિતે ‘મ્લેચ્છ’ કહેલ છે—એના કોષાવેશમાં પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથે બંને ‘પ્રૌઢમનોરમા’નું ખંડન કરવા ઉદ્ધત થયા હોય, તથાપિ એ કહેવું જોઈએ કે આ બે વ્યક્તિત્વ વચ્ચેના સંઘર્ષથી અતિ તો વ્યાકરણશાસ્ત્રને જ લાભ થયો છે. વળી, પંડિતરાજ જગન્નાથે બહોળિ દીક્ષિત તરફનો પોતાનો કોષ કેવળ ‘પ્રૌઢમનોરમાકૃચ્ચમર્દિની’ એવા શીર્ષક પૂરતો જ સીમિત રાખ્યો છે. પશુ ન્યારે તેઓ ‘પ્રૌઢમનોરમા’ની અમુક અમુક ઉક્તિઓને લઈને એની પ્રામાણિકતા વિષે મર્યા હાથ ધરે છે, ત્યારે તેઓ કદુતા કે અસમ્યતા ભરી ભાષા ફરીવાર કર્યાંક વાપરતા નથી.

૨૮. एवमपि स्थानिगते षण्दिचतुष्टयस्यादेशगतयस्वदिजातिचतुष्टयसंख्यासाम्यमादाय परवादन्तरत-
मपरिभाषावाचने प्रवर्तमानाया ‘वथासंख्यम्’ इति परिभाषायाः प्रकृते, तथा (१-१-५०)
गतार्थत्वेऽपि दुष्परिहारस्वात् ॥ (तत्रैव, पृ. १५)

૨૯. अयमेव ‘इको यणचि’ इत्यत्र ‘वथासंख्यम्’ इति परिभाषायाः प्रवृत्तिमाचक्ष्णानां प्राचीन-
प्रक्रियाकृता तद्व्याख्यातृणां चाशयः ॥ (तत्रैव, पृ. १६)

મોઢેરા અને જૈનો

પ્રો. ર. ના. મહેતા, ડૉ. કે. વી. શેઠ, મણિલાલ મિસ્ત્રી

પ્રાસ્તાવિક :

ઉત્તર ગુજરાતના ચાણુસ્મા તાલુકાનું આશરે ૭,૦૦૦ ની વસ્તી ધરાવતું મોઢેરા એક મહત્વનું સ્થાન છે. ગુજરાતને આંતરરાષ્ટ્રીય ખ્યાતિ અપાવનાર બારમી સદીના કલિકાલ સર્વજ્ઞ આચાર્ય હેમચંદ્ર અને વીસમી સદીના અહિંસાના રાજકીયક્ષેત્રે મહાન અને સફળ પ્રયોગ કરનાર માહાત્મા ગાંધી એ બંને મોઢેરાની મોઢ જ્ઞાતિના મહાપુરુષો મોઢેરાની લાંબી પરંપરા સાચવે છે.

સામાન્ય રીતે તે બુદ્ધલાકર્ષી સુશ્રુભિરર્થી સુપ્રસિદ્ધ મોઢેરામાં શિવ, ગણેશ, શક્તિ આદિનાં સ્થાનકોની સાથે અહીંની જૈન પરંપરા સાચવતું પરંતુ તબુ તૈયાર થયેલું ચિંતા-મણિ પાર્શ્વનાથનું દેરાસર અસ્તિત્વ ધરાવે છે. આ દેરાસરના શિલાલેખો પૈકી જીર્ણોદ્ધાર સૂચક શિલાલેખમાં મોઢેરામાં સિદ્ધસેનસુરિના શિષ્ય બપ્પભટ્ટે અહીં દીક્ષા અને આચાર્યપદ પ્રાપ્ત કર્યાના ઉલ્લેખો છે. તેથી અહીં જૈન પરંપરા પશુ ધર્મી પ્રાચીન લાગે છે. આ બપ્પભટ્ટસુરિ સં. ૮૦૦-૮૬૫ માં વિદ્યમાન હતા, એમ મો. દ. દેસાઈ [જૈન ગુજર્ કવિઓ ભાગ-૨, પૃ. ૭૧૦ પર] નોંધે છે :

મોઢેરા અને જૈન સાહિત્ય :

મોઢેરાના જૈન આગમ સાહિત્યમાંથી ઉલ્લેખો પ્રાપ્ત કરીને ડૉ. ભોગીલાલ સરિસરાએ આ પ્રમાણે નોંધ આપી છે.

ઉત્તર ગુજરાતનું મોઢેરા. મોઢરક આહારનો ઉલ્લેખ સૂત્રકૃતાંગસૂત્રની વૃત્તિમાં છે, એ જ સૂત્રની ચૂલ્હિમાં મોઢેરકનો એ પ્રકારનો ઉલ્લેખ છે. જેથી એ એક મહત્વનું સ્થળ હોવાનું સિદ્ધ થાય છે.

‘જૈન આગમ સાહિત્યમાં ગુજરાત’ નામનાં તેમનાં પુસ્તકના પૃ. ૧૪૯ પરની આ નોંધની પાઠવી પરથી શીલાંકની વૃત્તિની આ માહિતી છે, એમ સ્પષ્ટ થાય છે, શીલાંક અપરનામ કોટયાચાર્યે આચારાંગ અને સૂત્રકૃતાંગ પર વૃત્તિ રચિ છે. પ્રભાવક ચરિત્ર ૯ શ્લોક-૧૦૫ પ્રમાણે તેમણે ૧૧ અંગે પર વૃત્તિ રચિ હતી. તેઓ જિનભદ્રગણિ ક્ષમાશ્રમણના શિષ્ય હતા, અને તેમની રચાયેલી વૃત્તિની ટીકાની હસ્તપ્રતની પ્રશસ્તિ પછી ઉમેરેલા શ્લોકને આધારે તે શક સંવત ૭૮૪ માં તેઓ વિદ્યમાન હતા. લાલા સુંદરલાલ જૈન આગમ ગ્રંથમાળાના ૧ પુસ્તકની પ્રસ્તાવના પૃ. ૩૬૫૨-શીલાચાર્યની ટીકા સંવત ૭૮૪ તથા ૭૯૮ માં રચાયેલી નોંધ છે. આ સાહિત્યના ઉલ્લેખો શીલાંકને ઈ. સ. ૮૬૨ અને ૮૭૬ વચ્ચે વિદ્યમાન હોવાનું સૂચવે છે. અર્થાત્ જૈન પરંપરા મોઢેરાનો નવમી સદીમાં ઉલ્લેખ કરે છે તે સૂચક હકીકત છે.

આ હકીકતની સાથે જૈન પરંપરા વલભી ભગવંતની પરિસ્થિતિની માહિતી સાચવે છે. આ પરંપરા “પુરાતન પ્રવંધ”માં સચવાયેલી છે: તે પ્રમાણે વલભી ભગની જૈનાને ખબર પડતાં તેઓ વલભીથી સલામતી માટે મોઢેરા આવ્યા હતા.

ઐતિહાસિક સમીક્ષા :

આ કથાઓને ઐતિહાસિક માહિતી સાથે સરખાવતાં ગુજરાતમાં અનેલા રાજકીય બનાવોની કેટલીક પરિસ્થિતિ સ્પષ્ટ થાય છે. તેમાં ઈ. સ. ની આઠમી સદીમાં વલભી પર ચારબોએ કરેલાં આક્રમણો, તેની થોડી સફળતા, તેમનો નવસારી પાસે પરાજય, અને તે સુદ્ધ પછી થયેલા રાજકીય ફેરફારોની અસરો વર્તાય છે. ચરબોનું આ આક્રમણ દેશરૂઢના અધિકારીઓ અને સૈનિકોનું હતું. તેની સીમા સિંધ સુધી વિસ્તરેલી હતી. તેથી આ આક્રમણ સિંધ તરફથી થયું હોવાનો આપણે ત્યાં અભિપ્રાય છે, તે સમય ઉચ્ચેદ ખિલાફતની શક્તિ ધ્યાનમાં લેતો નથી. દમસ્ક અર્થાત સિરિયાથી સમગ્ર ઇરાક, અરબસ્તાન, ઇરાન આદિ પ્રદેશોની કેન્દ્રિત સત્તાનું આક્રમણ પ્રમાણમાં નાનાં અને કંઈક અવ્યવસ્થિત અને આંતરિક કલહવાળાં રાજ્યો પર સફળ થયું તેથી મૈત્રક અને ગુર્જર જેવા રાજ્યોનો નાશ થયો.

પરંતુ દક્ષિણની ચાલુક્ય સત્તા તથા રાજસ્થાન અને ઉત્તરપ્રદેશની ગુર્જર પ્રતિહાર સત્તાની સામે તે આક્રમણો ટક્યાં ન હતાં. ગુર્જર પ્રતિહારો સાથે ઉચ્ચેદ ખિલાફતના અધિકારીઓની સ્પર્ધા અસફળ હતી, તેથી ન્યારે વલભી પર આક્રમણનો ભય ઊભો થયો ત્યારે વલભીના જૈન સંઘે પોતાના બચાવ માટે જે સ્થળોંતર નોંધ્યું છે તે ગુર્જર-પ્રતિહાર સત્તાના પ્રદેશ તરફ છે. આ પ્રદેશ તરફ મૈત્રકોના અવશિષ્ટ લોકો પણ પાછા હાજી ગયા હતા અને વડનગર થઈને મેવાડ તરફ ગયા એ સૂચક કથાં વલભીના નાશ વખતે થયેલાં સ્થળોંતરો સૂચવે છે.

જૈન અને બ્રાહ્મણ પરંપરા :

આમ મૈત્રક સત્તા તૂટ્યા પછી વલભીવાચનાના જૈન સમર્થકોનું મોઢેરા તરફનું આગમન ગુર્જર-પ્રતિહાર રાજ્ય પ્રતિ હતું. આ આગમનની કંઈક વિકૃત કથા ધર્મારણ્ય પુરાણમાં આમ રામની કથા સાથે જોડાયેલી લાગે છે. તદુપરાંત ધર્મારણ્ય જૈનેતર અને સ્થાનિક બ્રાહ્મણ સમુદાય તરફી પ્રથ પોતાની રીતે આ પ્રદેશમાં જૈનોની કથા સાચવે છે, તે કથાઓનું વિશ્લેષણ બીજા લેખની અપેક્ષા રાખે છે. પરંતુ જૈન પરંપરા અને સ્થાનિક બ્રાહ્મણ પરંપરામાં અધ્યયનથી મોઢેરામાં જૈન વસતી ગુર્જર-પ્રતિહારોના વખતથી વધુ પ્રમાણમાં વધુ હોવાનો અભિપ્રાય ઐતિહાસિક પરિસ્થિતિના પ્રાપ્ત પ્રમાણો દર્શાવે છે.

જૈન દેરાસર :

મોઢેરામાં જૈન વસતીના એંધાણ તપાસવા માટે અહીંથી જૈન સામગ્રી જોવી પડે. સામાન્યતઃ મકાનો, ઘરવપરાશની વસ્તુઓ આદિ જે તે સ્થળે વસતી અહીં હોમે વાપરતી હોવાથી તેમાં સમાન અંશે દેખાય, પરંતુ તેથી વિશિષ્ટ જૈન પ્રવૃત્તિ દેખાય નહીં.

આ પરિસ્થિતિમાં જૈન દેરાસરો અને જૈન પ્રતિમાઓ તથા પ્રતિમાલેખોનું વિગતવાર અધ્યયન અપેક્ષિત ગણાય, તેથી ચિંતામણિ પાર્શ્વનાથનાં દેરાસરની મુલાકાત લેવામાં આવી. આ મુલાકાત વખતે સ્થાનિક જૈન સંઘે ઉત્તમ સહકાર આપ્યો. દેરાસર સંવત ૧૯૭૫-૧૯૧૯ ઈ. સ. માં નવેસરથી તૈયાર થયેલું હોઈ પ્રથમ નજરે તેની શિલ્પશૈલી ઝોગધુસરી સદીના ઉત્તરાર્ધ અથવા વીસમી સદીના પૂર્વાર્ધની દેખાય એવી છે.

મોદેરાના કિલ્લેખંદલાગની અંદરના ટેકરા પર સરદારઓકની ઉત્તર દિશામાં આજનું ચિંતામણિ પાર્શ્વનાથનું નવું દેરાસર છે. તેની દક્ષિણ દિશાની સોપાન શ્રેણી પરથી તેના ગૃહમંડપમાં જવાય છે. મૂળ દેરાસર પૂર્વાભિમુખ છે. નિર્ધારશૈલિનાં આ દેરાસરની પ્રતિમાઓમાં ધાતુ પ્રતિમાઓનો પણ સારો સંગ્રહ છે.

ધાતુ પ્રતિમાઓના લેખો :

આ ધાતુ પ્રતિમાઓના પરિકર તથા પિઠિકાના કેટલાક ભાગો પર પ્રતિમા લેખો કોતરેલા છે. આ લેખો સંવત ૧૨૩૫, ૧૪૭૫, ૧૫૦૫, ૧૫૧૦, ૧૫૧૨, ૧૫૫૧, ૧૫૬૪, ૧૬૮૫, ૧૬૮૯ અને વીરસંવત ૨૪૯૮ ની તિથિઓ દર્શાવે છે. તેથી તે લેખો છેલ્લાં આશરે આઠસો વર્ષની પરંપરા સાચવે છે. આ લેખોનું વાચન અને રજૂ કર્યું છે.

(૧) પાર્શ્વનાથ ૧૬ સે. × ૧૦ સે.

સં. ૧૨૩૫ વ. વૈ. શુ. પૂ. શુ. શ્રીમાલ જ્ઞાનીય દાવેલાયારોવાજીવામ શ્રી પાર્શ્વ અંચલગચ્છે શ્રી સંવયમસુરિ સુ. ૫ પ્રતિ મોઢેરા ।

(૨) તીર્થંકર ૧૬ × ૧૦ સે.

સંવત ૧૪૭૫ વર્ષે ચૈત્ર વદિ ૮ શુક્ર શ્રી અંચલગચ્છે શ્રીમાલીય શ્રેષ્ઠ કર્મા.... માર્યા.....

(૩) કુંથુનાથ ૧૫.૫ × ૯

સં. ૧૫૦૫ વર્ષે પોષ શુરુ શુ. ૧૫ શ્રી શ્રીમાલજ્ઞાત ગામી જૈણ માર્યા જનમાદે સુત સુરા વાઘા કમલીભિઃ કુટુંબયુતે માતૃ સાંગાનિમિત્તં શ્રી કુંથુનાથ વિંવ કારિત પ્રતિષ્ઠિતં ચૈત્રાચ્છે ધારણ્ણીય મ. લક્ષ્મીદેવસુરિભિઃ

(૪) નમિનાથ ૧૬ × ૯.૫

સંવત ૧૫૧૦ વ૦ માધ માસે માધમાસે દેકાવાટક વાસી ધોરવાટ્ટ શે સાલિયૈ-કન મા. લીલાદે પુત્ર વીરદાસ શિષ્યા માંઢળં વીમા મુળારિસી પ્રમુલ્લ કુટુંબ યુક્તેન શ્રી નમિનાથ વિંવ કારિતમ્ પ્ર. તથા શ્રી સોમસુંદર સૂરિ શિક્ષા શ્રી રત્નમેલદસુરિભિઃ ॥શ્રી॥

(૫) અભિનંદન ૨૫ × ૧૫

સંવત ૧૫૧૨ વર્ષે વૈ. શુદિ ૧૩ દિને મુંઝિગપુર વામિ પ્રાગ્વાટય મુંજાસા, જાસુ પુત્રમ્, હીયકેન મા. રમાદે પુત્ર જાવદ જાવાદિ કુટુંબયુતેન શ્રી અભિનંદનનાથ વિંવ કારિત, પ્રતિષ્ઠિતં શ્રીસુરિભિઃ શ્રીઃ ।

(૬) સંભવનાથ ૧૫.૫×૬.૫

સં. ૧૫૫૧ વર્ષે વૈ. શુ. ૧૩ રૌપાદા. ન ગામા. સુહાસિળી પુત્ર દો. દેવદાસ
શામા ગંગાકેન કા શ્રી સંભવ વિંચ પ્ર. તથા. શ્રી હેમવિમલસૂરિમિ શ્રીશ્રીશ્રી

(૭) શાંતિનાથ ૨૧×૧૧.૫

સંવત ૧૫૬૪ વર્ષે જયેશ્વ સુદિ ૧૧ શની. પ્રાગ્વાટ જા. સા. મોહંદમા માળિકીપુત્ર
સા શિવદાસ મા. હીરાઈ નામના પુત્ર સા. ઘનજી સા. હંસજી મીમજી પ્રમુક્ત પરિવારયુત્તયા
સ્વ શ્રેયસ શ્રી શાંતિનાથ વિંચ કારિત પ્રતિષ્ઠિતં કોરંટગચ્છે શ્રીનમ્સૂરિમિઃ કારિતઃ
શ્રીરસ્તુ શ્રી.

(૮) પાશ્વનાથ ૧૮×૧૮

સં ૧૬૮૫ વર્ષે વૈશાખ સુદિ ૧૫ દિને ચરહાન
પુર વાસ્તવ્ય વૃદ્ધ શ્રીમાલી જાતીય સા
મેષ માર્યા તેજલદે નામના । કારિત શ્રી વાઙ્મ
નાથ વિ. પ્ર. તપાગચ્છે મ. શ્રી હિરવિજયસૂરિ
પટ્ટે મ. શ્રી વિજયસેનસૂરિ પ. મ. શ્રી વિજયદેવસૂરિમિઃ

(૯) કુંથુનાથ ૧૦.૫×૧૦

સં. ૧૬૮૯ ચા. રતન નામના । શ્રી કુંથુ વિ. કા. પ્ર. વ. તથા ગ.....

(૧૦) મહાવીરસ્વામી ચોવીસી ૩૪×૧૮

સ્વસ્તિશ્રી મહેલાજાનગરે વિ. સં ૨૪૬૮ વૈ. સુ. ગુરુવારે
મોઢેરાના ગાંધી મોહનલાલ મૂળચંદ્રે તેમના
ધર્મપત્ની શિવકોર બહેના સ્મરણાર્થે તેમના સુપુત્ર
ગાંધી પોપટલાલ પૂંજલાલે શ્રી મહાવીર સ્વામી
ચોવીસી ભરાવ્યા છે. તથા આ. શ્રી કૈલાસસાગર
સૂરિએ પ્રતિષ્ઠા કરી છે.

આ ઉપરાંત નવપદની નીચેના ભાગમાં પણ સં. ૨૪૬૮નો લેખ છે. તેનું વાચન
અત્રે રજૂ કર્યું છે.

સ્વસ્તિશ્રી મહેલાજાનગરે
સં. ૨૪૬૮ વૈ. સુ. ગુરુવારે
શ્રેષ્ઠિયર્થે સ્વ. ગાંધી મોહનલાલ મૂળચંદ્રભાઈ
ના ધર્મપત્ની સ્વ. શ્રી શિવકોરબેન ગાંધીના
સ્મરણાર્થે મોઢેરા નિ. તેમના સુપુત્ર ગાંધી પૂંજલાલ
મોહનલાલ તથા તેમનાં ધર્મપત્ની શ્રી કૈસરબેન પૂંજલાલ
ગાંધીએ શ્રી નવપદજી ભરાવ્યા છે. તપા. આ. શ્રી
કૈલાસસાગરસૂરિએ પ્રતિષ્ઠા કરી છે.

આ ઉપરાંત દેરાસરના ગભારામાં મહાવીરસ્વામીની પ્રતિમા નીચે પચાસણુ પર સં. ૨૪૬૮નો પ્રતિષ્ઠા લેખ છે તે અપૂરતા પ્રકાશને લીધે વંચાયો નથી, તેમજ ખીન્ને એક લેખ અષ્ટાધ (૧) નીચે શ્રી મહાલ હીરાચંદ સં ૧૬૧૪ વૈસાક સુદ ૭ નો છે.

દેરાસર છણોદ્ધારનો લેખ (૬૦ × ૫૫) ગૃહમંડપના પ્રવેશદ્વારની પૂર્વમાં ભીતપર છે તેનું વાચન આ પ્રમાણે છે :

નમઃ શ્રી પાર્શ્વનાથાય

સરસ્વતીલગ્ન પ્રસાદાનાં શ્રીસિદ્ધસેનસૂરિ શિષ્યાનાં
શ્રી વગ્દમદ્ (ઉપરનાથ મદ્ગકીર્તિ) સૂરીનાં
નૃપ વિક્રમ સંવત (૮૦૭-૮૧૧) લીલા આચાર્યપદ પ્રાપ્તિ
સ્થલે ઉત્તર ગુર્જર દેશાન્તર્વર્તિની શ્રી મુદેરાચ્ય પ્રાપ્તે
નૃપ વિક્રમ સંવત ૧૧૦૨ પ્રવર્તમાને શ્રાવણ માસે
શુક્લ પક્ષે દશમીતિથી શાનિવાસરે શ્રુમયોગપ્તમન્વિતે
શ્રી શ્વેતામ્બર તપાગચ્છે શ્રી પાર્શ્વ જિનપ્રાસાદસ્ય
સ્થાત મુદ્દર્તમ્ ॥
નૃપ વિક્રમ સંવત ૧૧૭૫ પ્રવર્તમાને વ્યેષ્ઠમાસે
શુક્લ પક્ષે તૃતીયા તિથી માનુવાસરે શ્રુમયોગ સમ
ન્વિતે લગ્ને મૂલનાથક શ્રી પાર્શ્વનાથાધિ જિન વિશ્વ
પ્રતિષ્ઠા હોત્સવે ત્રિશંતસહસ્ત્ર પ્રમિત (૩૦,૦૦૦)
દેવદ્રવ્ય સમુપવન્નમ.
પ્રતિષ્ઠા વિધિ વિધાનકાર કર્ત્તવ્ય ગાલાપુર
(વલાદ) ગ્રામ વાસ્તવ્યઃ આધ્યવરઃ શ્રી ક્ષેમચન્દ્રપુત્રઃ ફૂલેન્દ્ર

॥શ્વિતિ॥ શુભ મવતુ શ્રી સંઘસ્ય ॥

ચિત્રામણિ પાર્શ્વનાથના મંદિરના આ લેખો મોદેરાની જૈન પ્રવૃત્તિ પર પ્રકાશ પાડે છે. અહીંની જૈન પ્રવૃત્તિના અન્ય પ્રમાણો સાથે આ લેખો તપાસતાં મોદેરાની ગામની જૈન પ્રવૃત્તિ પર જે પ્રકાશ પડે છે તેની અર્થા કૃતિ.

લેખના પ્રારંભમાં મોદેરામાં જૈન આગમન અને તેમના સ્થાનિક લોકો સાથેના સંઘર્ષની અને વિવાદોની કેટલીક માહિતી આપી છે. પરંતુ અહીંથી મળેલા પ્રતિમા લેખો સંવત ૧૨૭૫-ઈ. સ. ૧૧૭૬થી શરૂ થાય છે. તેની પહેલાંની પ્રતિમાઓ કે લેખો મળ્યા નથી તેથી તેની તપાસ ભવિષ્યની પ્રવૃત્તિ છે. મોદેરાની પ્રતિમાઓ પૈકી સૌથી જૂનો લેખ સાચવતી પાર્શ્વનાથની પ્રતિમાના લેખમાં ‘મોદેરા’ શબ્દ સંકારપદ છે. કારણ કે કુમારપાળના વખતમાં આ ગામનું નામ કેવી રીતે લખાતું કે બોલાતું તે અન્ય પ્રમાણો દ્વારા સ્પષ્ટ થતું નથી. વળી આગળ અર્થા કરી છે તે પ્રમાણે તેની પ્રતિષ્ઠા કરાવનારનાં જીવન અને પ્રતિમાની તારીખ વચ્ચે મેળ ખાતો નથી. તેથી આ લેખ પ્રતિમા પર પાછળથી તેને કુમારપાળની સમકાલીન બનાવવાના હેતુથી કોતરાવવામાં આવ્યો હોય તેમ લાગે છે.

આ પ્રતિમા પછીનાં વર્ષો યુગરાત સુલ્તાનોના યુગના છે. અને ત્યારનાર પાનુરી પાદશાહના વખતના લેખો અને છેલ્લે આધુનિક લેખ છે. આ પ્રતિમાઓ નવા કરાવી હશે એ નિશ્ચિત કરવાનું કાર્ય મુશ્કેલ છે, અને કરવાનો વિષય છે. તે આખત નવા કરાવે તે પછી તેમાં દેકાપાટક (સંવત ૧૫૧૦) મુન્ગિયુર (સં. ૧૫૧૨) અરહાનપુર (સં. ૧૨૬૫) જેવાં નામો પરથી તે સ્થળે વસતાં કુટુંબોએ આ પ્રતિમાઓ ભરાવી હોવા ખાબત સ્પષ્ટ થાય છે. આ પ્રતિમાઓ જે સ્થળે વસતાં કુટુંબો હતાં તેમણે કયાં ભરાવી હતી, તેનાં સ્થળાંતરે કયાં કયાં થયાં હતાં ખત્યાદિ પ્રશ્નો અનુત્તર રહે છે.

પરંતુ આ પ્રતિમાઓ ભરાવનાર કૈનો શ્રીમાલી, પોરવાર, માતિના હતા એ ખાબત સ્પષ્ટ છે. મોદરાની સંવત ૧૨૩૫ની પ્રતિમા શ્રીમાળીઓએ ભરાવી છે તે એ દર્શાવત કુમારપાળનાં વખતમાં શ્રીમાલી કૈનોનું બળ દર્શાવે છે, અને યુગરાતમાં શ્રીમાળી, પોરવાર આદિ કૈન વસતીની લાંબી પરંપરા દર્શાવે છે.

સંવત ૧૨૩૫નો લેખ સિંહપ્રભસૂરિનું નામ સાચવે છે. વિધિપદ્ધતિનું નામ આચાર્યનું નામ પ્રતિમાલેખમાં શ્રી સંઘપ્રભસૂરિ આપ્યું છે તે સિંહપ્રભસૂરિ હોય તે સંવત ૧૨૮૩થી ૧૩૧૩ સુધી વિદ્યમાન હતા. તે જોતાં અને તેમનું આચાર્યપદ સં. ૧૩૦૬માં હોઈ આવસનમાં ૫૧મા ક્રમે નોંધાયેલા આ નામના આચાર્યને બદલે સંવત ૧૨૩૫માં આવસનમાં ૫મ થિય આચાર્યપદે હતા તે માહિતી બાધક પ્રમાણ પૂરું પાડે છે. તેથી તે સંઘપ્રભસૂરિએ આ પ્રતિમાની પ્રતિષ્ઠા કરી હોય તો તેની તારીખ સંવત ૧૩૦૬થી ૧૩૧૩ના સમયની હોવા આ પરિસ્થિતિમાં તથા લેખમાં મોદરા લખેલું હોઈ આ પ્રતિમા લેખ પાછળથી પાવનાથના બિંબ પર કોતરાયો લાગે છે.

બીજા લેખમાં પ્રતિષ્ઠા કરાવનાર આચાર્યનું નામ નથી. પરંતુ ત્રીજા લેખમાં સંવત ૧૫૦૬માં કુચનાથની પ્રતિષ્ઠા કરાવનાર ચૈવગચ્છના ધારણ્ય પદ્મિય ભ. સત્તમદિવસદિએ સં. ૧૫૧૭માં પ્રતિષ્ઠા કરાવેલી સુવિધિનાથની પ્રતિમા શત્રુન્ય પર્વત પર મોઢી દૂંકતી દેરી નં. ૭૧૧૪માં છે. તે નોંધવાની જરૂર છે. (શ્રી શત્રુન્ય ગ્રીરીરાજ દર્શન. કચનસંગર, લે. નં. ૪૫૪)

નમિનાથ બિંબની પ્રતિષ્ઠા તપાગચ્છના સોમસંકુરસૂરિના શિષ્ય રત્નશેખરે સંવત ૧૫૧૦માં કરી છે. સોમસંકર (સં. ૧૪૩૦ થી સં. ૧૪૬૯)ના બાલ સરસ્વતિ બિહદધારી શિષ્ય રત્નશેખરે (સં. ૧૪૫૭થી ૧૫૧૭) સંવત ૧૫૧૦માં આ પ્રતિષ્ઠા કરી છે. તેમણે સંવત ૧૫૦૬થી સંવત ૧૫૧૭ સુધી પ્રતિષ્ઠાઓ કરાવી હતી, એમ મો. દ. દેસાઈની [કૈન યુગ]૨ કવિઓ ભાગ-૫. ૭૧૯-૨૦ પરથી નોંધથી સ્પષ્ટ થાય છે.

સંભવનાથનાં બિંબની સં. ૧૫૫૧માં પ્રતિષ્ઠા કરનાર હેમવિમલસૂરિ (સં. ૧૫૨૨-સં. ૧૫૮૩) તેમણે ઘણી પ્રતિષ્ઠાઓ કરાવી છે. તેમાં સં. ૧૫૫૧ની પ્રતિષ્ઠાની નોંધ મો. દ. દેસાઈના કૈન યુગ]૨ કવિઓ ભાગ-૨, પૃ. ૭૧૯-૨૦ પર છે. હેમવિમલ સત્તમસંગર-સૂરિના શિષ્ય હતા. અને સં. ૧૫૪૮માં તેમને સૂરિપદ મળ્યું હતું.

આમ મોઢરામાં જોવામાં આવતી સં. ૧૬૮૫ની બરહાનપુરવાસી સા મેઘની પત્ની તેજલહેની પ્રતિમાની પ્રતિષ્ઠા હીરવિજયસૂરિના શિષ્ય વિજયસેનના શિષ્ય વિજયદેવે કરી છે. વિજયદેવને (સં. ૧૬૪૪-૧૭૧૩) પાદશાહ જહાંગીરે મહાતપાતુ ગિરદ માંડવગઢમાં આપ્યું હતું. તેમણે કરાવેલી પ્રતિષ્ઠાના ઘણા લેખો મળે છે. (મો. દ. દેસાઈ, જૈન ગુર્જર કવિઓ ભાગ-૨, પ. ૭૨૭)

આમ ચિંતામણિ પાશ્વનાથનાં મંદિરમાં સચવાયેલી પ્રતિમાઓ પરના કેટલાક લેખોનાં અધ્યયનથી આ પ્રતિમાઓની ઐતિહાસિકતા પ્રમાણિત અને અપ્રમાણિત થાય છે, તેથી મોઢરામાં મળેલી આ પ્રતિમાઓ મૂળ અહીંની છે, અહીંથી બહાર ગયેલા મૂળ મોઢરાના નિવાસીઓએ ભરાવી છે કે બીજા જગ્યાએ ભરાવેલી પ્રતિમાઓ અહીં આણી છે. એ પ્રશ્નો ઉભા થાય છે, તેનો ઉત્તર આપવો મુશ્કેલ છે.

પરંતુ નવા શિલાલેખ તથા મૂર્તિ લેખો કરાવનાર આજે મોઢરામાં રહેતા નથી પરંતુ અહીંથી બહાર ગયેલા લોકોએ આ કામ કરાવ્યાં છે એમ માનવાને કારણ છે, તેથી મોઢરા સાથે સંબંધ રાખનાર લોકોએ આ પ્રતિમાઓ ભરાવી છે. અને તે અહીં સ્થાપી કે બીજા જગ્યાએથી આણી છે. તે આખત વધુ તપાસ અપેક્ષિત છે.

આ પરિસ્થિતિમાં મોઢરા સાથેનો જૈન સમાજનો સંબંધ વલભીના નાશ પછી આશરે આઠમી-નવમી સદીમાં શરૂ થયો અને તે આજદિન સુધી જુદી જુદી પરિસ્થિતિઓ-માંથી પસાર થતો ચાલુ રહ્યો છે એમ ઉપલબ્ધ પ્રમાણો દર્શાવે છે, એટલું જ નહીં પણ એ લેખોમાં દર્શાવેલાં નામોવાળા સૂરિઓ તેમનાં કાર્યોથી સુપ્રસિદ્ધ છે, અને તેઓ તેમના સમયમાં મોઢરાને ધણા વિશાળ પ્રદેશ સાથે સાંકળી લે છે.

આભાર દર્શન

આ લેખ તૈયાર કરવામાં મૂર્તિલેખો વાંચવાની સગવડ કરી આપીને અમૂલ્ય સહાય આપનાર મોઢરાના શ્રીસંઘના મુખ્ય ટ્રસ્ટી શ્રી વનરાજ શાહ તથા અન્ય સભ્યોનો અતઃ-કરણ્યુર્વક આભાર માનીએ છીએ. તથા શીલાલેખનની નકલ કરવા માટે શ્રી અરવિંદ પટેલનો પણ આભાર માનીએ છીએ.

LOCATION OF RASA

V. M. Kulkarni

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata is the oldest work on aesthetics in Sanskrit. Of all the chapters in this work the sixth chapter on *rasa* is the most significant as it deals with the theory of literary beauty—the *rasa* theory. The two traditional verses incorporated in this chapter, numbered 32 and 33, and the prose passage immediately preceding these verses are instructive regarding Bharata's own view about the location of *rasa*. The traditional verses he cites in support of his views stated in the prose passage : “...What is it you call *rasa* ? (Or, what is the meaning of the word *rasa* ?). We reply : ‘it is called *rasa* because it can be relished. How is *rasa* relished ? Just as gourmets relish the flavour of food prepared with various spices and obtain pleasure etc., even so sensitive spectators (*sumanasah prekṣakāḥ*) relish the dominant or permanent emotions (*sthāyibhāva*) manifested or suggested by the acting out of the *bhāvas* (*vibhāvas* and *vyabhicārins*) and which are presented with the three kinds of dramatic representation, viz., that which uses speech, that which uses the body and that which is *sāttvika* (involuntary), obtains pleasure, etc. Therefore they are called *nāṭya-rasas* (dramatic sentiments, sentiments in drama).¹ On this subject there are the following two traditional stanzas :

“As gourmets relish food prepared with various ingredients (of pleasant flavour) and various condiments, so *saṅgdayas* (*rasikas*, lit. people with empathy) enjoy mentally (with a mind completely concentrated) the permanent emotions presented (connected) with their (appropriate) *vibhāvas*, *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas*.”

From the passage and the stanzas translated above it would seem that Bharata held the view that the permanent emotions are themselves *rasas* and that they are found in the drama. In other words, according to Bharata's view, it is in the drama itself that *rasa* is located.

According to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's view, that which is known as a permanent emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) in its unintensified or undeveloped form becomes intensified or developed through its union with the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*, etc., and becomes *rasa* located in the character that is being portrayed (*anukārya*). *Rasas* are called *nāṭyarasas* because they are portrayed in drama (*Dhvan-yaloka* (ii) Locana, p. 184). In the *Abhinavabhāratī* (Vol. I, p. 272) and in the somewhat amplified text of Hemacandra (*Kāvyaṇuśāsana*) this view is

presented as follows : "Rasa is the permanent emotion itself intensified by the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc. (i.e. *sāttvikabhāvas*). The *rasa* is present both in the character that is portrayed (*anukārya*) and in the actor who represents the character (*anukartā*)-Rasa is present/exists primarily in the character as has been represented by the poet in his dramatic work. When the actor, through his sustained training, discipline and art presents the character on the stage the *rasa* is present in him secondarily.²

Saṅkuka who criticises Lollaṭa's view differs with him regarding the location of *rasa*. According to his view *rasa* is simply a permanent emotion or rather, the reproduction or refenaction of the permanent emotion of the character (say, Rāma); and because it is a reproduction it is called by a different name : *rasa*. This reproduced permanent emotion is inferred, on the strength of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vynthicāribhāvas* as existing in the actor (*anukartā*). In other words, according to Saṅkuka the *rasa* is located in the actor and actor alone. In another context (A. Bh. I., p. 292) Abhinavagupta quotes Śrisaṅkuka : "In a dramatic performance the sensitive spectator enjoys the *rasas* in the actor, and then perceives the (permanent) emotion as existing in the character. In everyday life, however, *prakṛti* (reading emended to *prakṛta-bhāva*) a particular *bhāva* (emotion) leads to its corresponding *rasa*... "This is not true" says Abhinavagupta. For the sensitive spectator is not aware of any distinction between the character reproduced and the actor."³

The *Locana* commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* p. 184) too criticises, Lollaṭa's view. This criticism partly agrees with Saṅkuka's criticism and partly with Bhaṭṭanāyaka's criticism as recorded in Ch. I. p. 272 and p. 276 : There is no *rasa* in the character that is portrayed, say Rāma, who is removed both in space and time from the spectators. If one were to say that it is present in the actor, there would arise the difficulty, viz., the actor who would be absorbed in aesthetic rapture would not be able to follow the *laya* (tempo ?) and other dramatic conventions. If one were to say that *rasa* is present in the sensitive spectator, how could there be aesthetic pleasure ? On the contrary in *Karuṇa-rasa* the sensitive spectator would experience nothing but sorrow..."⁴ In this passage too, Saṅkuka's view regarding the location of *rasa* is further confirmed.

According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, *rasa* is perceived neither as located in oneself nor in someone else. In other words, *rasa* is not located in the spectator nor in the original character that is portrayed or in the actor who plays the role of the original character. If *rasa* were to arise or exist in the spectator how could there be the thrill of delight and wonder (*camatkāra*) ? On the contrary in *Karuṇa-rasa* he would experience sorrow...

in someone else—the original character or the actor who plays his part—the spectator would remain indifferent. *Rasa* is not perceived the way other things are seen in the world. In other words, it is not the result of the ordinary *pramāṇas* such as *pratyakṣa* (perception) etc. When *rasa* (really, the permanent emotion) of, say, Rāma, etc., is universalised by *bhāvanā-vyāpāra* (the process of universalisation or generalisation) it is enjoyed by the spectator through the *bhōgikarāṇa* or *bhoktṛva-vyāpāra*. This aesthetic enjoyment consists of 'repose in the bliss which is the true nature of one's own self' and 'which approximates the bliss that comes from realising (one's identity) with the highest Brahman'.⁶

This description is silent as to whether the permanent emotion of the spectator is awakened by the *vibhāvas*, etc., whether it colours the mass of bliss of the Self that is enjoyed by him (the spectator). Bhaṭṭanāyaka, however, explicitly speaks of the permanent emotion of the original character as universalised and then enjoyed. In accordance with Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view the Universalised permanent emotion of the original character, Rāma, etc., presented by the actor playing the part of Rāma, etc., is enjoyed by the spectator. The permanent emotion of the original character, when universalised, includes the permanent emotion of the spectator too. So we may not be wrong if we infer that Bhaṭṭanāyaka held the view that the spectator himself is the location of *rasa*.

It is Abhinavagupta who categorically and unambiguously states his position regarding the location of *rasa* in the course of his discussion about the nature of *rasa* and its enjoyment in his two commentaries—*Abhinavabhāratī* and *Locana*. On the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and *Dhvanyāloka* respectively. The relevant passages from these commentaries may be reviewed here :

(1) *A. Bh. VI. 33* : While commenting on *NS. VI. 33*, Abhinavagupta says : "Rases arise from drama which is a combination (of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*); or rather, *rasas* are themselves drama. For a drama is only a combination or collection (*samudāya*) of *rasas* (that is, a drama depicts a variety of *rasa*). *Rasas* are found only in the drama (and never in our everyday life). In poetry too, when it is dramatised, mentally (acted out before one's mind's eye) *rasa* is found. Our teacher (Bhaṭṭa Tota) says that *rasa* arises in a poem if we see things as if they were happening before our very eyes. As he observes in his *Kāvya-kautuka* : "In a poem that is not (mentally) enacted, there is no possibility of having aesthetic relish or enjoyment." Therefore *rasas* are found only in drama and not in the everyday world; and poetry is drama itself."

And therefore aesthetic relish or enjoyment is not found in the actor. ...The actor is only the means for the spectator's aesthetic relish or enjoyment. This is why the actor is called a *pātra* (i. vessel, glass, ii. character in a drama). An ordinary vessel (e.g., wineglass) is not able to taste the wine contained in it. It is only a means to tasting the wine for some one else).⁶

(II) *A. Bh.* VI. 33, p. 292 : In *crit* (considered) opinion in aesthetic relish or enjoyment what is tasted or enjoyed is one's own consciousness which consists of a mass of bliss. How can there be any question of sorrow ? Such varied permanent emotions as love, sorrow, etc., only serve to lend variety to the relish or enjoyment of the (otherwise pure compact mass of) consciousness. Acting or dramatic representation and such other activities serve in awakening the dormant permanent emotions.⁷

(III) *A. Bh.* VI. 38, p. 294 : Just as the seed stands as the root-cause of a tree, even so the *rasas* stand as the root-cause of the *bhāvas*.....The dramatic representation of the actor which is based on the (dramatic) poem is ultimately based on the generalised (or universalised or idealised) *samvit* (emotion or feeling) - not on the poet's personal emotion or feeling as it actually was but as transfigured by his poetic sensibility and creative imagination (*pratibhā*). It is that very idealised emotion or feeling that is really speaking the *rasa*.... Thus the *rasa* existing in the poet is like the seed which is the root-cause of a tree. For the poet is just like the spectator. For this very reason it has been said by Ānandavardhanācārya "if the poet is full of the erotic sentiment" etc. Therefore a dramatic poem is like a tree. The dramatic representation by the actor is like the flower, etc. The spectator's aesthetic enjoyment is like the fruit. Consequently everything is full of *rasa*.⁸

(IV) *Dhvanyālokalocana* 1.5, pp. 85-87 : Abhinavagupta interprets the famous incident of *Kṛaunca-vadha* narrated in the beginning of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in an extra-ordinary way. The poetic utterance, "mā niṣāda", etc., according to him, is not to be viewed as the expression of Vālmiki's (the poet's) personal feeling of sorrow. For, if he were grieved on account of the bird's sorrow or grief then the vital statement of Ānandavardhana's *Kārikā* (1.5) that *rasa* is the soul - the very essence of *Kāvya* (poetry or creative literature) would have no basis. For there can be no sorrow or grief in *rasa* which is, in Abhinavagupta's own words, '*sukha-pradhāna*' and *ānandarūpa*' - pleasurable. Nor is it possible for one who is tormented by grief to engage himself in poetic creation (at the very moment of his grief). In other words,

one who is plunged in sorrow cannot create. The act of poetic creation takes place later when the experience has been fully assimilated and is then contemplated.⁹ Bhaṭṭanāyaka who preceded Abhinavagupta held an identical view; he says in his *Hṛdayadarpana* : "The poet does not back *rasa* until he is completely filled with it."¹⁰ To put it in modern terminology, "it is when the poet is fully under the spell of such unique form of *rasa*-experience that he spontaneously expresses himself in the form of poetry."¹¹ Abhinavagupta's own teacher, Bhaṭṭa Tota, held a similar view; "The aesthetic experience is the same in the case of the hero of a poem (or a play), the poet himself, and the reader of the poem or spectator of a play when recited or enacted respectively."¹²

These passages inform us that the location of *rasa* differs, according to Abhinavagupta, depending upon our different points of view : (i) *Rasa* is not found in our everyday world; it is found only in drama-in the sense that it has the capacity to arouse *rasa* in a reader or spectator. (ii) *Rasa* is primarily located in the poet or playwright for it is only when he is fully filled with it that he spontaneously expresses it in his poem or play. (iii) It is however located, in its real sense in the sensitive reader or spectator.

Incidentally, it may be noted, that Dhananjaya and Dhanika, the authors of *Daśarūpaka* and the commentary *Avaloka* on it respectively assert :

"Aesthetic experience is possible in the actor",³

In his commentary on NS. VI.10 Abhinavagupta quotes Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's view : "Aesthetic experience is possible in the actor, through his *vāsanās* (for he has himself experienced such feelings in his previous existences); and through concentrated attention he can continue to follow the *laya* (tempo) and other dramatic conventions."¹⁴

Regarding Bhoja's view Dr. Raghavan observes : "To Bhoja, *rasa*, as ordinarily understood, means what is meant to Daṇḍin and Lollaṭa, the *prakāśa* of the *sthayibhāva*. It is in the character, in the poet, in the actor, and in the composition. To him *rasa* does not mean *primarily only* the aesthetic subjective *sahvāda* of the *sahṛdaya* and thus to him the *sahṛdaya* is not the only *primary seat* of *rasa*. Of his main concept of *rasa* as the one principle of *ahāṅkāra* underlying all feelings and activities, by which characters come into various moods, the poet is enabled to portray them, the actor is enabled to enact them, and the *rasika* is enabled to enjoy them, the seat is the soul of all cultured men."¹⁵

Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the authors of the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* declare their position in these words: "Generally, they say, an actor does not experience *rasa*, but there is no inviolable rule that he cannot do so. A prostitute displays sexual pleasure in order to arouse her customer's sexual excitement (only) out of greed for money. But it can happen that sometimes she too will experience profound sexual pleasure. Similarly a singer (generally) gives pleasure (only) to others, but at times he too derives pleasure (from his singing). In the same way, even an actor when he imitates the feelings of loss etc. that Rāma feels, may suddenly find he has totally identified himself with Rāma."¹⁶

Abhinavagupta takes a firm stand, as seen above, that there can be no *rasa* in an actor (i.e., the actor cannot be the location of *rasa*). The majority of thinkers follow Abhinavagupta regarding the location of *rasa*. Pāṇḍitarāj Jagannātha, for instance, clearly says, when he defends the ninth *rasa*, *śānta* :

"The logical reason, that there is absence of *śāma* (i.e. *sama* is not possible in an actor) does not stand to reason, because we do not accept that the revelation (i.e., aesthetic pleasure or relish or enjoyment of *rasa* ever takes place in an actor (i.e. the actor is never the location of *rasa*."¹⁷

FOOT-NOTES

१. रस इति कः पदार्थः । उच्यते—आस्वाद्यत्वात् । कथमास्वाद्यते रसः । यथा हि नाना-
व्यञ्जन-संस्कृतमन्त्रं सुक्तानां रसानास्वाद्यन्ति सुमनसः पुरुषा हर्षादींश्चाधिगच्छन्ति ।
तथा नानाभाषामित्यव्यञ्जितान् वाचङ्मसस्वोपेतान् स्थायिभाषानास्वाद्यन्ति सुमनसः ।
प्रेक्षका हर्षादींश्चाधिगच्छन्ति । तस्मान्नाट्यरसाः इत्यभिप्रायः ।

—NS Vol. Ch. VI, pp. 288-89.

२. तेन स्माद्येव विभावानुभावादिसिद्धयन्ति रसः । रथाथो भवत्यनुपचितः (? त्वनुपचितः) ।
स चोभयोरपि । [मुख्यतया वृत्त्या रामादौ अनुकायेऽनुकर्तार्यपि चानुसन्धानबलात्—इति ।

—A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 272.

३. श्रीशङ्करस्तथाह—'अनुकर्तरि रसानास्वाद्यतोऽनुकाये भावप्रतीतिः प्रयोगे । लोके प्रकृतिः
रसनिष्पादयति' इति । ... एतदप्यसत् । नहि सामाजिकोऽनुकार्यानुकर्तृविभागमवेति ।

—A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 292.

४. ... इति नानुकाये रसः । अनुकर्तरि च तदभावः लयाद्यननुसरणं स्यात् । सामाजिकगते
वा कश्चमस्कारः । प्रत्युत कृष्णादौ दुःख-प्राप्तिः ।

Locana on Dhv. II, p. 184.

५. निविडनिजमोह संकट [ता-निगसि] कारिणा विभावादि-साधारणीकरणात्मना...भावकत्व-
व्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रसो रजस्तमोऽनुवेद्यऽवेचिष्यबलाद् द्रुतिविस्तारविकासलक्षणेन सत्त्वा-
द्रेकप्रकाशानन्दमयनिर्गसिद्धि आन्तिर्लक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादसंविद्येन भोगेन परं मुञ्च्यत इति ।
-A. Bh. I, p. 277.

६. तस्मादिति । नाटयात् समुदायरूपाद् रसः । यदि वा नाटयमेव रसाः । रससमुदायो हि
नादयम् । नाटय एव च रसाः । काव्येऽपि नादयायमान एव रसः । काव्यार्थं विषये हि
प्रत्यक्षकलासम्बेदनेादेर रसादये इत्युपाध्यायाः । यदाहुः काव्यकौतुके “प्रयोगस्त्वमनापन्ने
काव्ये नास्वादसम्भव” । इति । तेन नाटय एव रसा न लोक इत्यर्थः । काव्यञ्च
नाटयमेव । अत एव च नटे न रसः ।...नटे तर्हि किम् । आस्वादोपायः । अत
एव च पात्रमित्युच्यते । नहि पात्रे गत्यास्वादः न अपि तु तदुपायकः । तेन प्रमुख माने
नटोपयोग इत्याऽम् ।

-A. Bh. Vol. I, pp. 290-291.

७. अस्मान्मते संवेदनमेवानन्दधनमास्वाद्यते । तत्र कादुःखाशङ्का । केवलतद्वैष्य चित्रताकरणे
गतिशोलादि वासना व्यापारः । तदुद्बोधने चाभिनयादि व्यापारः ।
-A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 292.

८. बीजं यथा वृक्षमूलत्वेन स्थितं तथा रसाः ।...कविगतसाधारणीभूतसंविन्मूलश्चा काव्यपुरः
खरो नटव्यापारः । लौक्य च संवित् । परमार्थतो रसः ।...तदेवं मूलं बीजस्थानीयः कविगतो
रसः । कविर्हि सामाजिकतुल्य एव । तत एवाकं “शृङ्गारि चेत् कविः” इत्याद्यानन्द-
वर्धनानुसारेण । ततो वृक्षस्थानीयं काव्यम् । तत्र पुष्पादि स्थानीयोऽभिनयादिनटव्यापारः ।
तत्र फलस्थानीयः सामाजिक रसास्वादः । तेन रसमयमेव विश्वम् ।
-A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 294.

९. न तु मुने. शोक इति मन्तव्यम् । एवं हि सति तद्-दुःखेन सोऽपि दुःखित इति कृत्वा
रसस्यात्मतेति निरवकाशं भवेत् । न च दुःख संतप्तस्येषादशेति । एवं चर्चगेचितशोक-
स्थाधिभावामक करण रस समुच्च(गच्छ) लनत्वमावत्वात् स एव काव्यस्यारमा सारम्
स्वभावोऽपरशाब्दवैलक्षण्यकारकः ।

-Locana on Dhv. I. 5, pp. 86-87.

१०. एतदेवाकं हृदयदर्पणे--
'यावत्पूर्णा न चैतेन तावन्नीव वसत्यमुम्' इति ।

-Locana on Dhv. I. 5, pp. 86-87.

11. Art Experience by M. Hiriyanna, p. 35.

१२. यदुक्तमस्मदुपाध्यायभट्टतोतेन--
नायकस्य कवेः श्रोतुः समानोऽनुभवस्ततः' इति ।

-Locana on Dhv. I. 6, p. 92.

१३. काव्यार्थभाषनास्वादेो नतकस्य न वार्यते ।

-DR IV. 42 (b).

१४.नैतदिति भट्ट-लोल्लरः । रसभावानामपि वासनावेशवशेन नटे सम्भवादनुसन्धिवलाच्च
लयाद्युत्तरणात् ।

-A. Bh. Vol. I. Ch. VI. 10, p. 264.

15. *Bhoja's Śṅgāraprakāśa*, 1963, edn., pp. 433-34.


16. *Aesthetic Rapture, Vol. II : Notes*, f. n. 351.

१७. तथाहि-नटे सम्भवाद् इति हेतुरसाङ्गतः नटे रसाभिव्यक्तेरस्वीकारात् ।

-*Rasaṅgādharu* I, p. 36.



PANDIT MALVANIA RECEIVING THE RASHTRAPATI AWARD
FOR 1992



PANDIT DALSUKH MALVANIA

AWARD OF PADMABHUSHAN TO PANDIT DALSUKH MALVANIA

A function was organized by the L. D. Institute of Indology on 16th Feb. 1992 to felicitate, Pandit Dalsukh Malvania, the Institute's academic founder and ex-Director for being honoured this year with the award of Padmabhushan by the Government of India. The function was chaired by Sheth Shrenikbhai, the Secretary of the Managing Board of the Institute, several scholars and admirers of Panditji including Shri Shrenikbhai and Atmarambhai Sutaria paid warm and reverential tributes to him. In his response Panditji voiced his concern regarding the acceleratingly waning interest in the area of Prakrit Studies and Jainology.

A brief note on Malvaniajis as a scholar, academician and person follows,

[1]

पद्मभूषण से अलंकृत जैनदर्शन के प्रकाण्ड पंडित दलसुखभाई मालवणिया

संस्कृत, पालि, प्राकृत, अपभ्रंश आदि प्राच्य भाषाओं के निष्णात पंडित मालवणियाजी जैन एवं बौद्ध आगमों के साथ वैदिक वाङ्मय के गहन अध्येता हैं। सत्यशोधक ज्ञानोपासक के रूप में पंडितजी देश-विदेश में विख्यात हैं। श्री मालवणियाजी वस्तुतः सिद्धहस्त सरस्वती पुत्र हैं। हंस की नीरसीर-दृष्टि सम्पन्न श्री मालवणियाजी सर्वदर्शन समभाव के सहज विश्वासी हैं एवं वर्तमान की विषमतामूलक एवं भेदजनक दृष्टि से अति खिन्न हैं।

सौम्य व्यक्तित्व के धनी श्री दलसुखभाई का जीवन अत्यन्त सरल, निर्मल और सहज है। अगाध विद्वता सम्पन्न पंडितजी अत्यन्त सज्जन हैं। लगता है प्रखर पाण्डित्य एवं सहज सौजन्य प्रतिस्पर्धी बनकर इनके व्यक्तित्व में इस तरह समायें हुए हैं जैसे चन्दन में शीतलता एवं सुवास।

अनेक ग्रन्थों एवं शताधिक शोध निबन्धों के रचयिता, सम्पादक एवं प्रणेता पंडितजी अत्यन्त स्पष्ट वक्ता हैं। वेहिचक सञ्चार को प्रकट करने में पंडितजी अपना सानी नहीं रखते। लगता है जैन एवं भारतीय दर्शन के मध्य पितामह पंडित तुलसीदासजी इनके व्यक्तित्व में अपनी पूरी गरिमा एवं प्रभा से अभिव्यक्त हैं।

अनेक जैन अजैन संस्थाओं से सम्बद्ध पंडितजी भारत के आधे दर्जन से अधिक विश्व-विद्यालयों में पीएच.डी. के परीक्षक हैं। अनेक विख्यात संस्थाओं के मानद पदाधिकारी, परामर्शदाता एवं सदस्य हैं। सन् १९७४ में भगवान् महावीर के २५०० वें निर्वाण महोत्सव के अवसर पर 'दर्शन साहित्य' के सर्वोच्च हेतु पंडितजी को 'सिद्धान्त भूषण' की मानद उपाधि से विभूषित कर स्वर्ण पदक तथा २५००० रुपये का पुरस्कार वीर निर्वाण भारती, दिल्ली ने प्रदान किया। सन् १९७६ में भारत जैन महामण्डल ने हैदराबाद अधिवेशन में

देश-विदेश के अनेक विश्वविद्यालयों में पंडितजी ने जैन, बौद्ध एवं भारतीय दर्शन पर अनेक बार व्याख्यान दिये हैं। सन् १९७७ में पेरिस में सम्पन्न अन्तराष्ट्रीय संस्कृत परिषद के तृतीय अधिवेशन में विशेष आमंत्रण पर सम्मिलित होकर पंडितजी ने 'भरत बाहुबली की कथा के विकास' पर अत्यन्त सारगर्भित एवं विद्वत्पूर्ण निबन्ध का पाठ किया जिसकी भूमि-भूमि प्रशंसा की गई। फलतः पेरिस यूनिवर्सिटी में विशेष अनुरोध पर पन्द्रह दिन तक रहे।

सन् १९६८-६९ में कनाडा के टोरण्टो विश्वविद्यालय में डेढ़ वर्ष तक भारतीय एवं बौद्ध दर्शन तथा उपनिषद्-प्रपञ्चकथा का विशेष अध्यापन कार्य किया।

संस्कृत के प्रखर विद्वान होने कारण सन् १९८४ में महामान्य राष्ट्रपति ने पंडितजी को राष्ट्रपति भवन में अलंकरण प्रदान कर सम्मानित किया। सन् १९९० में जैन विश्वभारती द्वारा आपको 'जैन विद्या मनीषी' की उपाधि से अलंकृत किया गया।

जैन वाङ्मय की विशिष्ट सेवा के उल्लेख में अनेक संस्थाओं ने पंडितजी को स्वर्ण पदक एवं मानद उपाधियाँ प्रदान कर सम्मानित किया है।

दिनांक ८-९ दिसम्बर १९९० को बैंगलोर में सम्पन्न प्रथम राष्ट्रीय प्राकृत सम्मेलन के अवसर पर इन प्राकृत विद्वानों को प्राकृत ज्ञान भारती अलंकरण से सम्मानित किया गया जिसमें पंडितजी प्रमुख हैं।

एक अत्यन्त साधारण परिवार में उत्पन्न दलसुखभाई अपने चार भाई एवं एक बहिन में सबसे बड़े हैं। २२ जुलाई, १९१० को सौराष्ट्र के शालावाड़ जिले के सायला ग्राम में इनका जन्म हुआ। उनके पूर्वज मालवण ग्राम में रहने के कारण ये मालवणिया कहलाये। भावसार गौरीय श्री दलसुखभाई के पिता का नाम ढाहयाभाई एवं माता का नाम पार्वतीबहिन था।

दलसुखभाई ने सुरेन्द्रनगर में प्रारम्भिक शिक्षा प्राप्त करने के पश्चात् कीकानेर, न्यावर, जयपुर, अमदाबाद, शान्तिनिकेतन आदि स्थानों पर पंडित बेचरदासजी दोशी, महामहोपाध्याय श्री विधुशेखर शास्त्री भट्टाचार्य, सुनिश्री जिनविजयजी जैसे प्रख्यात विद्वानों एवं मनीषियों के सान्निध्य में रहकर जैन आगमों, शास्त्रों तथा संस्कृत, प्राकृत, पालि, अपभ्रंश आदि भाषाओं के साथ बौद्ध एवं भारतीय दर्शन का गहन अध्ययन किया एवं विशेष ज्ञान प्राप्त किया। सन् १९३१ में जैन विशारद एवं न्यायतीर्थ की परीक्षाएँ उत्तीर्ण कीं।

प्रबल पुरुषार्थी, अथक अध्यवसायी एवं प्रखर प्रतिभा सम्पन्न जैन मनीषी पंडित दलसुखभाई मालवणिया को भारत सरकार ने पद्मभूषण खिताब से अलंकृत किया है, इससे हम सब गौरव की अनुभूति कर रहे हैं।

[2]

[Ahimsa पत्रिका से उद्धृत]

AN UNRIVALLED SCHOLAR

Pandit Dalsukh Malvania has been one of the few present-day interationally acknowledged authorities on the history and development of

centuries. Although giving guidance over years to many Ph.D. students and scholars, Indian as well as foreign, he himself does not have any university degree. He was however fortunate to have been a devoted disciple of three eminent Jain scholars of the earlier generation - Pandit Bechardas Doshi, Pandit Sukhlal Singhvi and Muni Jinavijaya. He acquired from them a first-hand knowledge of Jain and Buddhist philosophical traditions and more importantly, the modern spirit of studying Indian philosophy in a critical, comparative and historical perspective.

Malvania's very first systematic work published in 1949 when he was just thirtynine evidences his sound grasp and critical insight into those basic philosophical issues with regard to which top intellectuals of India carried on greatly subtle and sophisticated debates during the whole course of the first millennium of the Christian era.

Siddhasena Divākara, a fifth century Jain logician, wrote a short but compact tract putting forth the Jain philosophical viewpoint vis-a-vis various Buddhist and Vedic positions. His ideas and arguments were extensively worked out by Śhānti Ācārya in the 12th century. In his penetrating study of these two works, Malvania has surveyed the entire panorama of Jain philosophy in its successive stages of development within a comparative Indian perspective,

With a record of some 25 research works and more than 200 research papers, scholarly and popular lectures, articles, introductions etc. Malvania's long academic career has been fairly productive.

One of his scholarly undertakings however merits special mention. That was the critical editing of the basic texts of the Jain sacred canon, the groundwork for which was prepared by the late Muni Punyavijaya. In this case also Malvania's assimilation of modern scholarship and learning is quite in evidence. Regretably, however, his adoption of scientific principles of text editing came into conflict with the orthodox Jain beliefs and he had to dissociate himself from that project in midstream,

Because of Malvania's work and position as an eminent scholar of Indian philosophy, somebody would be tempted to concoct an image of him as a dry-as-dust, staid-offish, high-brow person. Far from this, he is quite simple, unassuming, warm and sociable. Not only that, the prominent rationalistic strand in his nature and attitude, a heritage of his guru Pandit Sukhlal, has been the source of his reformist zeal, evident in the view about certain modern Jain beliefs and practices which he has expressed frankly and freely in his popular lectures and writings and which have frequently proved an irritant and inconvenience to the orthodoxy.

The Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Institute of Indology at Ahmedabad, with its prestigious L.D. Series (comparable in quality and quantity to the famous Gaekwad's Series, the Harvard Oriental Series and the Singhi Jain Series of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan) can be said to be entirely Malvania's creation. So also the Prakrit Text-Society Series with its numerous publications of important Jain texts. He has also played a key role in the development of the Parshvanath Research Institute of the Banaras Hindu University, which has, among other things, brought out a comprehensive history of Jain literature.

The vigorous tradition of sound Indological scholarship in the area of Jainology and Prakrit studies, which Pandit Malvania has represented so brilliantly is also rapidly coming to a sad end. But Malvania with the wisdom earned during six decades of unflinching devotion to learning would hopefully observe that in view of several sincere and serious students and scholars of Jainology from Japan, France, Germany, United States etc., who sought his guidance and were benefited by his scholarship, the light of learning would keep shining, if not here, at least abroad.

—H. C. Bhayani

BOOK REVIEW

Sureśvara's Vārtika on Madhu Brāhmaṇa. Edited with Introduction Notes and Translated into English by K. P. Jog and Shoun Hino. Pub: Motilal Banarasidas. Delhi, 1988. PP. XXXIII + 59.

The work under review is an English translation of Sureśvara's Vārtika on Madhu Brāhmaṇa which is a part of his Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya Vārtika (BUBV). This BUBV occupies unique place among the Advait Vedantic texts. It is written in defence of Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māya, oneness of Brahman and identification of individual self with Supreme Self. Madhu Brāhmaṇa portion deals with Brahma Vidya and means of realization. Sureśvara's Sambandhavārtika (i.e. Introduction to Śaṅkara's Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya) has been edited and translated into English by learned scholar Prof. T.M.P. Mahadevan and is published by Madras University in 1972. Again, a portion of Vārtika viz., Yajñavalkya-Maitreyi dialogue is translated into English together with its study by Shoun Hino, and is published by Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1982. Madhu Brāhmaṇa portion and notes of BUBV is translated into English with introduction for the first time here by the learned scholars K.P. Jog and Shoun Hino.

Introduction to this translation is a brief study on the text and the translators have rendered great service to understand the text discussing various topics in it such as the subject matter of the Madhu Brāhmaṇa (MB), its relation to the Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa, on the dṛṣṭānta of Rathanābhi Rathanemi and Aras, TV aṣṭa Madhu, verses quoted in MB and Madhuvidyā as Ātma-Vidyā (= Brahnavidyā).

The main teaching of the MB., lies in attaining immortality (amṛtatattvaikasādhanaṁ. MB. 2). The word Madhu, though has many meanings, essentially stands here for immortality and oneness of Ātman. As per textual study, this word also signifies the relation of the various beings and elements as mutually dependent for their worldly existence (parasparopakāryopakārakatva).

This is a kind of relation between enjoyer and the enjoyed (bhoktṛ-bhogyatā) and that of a maker and what is made (Kartṛkāryatā). The knowledge of this relation of mutual dependence among the various beings and elements is called Madhuvidyā-the lore of Madhu (Intro. P. XV). If the word Madhu is taken in this sense, then it naturally implies the absence of the oneness of the Ātman (aikātmya) which is purpose of all Upaniṣadic teaching. To avoid this difficulty Sureśvara has emphasized citśāmānya, cidutpatti and cidekapralaya (MB-4) of the mundane existence by pointing to the śruti verses which declares the oneness of the Ātman

on the strength of the derivation of the word 'puruṣa' which signifies the Ātman (MB. 119). According to Sureśvara the word 'puruṣa' is derived from 'Puru' means many and the root si-to lie (in). Collectively it means that which exists in many. In other words the word puruṣa etymologically implies the Ātman which exists in all discrete beings and elements (M. 120). Again, Sureśvara asserts that the Puruṣa is all pervading Brahman itself (Brahmākām puruṣastataḥ-MB-122) Sureśvara refutes Bhartṛprapañca's interpretation of the word Nididhyāsana and Rathanaḥbhi and Rathane dṛṣṭāntas (instances) (M. B.-14-17).

Śaṅkara as well as Sureśvara identify Madhuvidyā with Āthmajñāna. This word is clearly used as a synonym for the word Brahman by Śaṅkara. Analysis of Madhuvidyā as Brahmanavidyā, and philosophical aspect of doctrine of Madhu, by the translators is quite enlightening.

It is well known fact that translation of Sanskrit philosophical text into English is indeed a very difficult task. There also Advaitic texts are very difficult to understand and translate. It needs extraordinary scholarship and skill in translating such texts. We can definitely say that translators of this text have achieved remarkable success in their attempt. They have tried to maintain original spirit at all cost. Both these scholars have done commendable service to the field of oriental learning by translating this difficult text into English. We hope to see translations of some more Vedāntic texts from the pen of these scholars.

Standard of translation is maintained throughout but it is felt that more care could have been taken to use more appropriate philosophical terminology in translating certain words. To cite one or two instances, the word 'aikātmya' is usually translated as oneness of the Ātman in philosophical writings not as 'uniqueness' a version adopted by the translators.

Again, knower, knowledge and known are better words for jñātṛ, jñeya and jneya (M.B.-1). The word 'embodied' is somehow not appealing to the mind for the word 'adhyātma' (MB. 28). Few printing mistakes in Sanskrit texts such as 'निष्कृते', (M.B. 1), 'निष्कृतात्', (MB. 6), 'सिद्धय', (MB. 1), 'वाक्येषु धोक्तैर्नैव', (M.B. 42), 'सर्वैः', (MB. 73) 'यत्नाच्चबुद्ध्याय', (Appendix verse. 4), 'यस्माद्वयस्तत्त्वोऽयं', (Appendix, verse. 5), could have been avoided.

Equipped with appendix, select glossary, bibliography and index verses, the book is nicely brought out. Both translators and publisher deserve compliments for bringing out such a fine translation of the text into English which will certainly be welcomed by the students and scholars of Indian philosophy in general and Advaita Vedānta in particular.

Y. S. Sha:

छान्दोग्योपनिषद्दीपिका—Ed. Dr. Gautam Patel. Published by—Sadguru Gangeswar International Ved a Mission, Bombay, 1988.

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The present work is quite a welcome critical edition of the छान्दोग्योपनिषद्दीपिका of Shri Sayanaācārya. The दीपिका is modelled on and almost scrupulously follows the Bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya on the said Upaniṣad as also the other works of Śrī Śaṅkara. The editor accepts that the present author is the same as the writer of सायणभाष्य on the Rgveda. As he states 'Shri Sayana is the Upholder of the Advaitavedānta [actually he should have stated Advaitavada or Kevalādvaitavāda] and Māyavada.' (p. VII Intro). It is therefore no surprise that he should often follow Śaṅkara almost verbatim in his Dīpikā. It is yet interesting to note that "In the chhandogya Upaniṣad Brahma is described both as Saguna and Nirguna. In the Opinion of Sayana the writer of the Bhāṣya, the first five Adhyāyas of the Upaniṣad depict Brahma as Saguna while the last three depict the propitiation of Nirguna Brahma" and Sayana analyses Brahma on the same lines in his Dīpikā. The editor raises the question as to why Sayana should have written this Dīpikā if he intended only to follow Śaṅkara. Dr. Patel feels that the reply is simple and it lies in the fact that he has written so many other works and Bhāṣyas and so the present one (XII). The explanation could also be that he has written the present work to reveal his scholarship. What even if he were to follow Śaṅkara? His Dīpikā actually places Śaṅkara's doctrines in proper perspective. The editing of the work is therefore welcome, a valuable addition on all the work on Śaṅkara. The editor is right when he states that "Śaṅkarabhāṣya is भाष्यं प्रसन्नगंभीरम्. But is debatable when he adds that "There is a happy combination of simplicity and sweetness in the Dīpikā of Sayana." (IX). The editor also states that "the present Bhāṣya of Sayana has some traits of its own, some new contribution. But it is not possible to narrate all this." (XIII). why? The question remains unanswered.

The editor has a fairly good command over manuscriptology and the method of editing. He deserves our congratulations for this. The three परिशिष्ट are also welcome.

However, it should be added that the Introduction in Hindi is full of mistakes from the point of view of language. If his command over the Hindi language was not up to the mark, he should have got his Introduction thoroughly rechecked and revised by an expert in Hindi.

We welcome the work as an addition to our works on the Upaniṣads in particular and Indian philosophy in general.

APPENDIX

ALANKĀRA-DAPPAṆA

—Dr. H. C. Bhayani

suṁdara-paa-viṇṇāsaraṁ vimalālamkāra-rehia-sariraṁ /
sui-deviaṁ ca kavvaṁ ca paṇavia¹ pavara-vaṇṇaḍḍhaṁ // 1

Homage firstly to the Goddess of Learning who takes steps beautifully, whose body is adorned with bright ornaments and who is *refulgent* with abundant lustre and (secondly) to Poetry that has *beautifully structured* diction, that has a form illuminated with pure figures of speech and that is rich in excellent sound patterns.

savvāṁ kavvāṁ savvāṁ jeṇa horṇti bhavvāṁ
tamālamkāraṁ bhaṇimo 'lamkāraṁ ku-kavi-kavvāṇaṁ // 2

We propose to describe (the chief figures of speech), due to which all the poems become worthy of hearing and gain loftiness and which cry halt to the compositions of worthless poets.

accanta-suṁdaraṁ pi hu nīralamkāraṁ jaṇammi kīraṁtaṁ /
kāmiṇi-muhaṁ va kavvaṁ hoi paṣaṇṇaṁ pi vicchāraṁ // 3

A poem and a damsel's face inspite of being very beautiful and lucid, if they are bereft of ornaments, would appear lustreless to the people.

tā jaṇiṇṇa ṇiṇṇaṁ lakkhiṇṇai¹ bahu-viḥe alankāre /
jeṇi alankariṇiṁ bahu maṇṇijjanti kavvāṁ // 4

Hence becoming thoroughly conversant with numerous types of the figures of speech, we define and describe them here so that the poems beautified with them get excellent recitation.

uvamā-rūvaa-divaa- roḥaṇuppāsa-aisaa-visesā¹ /
akkheva-jai¹-vaira¹-rasa¹-paṇṇā¹-bhaṇṇā¹ u // 5

Upamā, Rūpaka, Dipaka, Rodha, Anuprāsa, Atiśaya, Viśeṣa, Ākṣepa,
Pañcī, Vyatireka, Rasika, Paryāya-bhaṇita,

jaḥṣaṁkha-samāhia- viroha-saṁsaa-vibhāvaṇā-bhāvā /
atthamtarāṇṇo aṇṇa-ṇariro taba saḥottā // 6

Begins : Om namah Sarasvatyai

1. 1. paṇaviṇṇa. 4. 1. lakkhiṇṇa. 5. 1. visesaṁ.

Yathāsamkhyā, Samāhita, Virodha, Samśaya, Vibhāvanā, Bhāva,
Arthāntaranyāsa, Anyaparikara, Sahokti,

ujjā avanhava io

pemmāisao udatta-pariattā /
davvuttara-kiriuttara- guṇuttarā bahu silesā a // 7

Ūrjā, Apahna, Premātiśaya, Udatta, Parivṛtta, Dravyottara, Kriyottara,
Guṇottara, various types of Śleṣa,

vavaesa-thut-samajoiā ia apatthuappasamsā¹ a /
anumāṇam āriso uppekkhā² taha a samñiṭṭhā // 8

Vyapadeśa-stuti, Samayojitā, Aprastutaprasaṁsā, Anumāna, Ādarśa,
Utprekṣā, Samśrṣṭi,

āsīsā-uvamārūvaā cā jāṇaha¹ niarisanaṁ taha a /
uppekkhāvaavo bhea-valia-jamaehi samjuttā // 9

Āśīp, Upamārūpaka, Nidarśana, Utprekṣāvayava, Udbheda, Valita
along with Yanaka.

ettia-mittā ee kavvesu paḍiṭṭhiā alaṁkāra /
ahiā uvakkameṣaṁ viśāo doṇṇi samkhāu // 10

These only are the established and accepted poetic figures. These,
numbering forty, we shall describe in order.

uvamāṇeṇaṁ jā desa-kāla-kiriāvaroha-paḍiṇeṇaṁ /
uvamcassa sarisaṁ lahai guṇeṇaṁ khu sā uvamā // 11 //

That is indeed Upamā which achieves the similarity of the object of
comparison, through a quality thereof, with the standard of comparison
that is distinct on account of difference in place, time or action.

paḍivatthu guṇa-kaliā asamā māla a viguṇa-rūva a /
saṁpūṇā gūḍhā samkhala a lesā a dara-vialā // 12

Prativastu, Gunakalita, Asamā, Mālā, Viguṇarūpā, Sampūṇā, Gūḍhā,
Śrīkhala, Śleṣā, Iṣatvikalā,

ekka-kkamā pasaṁsā tallicchā ṇimḍiā aisā a /
sui-miliā taha a viappiā a sattaraha uvamāo // 13

Anyonā, Prasāṁsā, Tallipsā, Ninditā, Atiśayā, Śrutimilitā, Vikalpita.

paḍivattthūc sā uvamā jā hoi samāṇa-vatthurūa /
'iva'-miva'-pivā'-rahia visarisa-guṇa-paṇaḥiṇto // 14.

That Upamā is Prativastu which lacks particles (of comparison) like *iva*, *miva*, *piva* and which conveys similarity between two things, inspite of dissimilar qualities.

paḍivattthūvamā jahā :

sampatta-tivagga-suhā thovā puhavia horṇti ṇāra-ṇahā /
mahura-phala (?) [-kusumā] siṇiddha-pattā-tarū virālā // 15

The illustration of Prativastūpamā :

There are few kings on this earth who have achieved (all the) three types of happiness : Rare are such trees that have sweet fruits, fragrant flowers and tenderly smooth leaves.

guṇa-kaliā sā bhuaṇai guṇehi dohiṇ pi sarisā jathā /
uvameo kira jīe uvamāṇam hoi sā samā // 16

That Upamā is called Guṇa-kaliā in which resemblance pertains to two qualities.

That Upamā is Asamā in which the Object of Comparison becomes the Standard of Comparison.

guṇa-kaliā jahā :

campā-lai¹ vva ṇava-kusuma-sundarā sahai vimjha-kaḍa² va
vaccha-tthalammi lacchi tamāla-nīle mahamahassa // 17

The Illustration of Guṇa-kaliṭo pāmā :

On the broad chaste of Viṣṇu that is, like the slope of Vindhya, as dark as (or due to) Tamāla tree(s), Lakṣmī like the Campaka creeper, as beautiful as (alternately beautiful due to) fresh flowers, appears charming.

asamā jahā :

joṇhā-nimmala-lāṇṇa-pasara-cimcaia-¹ saala-bhuaṇai /
tuha tujjha vva kisoari samāṇa-rūa-jae ṇatthi // 18

The illustration of Asam opamā :

O damsel of slender belly, your graceful beauty, like the clear moonlight, adorns the whole world. So nobody is there like you in this world who can compare with you in beauty.

sā māla uvamāṇāṇa jattha vivihāṇa hoi rimcholi /
biuṇa-sarisovamā jā viṇimmiā biuṇa-rūa tti // 19

That Upamā is Māla in which there is a series of different Standards of Comparison.

That which is constructed with twofold similar Comparisons is called Dviguṇa-rūpā.

mālovamā jahā :

hari-vacchari va sukamalaṇ gaanaṇ va bhamanta-sūra-sacchāam //
sāara-jalaṇ va kari-maara-sohiaṇ tuha ghara-ddāraṇ // 20

The illustration of Mālovamā :

The gate of your house is *sukamala* (marked with beautiful lotuses) like the chaste of Viṣṇu (which is marked by the presence of beautiful Lakṣmī); it is splendidous due to *bhamanta sūra* (brave men moving about), like the sky which is splendidous due to *bhamanta sūra* (the revolving sun); it is like the water of the ocean marked by (the figures or alternatively the presence of) elephants and crocodiles.

viuṇa-rūvovamā jahā :

nivāvārikaa-bhuṇa-mariṇalo sūra-ṇasia-pahāo /
ṇāha paosa-vva tumāṇ pāusa-sarisattāṇam vahasi // 21

The illustration of Dviguṇarūpamā :

As the night-time, putting a stop to the activities of the world and eliminating the sunlight resembles the rainy reason, you also, my lord, resemble the same by putting a stop to the (hostile) activities of all the feudatories and by destroying the prowess of the enemy heroes.

ṇa hu ṇāṇa ṇahu abhiā jā jāai sā hu hoi sampuṇṇā /
jā ṇa samāsa-ṇāṇa gūḍhā bhāṇṇae uvamā // 22

That Upamā which is neither deficient nor excessive (in the matter of requisite characteristics) is called Sampurṇopamā. That Upamā which is submerged in a compound is called Gūḍhopamā.

sampuṇṇā jahā :

sohasi vaṇṇaṇa tumāṇ keai-kaṇṇullā-saṇāheṇa /
kamaleṇa va pāsa-ṇhiṇa muddhaḍa-harīsena pasaacchi // 23

The illustration of Sampurṇopamā :

With your face having the Ketakī flower as the ear ornament, and thus resembling a lotus with a goose standing near-by, Oh damsel with beautifully long eyes, you appear charming.

gūḍhovamā jahā :

kaha pābihisi kisoari

daiam thaṇaala-sakhea-ṇīsasiri¹ /

rambhā-gabbhoaru-ṇiamba-bhāra masiṇeṇa gamāṇeṇa // 24

The illustration of the Gūḍhopamā :

O slim-waisted damsel, being short of breath due the strain of (your heavy) breasts and moving softly because of the great weight of your lower body with thighs like the pith of the plantain tree, how will you reach (?) your lover ?

uvamā-vaehi uttiviḍi-raiehi samkhala hoi /

uvamijjai uvameo jesim lesāṇa sā lesā // 25

That Upamā which is made up of a concatenation of Upamās is called Śṛṅkhalopamā.

That in which the Object Comparisan is Compared by means of Śleṣas is Śleṣopamā.

samkhalovamā jahā :

saggassa va kaṇaa-giri kamecaṇa-giriṇo [va] mahialam¹ hou /

mahivighassa-vi bhara-dharāṇa puccalo taha tumam cea // 26

The illustration of Śṛṅkhalopama :

As the Golden Mount (i. e. Meru) is capable to bear the great burden of the Heaven, and as the earth-surface is capable of bearing the great burden of Mount Meru, so it is only you who are capable of bearing the great burden of the vast earth.

lesovamā jahā :

so samjhā-rāa-samo¹ cala-pemmo jo jaṇo suhao /

so kim bhāsai samjhā- rāeṇa va jo ṇa rincholi // 27

The illustration of the śleṣopamā : That person who is attractive, but fickle in love is like the twilight colour...(?)

susarisamāpakhevam (?) vialai sa cceva hoi daravialā /

ekkakkamovamāṇeḥi hoi ekkakkamā ṇāna // 28 //

That Upamā which...is called Īśadvikalā. That Upamā in which there are mutual Upamānas is called Anyonyopamā.

24. 1. pādihisi; ṇīsasirim.

26. 1. giriṇā mahialā.

27. 1. roasamo.

daravialā jahā :

ptṇa-tthaṇṭi sa-rūā paha-ṇesia-loṇā sa-ukkaṇṭhā /
lihiya vva dāra-laggā ṇa calai tuha daṇisaṇāsāc // 29

The illustration of Iṣadvikalopamā :

That damsel with plump breasts and a beautiful figure, directing her glance with intense yearning on the path of your arrival, remains attached to the doorway without moving—as if she were a picture, hoping to catch your glimpse.

ekkakkamā jahā :

paai-vimalāu doṇṇi-vi vibuha-jaṇe nivvut-karāo a /
ekkekka-sarisāo tuha kitti tiasa-sariā a // 30

The illustration of Anyonyopamā :

Your fame and the heavenly river, both of them being pure by nature and imparting bliss to Vibudhas ((1) the learned, (2) the gods) resemble each other.

nimḍāe salahijjai uvameo jattha sā pasamā tti /
aṇuharai aisacṇam jā sa ecia hoi tallicchā // 31

That Upamā wherein the Upameya is praised under the guise of censure is called Prasamsopamā. That is Tallipsopamā which resembles Atiṣoyakti (?).

nimḍā-pasamā jahā :

tuha saṇḍhassa va naravai bhujjai bhiccehi pāḍā lacchi /
hiaṇi (hiaṇ pi?) kāarassa va vaṇṇijja-bhaṇa osarai // 32

Praising through censuring (i. e. Prasamsopamā) is as follows :

O King, your Laksmī (i. e. favours) is openly enjoyed by your dependents, as if you are eunuch, Your heart (?) too wilts from fear of scandalous rumours, as if it were that of a coward.

tallicchovamā jahā :

pāusa-nisāsu sohai jala-ppavahehi pāriā puhai /
cala-vijju-valaya-vāḍaṇa-ṇivadia-ṇakkhatta-sarisehim // 33

The illustration of Tallipsopamā :

In rainy nights, the earth filled with water—streams resembling masses of stars fallen down due to strokes from circular flashes of lightning, appears beautiful.

uvameo nimidijjai thui-vavaesena jatttha sa nimida /
aisaa-bhanna sa cea aisaia bhanna uvama // 34

That is Nindopama wherein the Upameya is censured through praise.
That Upama which is expressed through Atisayokti is called Atisayopama.

thui-nimidovama jahā :

tambola-raa-miliarnjanena aharena sohasi paose /
dara-parinaa-jambuhala-kamti-sariseṇa pihu-acchi // 35

The illustration of the Stuti-nindopama :

O girl with (beautifully) long eyes, you appear charming at the advent
of the night with your lowerlip that is coloured by the betel-juice mixed
with the kohl and hence it has the lustre like that of a slightly ripe
roseapple (jamba) fruit.

aisa(i)ya-uvama jahā :

jonha-bhaa-saranagaa-timira-samaheli nijjia-miamkam /
sevijjai vaanam sasa-gamtha-luddehi bhasalehi // 36

The illustration of the Atisayitopama :

(Your) face, which has conquered the moon, is served (i. e. attended
to) by bees, (which resemble) masses of darkness coming to seek refuge
due to fright of the moonlight, and which is covetous of the fragrance of
(your) breath.

ja sarisalehi bajjhai saddehi sa hu hoi suimila /
ekkannikka-viappana-bheṇa viappa du-viha // 37

Śruti-mitita is that (Upama) which is constructed by means of similar
words; Vikalpita (Upama) has two types according to fancying once or
more than once.

sui-miliovama jahā :

damhina para-kalattam chamdavadiam manobaram kavvam /
khijjai khalo viambhai dusai dosam a-pecchamto // 38

The illustration of the Śruti-militopama :

Seeing another's wife willful and beautiful (as also) a poem, composed
in metres and beautiful, a wicked person feels dejected, yawns and censures
her (or it) eventhough he fails (actually) to find any fault.

34. 1. gamdijjai.

25 1. 25

2. parina.

ekkattha-viappiovamā jahā :

paribhamāṇa-vai-ṇiagḍḍhia-saṇṇipīḍia-bahala-reṇu-niacchaṇ /
ṇahasu (?) aṇaḍa-taṇṇa iva, vāṇvatta muṇijjanṭe // 39

The illustration of Vikalpitopamā which has fancying related to a single idea :

The whirlwinds, controlling mass of dust drawn and collected near hedges though wanderings round and round, appear like tortuously moving paramours.

bahuhā-viappiovamā jahā :

sūrammi dāva jalāṇe vva volie ṇahaalam vaarasam(?)vayo /
pacchā maṇi-ṇareṇa va tameṇa kaṇṭikayam saalam // 40

The illustration of Bahudhā-vikalpitopamā :

Then as the sun like a fire departed, the surface of the sky which was as if ..(?) and afterwards all of it was darkened as if with a mass of soot.

(to be continued)

39. 1. saṇṇipīḍia.

40. 1. volio; ṇahaaram. 2. pacchi; saasam.

